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executive summary 
chapter 1: introduction
this report begins by defining islamophobia 
and explaining why it should be understood 
as a form of racism. unlike most other forms 
of racism in europe today, islamophobia has 
been institutionalised by government policies to 
varying extents in different countries. it has been 
rejuvenated by the ‘war on terror’, rendering 
Muslims an officially ‘suspect community’. 
therefore, rather than examining the counter-jihad 
movement in isolation as most prior research has 
done, this report looks at its activities in relation 
to official counter-extremism policies. it does this 
because we are concerned with islamophobia in 
general as opposed to the far-right per se.
the introduction briefly outlines the contents of 
each chapter that follows. critically, it explains 
why each of the three country case studies 
examines counter-extremism policies first 
and then the counter-jihad movement in each 
national context. this structure serves to highlight 
the ways in which counter-jihad and counter 
extremism actors legitimise each other. 
chapter 2: understanding the 
counter-jihad movement
Chapter 2 provides an overview of the counter-
jihad movement, beginning with an explanation 
of how – as its name suggests – it takes its cue 
from the ‘war on terror’. it emerged and began 
to coalesce after 9/11 especially in the usA 
and in north western europe, where this report 
focuses. reflecting a broader shift on the far-
right away from ‘old’ anti-semitism and towards 
islamophobia, the counter-jihad movement can 
be seen as a ‘new’ form of racism – one that 
speaks in the language of ‘Western values’ and 
uses counter-extremism rhetoric as a cover for 
targeting Muslims.
central to demonising islam has been the 
invention of the concept of ‘islamofascism’, 
through which far-right counter-jihad actors have 
perversely likened themselves to those who 
resisted the nazis. We consider how this inversion 
may have been facilitated by the onset of 
ahistorical ‘counter-extremism’ frameworks which 
tend to equate far-left and far-right.
counter-jihadists and the far-right more generally 
are willing and able to work through the state, 
rather than against it, which helps to explain why 
they are viewed as a public order problem rather 
than a strategic threat. Yet the elite support of the 
counter-jihad movement and the extent to which 
islamophobic parties are winning political power 
is nonetheless extremely dangerous for minorities 
and for democracy – though key actors may use 
legitimate means such as the ballot box. 
both at the grassroots and elite level, the counter-
jihad movement is organising across borders. 
one of its main rallying cries has been ‘free 
speech’, garnering it sympathy from the wider 
anti-‘political correctness’ lobby. our analysis 
shows that us funding is extremely important to 
the european counter-jihad movement.
chapter 3: united Kingdom
the first country case study begins by examining 
the uK government’s counter-extremism policy, 
Prevent. even though the government’s definition 
of extremism does not single out one group, it 
has created a climate of suspicion and mistrust 
in which Muslims have been disproportionately 
targeted. official efforts to mobilise public 
sector workers to spot supposed signs of 
‘radicalisation’ has advanced a climate in which 
the islamophobic paranoia of the counter-jihad 
movement has flourished. We examine parallels 
between the counter-jihad movement in the uK 
and state counter-extremism practices, noting 
that much of the language used – and several of 
the targets – closely overlap. 
looking carefully at interactions between 
counter-extremism and the counter-jihad 
movement, we note that while key figures like 
stephen Yaxley-lennon (aka tommy robinson) 
have sought to ‘go mainstream’, others – such 
as lord Pearson, gerard batten and baroness 
cox – already hold positions within the political 
elite. this has helped counter-jihadists in 
the uK – especially those who frame their 
targeting of Muslims as ‘counter-extremism’, 
since it appears to provide a ‘legitimate’ cover 
for their racism. Key actors including sharia 
Watch, stand for Peace and stephen Yaxley-
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lennon are examined. the latter epitomises 
the links between counter-extremism and 
counter-jihadism since in between his far-right 
organising with the english Defence league 
(eDl) and PegiDA uK he was briefly offered 
a public platform and financial support by the 
formerly state-funded Quilliam Foundation. 
While the uK government has taken some 
very limited steps to counter islamophobia, 
overall the state appears to be complacent 
about the counter-jihad movement. it does not 
classify groups like the eDl as ‘far-right’ and 
– despite the growing severity of islamophobic 
violence – counter-extremism efforts remain 
overwhelmingly focused on policing rather than 
protecting Muslim communities. 
chapter 4: germany
in Chapter 4 we note that greater emphasis 
is placed on tackling ‘right-wing extremism’ in 
germany than in the uK or France. However, this 
is still very limited and is overwhelmingly focused 
on the ‘traditional’ neo-nazi far-right and less 
so on the counter-jihad movement. Moreover, 
efforts to counter ‘islamist’ terrorism – viewed as 
the greatest threat the country faces – display 
the same tendencies towards placing collective 
blame on Muslim communities as seen in the uK 
and France. segments of the far-right in germany 
have responded to the social unacceptability of 
anti-semitism by turning towards islamophobia 
and hostility towards migrants, both of which 
have fed the alarming electoral rise of the political 
party Alternative für Deutschland.
As seen in the uK, several counter-jihad 
groups in germany frame their actions 
as ‘counter-extremism’. PegiDA does so 
implicitly, while bürgerbewegung Pax europa 
and the stresemann stiftung do so explicitly, 
raising serious questions about why counter-
extremism frameworks so often prove amenable 
to exploitation by the islamophobic far-right. 
Meanwhile, the circulation of counter-jihad ideas 
in the mainstream – among some intellectuals and 
certain politicians – suggests that these actors 
(sometimes dubbed ‘nazis in pinstripes’) enjoy a 
veneer of respectability which may make them all 
the more dangerous in the long run.
chapter 5: France
the final country case study looks at France, 
first providing an overview of counter-terrorism 
measures that have intensified greatly following 
a number of attacks since 2015. it notes that 
increased efforts to counter ‘radicalisation’ and 
‘extremism’ – such as the Stop Djihadisme 
campaign – have discriminated against Muslims. 
While these projects may not be helping to 
prevent terrorism, we argue that they have 
assisted the rise of far-right. though we did not 
find counter-jihad groups in France borrowing the 
rhetoric of counter-extremism as much as in the 
uK and germany, explicit islamophobia, targeting 
of mosques and the weaponisation of laïcité, the 
French concept of secularism, have all become 
thoroughly mainstream. 
the idea of islamophobia as ‘free speech’ is 
particularly pronounced in France and counter-
jihad ideas and tropes appear most deeply 
entrenched within intellectual circles and the 
political elite – the most notable example being 
former prime minister Manuel valls’ usage of 
the term ‘islamofascism’. the far-right Front 
national party has adopted the islamophobia 
of the counter-jihad movement and claims to 
have abandoned its old anti-semitism. it has 
undoubtedly been the biggest winner from 
the climate of islamophobia fostered by both 
counter-extremism policies and the counter-
jihad movement. Although the domestic security 
services have belatedly begun to realise the 
threat posed by the far-right, official counter-
extremism measures form part of an increasingly 
authoritarian government approach which 
has included the imposition of a repressive 
state of emergency for two years. A continued 
pre-occupation with the perceived ‘threat’ of 
islam potentially opens the backdoor for the 
rebranded Front national – recently renamed 
‘rassemblement national’ or ‘national rally’ – 
and its politics to continue to flourish. 
chapter 6: counter-jihad funders
in Chapter 6 we examine the importance of 
American money in sustaining the counter-jihad 
network in europe. our extensive investigation 
into non-profit tax filings between 2009-16 found 
that this funding is not only flourishing, but the 
scale of it is increasingly obscured by the use of 
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donor-advised funds which allow wealthy elites to 
mask their chosen controversial causes.
the chapter demonstrates how the us counter-
jihad movement has been critical to facilitating 
flows of ideas, people and money into europe via 
its transatlantic network. We discuss the core us 
activists and groups promoting anti-Muslim hate, 
their european activities and often inter-related 
funding relationships, as well as their ties to 
self-declared ‘counter-extremism’ organisations 
operating in europe. groups examined include 
the gatestone institute, center for security Policy, 
David Horowitz Freedom center and the Middle 
east Forum. the latter’s financial backing, for 
example, of successful legal cases for key anti-
Muslim figures such as Dutch MeP geert Wilders 
and ex-english Defence league leader stephen 
Yaxley-lennon (tommy robinson), as well as the 
‘Free tommy’ protests in london in June and 
July 2018, illustrates the potent reach of these us 
backers.
Finally, at the end of this chapter we profile the 
billionaires and top us charitable foundations 
funding these groups. their donations, which 
include many millions routed anonymously 
through us donor-advised funds, have proven 
a lifeline for the counter-jihad movement and 
underscore the transnational, and particularly 
transatlantic, nature of islamophobia funding.
conclusions and 
recommendations
our conclusions suggest that counter-extremism 
policies which place blame and suspicion on 
Muslims collectively in the uK, germany and 
France, are not only failing to prevent the rise of 
the counter-jihad strand of the far-right but may 
in fact be fostering and enabling it. significant 
overlaps between government counter-extremism 
efforts and the targets, symbols and language 
used by the counter-jihad movement raise cause 
for concern, as does evidence – from the uK 
and germany particularly – that counter-jihad 
actors are passing themselves off as ‘counter-
extremists’ since this provides ‘legitimate’ cover 
for targeting Muslims. We argue that the French 
case, and to a lesser extent germany, illustrate 
how the far-right thrives in a climate of officially 
sanctioned suspicion.
our recommendations for government call 
for a fundamental re-think of the underlying 
assumptions of existing counter-extremism 
policies, given that they are not only failing to 
prevent political violence but also appear to 
be fomenting islamophobia and aiding the 
far-right. We see anti-racism activists’ best 
strategy as campaigning against discriminatory 
government counter-extremism policies, rather 
than calling on government to be more ‘even-
handed’ in their application. legal strategies 
directed at the counter-jihad movement could 
also be pursued. We recommend more in-
depth study by researchers of the counter-jihad 
movement and its relationship to government 
policies. Meanwhile, the media should treat 
so-called ‘counter-extremism’ bodies with 
greater scepticism, and help educate the 
public about the counter-jihad movement’s 
hateful anti-Muslim rhetoric and islamophobic 
conspiracy theories.
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chapter 1: introduction
islamophobia, racism and the 
‘war on terror’
the ‘war on terror’ has become deeply 
entrenched in the security infrastructure and 
political imagination of european societies. 
leaders of the uK and other Western states 
claim that we face an unprecedented threat 
from ‘islamist’ inspired ‘terrorism’. Yet official 
data shows that the numbers of ‘failed, foiled 
or successful’ attacks in europe carried out by 
‘islamists’ has been a consistently tiny minority 
of all terrorist incidents: less than 1 per cent of all 
incidents in the years between 2006 and 2014, 
according to europol.1 the proportion of attacks 
attributed to ‘islamists’ increased to 8%, 9% and 
16% of attacks in the eu in the years 2015-2017 
respectively, though, as can be seen, this remains 
a small proportion of all attacks. it is clear though 
that in recent years the number of casualties 
attributable to these attacks has outstripped 
those caused by other kinds of ‘terror’ attacks. 
on the other hand, this is in a context where the 
numbers of civilians killed in western europe by 
non-state terrorists has dramatically reduced 
since the 1970s and 1980s, while at a more 
international level the number of civilian deaths as 
a result of ‘terrorism’ has increased dramatically 
in recent years (after 2005 and surging from 
2012-13).2 nevertheless, Western leaders 
continue to insist that the threat from ‘islamists’ 
is a generation-defining challenge and the media 
amplify these claims. 
Despite, or perhaps because of the implausibility 
of these claims, counter-terrorism strategies have 
increasingly focused not on active or genuine 
plots to cause violence but on the potential 
for possible future plots. the belief that certain 
values, religious practices, beliefs or ideologies 
indicate a vulnerability to ‘radicalisation’ and 
may in future lead to violence has seen ‘counter-
extremism’ policies and apparatus set up 
in many countries. there is, however, scant 
evidence that these practices effectively prevent 
political violence.3 instead, a growing body of 
research suggests they have fostered a deeply 
islamophobic climate.4 the net of suspicion has 
been widened from those engaged in planning 
A poster promoting the Swiss ban on minaret construction which was voted for in a referendum in 2009. 
Source: RYTC/Flickr
“ in contrast to most other forms of racism, 
several governments have, in effect, 
officially sanctioned Islamophobia”
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or executing acts of violence to include the 
religiously devout, politically active Muslims, and 
those (whether Muslim or not) expressing criticism 
of british foreign or domestic policy.
We can point to numerous examples of those 
caught up in the web of suspicion to illustrate 
this. For example: the Muslim postgraduate 
student studying counter-terrorism at university 
who was interrogated after being spotted reading 
a book on terrorism in the library;5 the Muslim 
schoolboy questioned by police because of 
his support for Palestinian human rights;6 the 
Muslim child of just four-years-old suspected 
of ‘extremism’ by nursery school staff when he 
mispronounced the word ‘cucumber’ as ‘cooker 
bomb’;7 the environmental, anti-fracking or anti-
nuclear campaigners deemed a potential threat.8 
the situation has worsened as major attacks, 
such as those in France, belgium and germany 
in 2015 and 2016, and the uK and spain in 
2017 are interpreted as ‘proof’ that ‘islamism’ 
– or sometimes just islam – is ‘incompatible’ 
with ‘european values’ and poses an inherent 
security threat. 
islamophobia did not suddenly emerge after 
9/11. it has a long history. nevertheless its current 
manifestations owe much to the interests behind 
the ‘war on terror’, as opposed to expressing 
some essential and timeless form of prejudice. 
some scholars fear that today islamophobia may 
be at tipping point.9 in the us, Donald trump won 
the republican Party’s nomination and then the 
us presidential election in part by calling for a 
ban on Muslim immigration. Across the Atlantic, 
according to scholar Matti bunzl, islamophobia 
‘threatens to become the defining condition of the 
new europe’.10
the rise of islamophobia in europe is also linked 
to deepening anti-immigration sentiment and has 
been intensified by government responses to the 
so-called ‘migrant crisis’. ‘nativist’ movements 
calling for tighter border controls and strict law 
and order have flourished on the streets and 
at ballot boxes across the continent.11 neatly 
marrying this xenophobia with islamophobia, the 
notion of ‘islamisation’ has gained widespread 
traction. Meanwhile, trust in the european union 
and mainstream political parties is declining 
across the continent, a symptom of growing 
polarisation which appears to have benefited the 
extreme right, especially those sections of it which 
have embraced islamophobia.12 
some of the basic organising concepts central to 
islamophobia can be summed up as follows:
• islam is monolithic and cannot adapt to new 
realities
• islam does not share common values with 
other major faiths
• islam as a religion is inferior to the West. it is 
archaic, barbaric, and irrational
• islam is a religion of violence and supports 
terrorism
• islam is a violent political ideology.13
While none of these ideas are new, they have 
been given new life in the context of the war on 
terror. Yet despite widespread discrimination, 
the very existence of islamophobia is sometimes 
questioned and even the term itself is intensely 
debated. given this, we define it here:
fear, prejudice, hatred or hostility towards islam 
or Muslims (real or perceived), perpetuated 
by stereotypes and resulting in discourse, 
behaviour or structures that discriminate, 
marginalise and exclude Muslims from social, 
economic, cultural, and political life.14
the oft-cited canard that ‘islam is not a race, 
therefore islamophobia is not racism’ rests 
on a misunderstanding (or wilful ignorance) of 
what racism is. the concept of ‘racialisation’ 
reminds us that ‘race’ is itself a social construct. 
As nasar Meer and tariq Modood put it, we 
should therefore:
guard against the characterization of racism 
as a form of single ‘inherentism’ or ‘biological 
determinism’, which leaves little space to 
conceive the ways in which cultural racism 
draws on physical appearance as one marker 
among others but is not solely premised on 
conceptions of biology in a way that ignores 
religion, culture and so forth.15 
in the case of islamophobia, particular practices – 
such as wearing a hijab – can ‘serve as signifiers 
of who belongs and who does not, in the same 
way that skin colour does’.16 though there are 
important differences between anti-semitism and 
islamophobia, anti-Muslim prejudice has parallels 
with, and bears comparison to, the history of 
discrimination which ‘raced’ Jewish people.17
10 •  Public Interest Investigations
like other racisms, islamophobia manifests 
itself through hate-speech online or at street-
level, physical violence targeting visibly Muslim 
people (or those perceived as such)18 and 
acts of vandalism including arson attacks on 
mosques – waves of which have occurred, for 
example, in the uK, France and sweden.19 Yet in 
contrast to most other forms of racism, several 
governments have, in effect, officially sanctioned 
islamophobia by passing anti-islam legislation. 
For example, switzerland enforced a minaret ban 
after a referendum in 2009; Austria implemented 
laws against foreign funding of mosques and 
islamic centres; the French, belgian, bulgarian, 
Austrian, Dutch and german governments have 
implemented policies against the wearing of full 
islamic face veils.20 often, islamophobic policies 
and practices are justified on tenuous security 
grounds linked to the war on terror. such policies 
and practices of the state – which are a key 
element in the enactment of discrimination and 
marginalisation – range from stop-and-search, 
detention at ports and borders, pre-emptive 
detention, surveillance and intelligence-gathering, 
attempts to recruit informers and ‘de-radicalisation’ 
programmes. these have rendered Muslims an 
officially ‘suspect community’.21
Why study the counter-jihad 
movement in the context of 
counter-extremism?
in 2012, academic Arun Kundnani pointed to 
an important gap in research on extremism. 
Many scholars, he observed, have asked which 
‘counter-narratives’ governments should deploy 
to effectively undercut jihadist propaganda. 
Attention has also been paid to the relationship 
between jihadist messages and right-wing 
extremism; the notion of ‘cumulative extremism’, 
which suggests the two may be mutually 
reinforcing, emerged from these debates. by 
contrast, Kundnani noted, the third side of this 
triangle – the interaction between government 
narratives and the far-right – has rarely been 
examined.22 Most counter-extremism analysts 
have failed to consider which counter-narratives, 
or indeed counter-practices, might undermine 
and weaken the far-right. Fewer still have asked 
whether government counter-terrorism initiatives 
might be reinforcing the far-right.23 this report 
seeks to reduce this deficit by focusing on the 
neglected but important relationship between 
the state and a distinct strand of the far-right that 
specifically targets Muslims and migrants: the 
‘counter-jihad’ movement. 
After Anders behring breivik massacred 
77 people in norway in 2011, analysts began 
paying more attention to the counter-jihad 
movement. breivik’s ‘manifesto’ showed he 
was steeped in online counter-jihad writings.24 
but while more research on this dangerous 
phenomenon is welcome – and although this 
report grew out of research focusing on this 
far-right current – we argue that examining 
the counter-jihad movement in a vacuum is 
analytically and politically inadequate. For the 
problem we want to address is not the far-right 
per se but islamophobia, wherever it occurs. two 
things are clear: firstly, grassroots anti-racism 
campaigners are far more concerned about the 
state’s role in fomenting islamophobia than the 
counter-jihad movement; secondly, there are 
significant overlaps between the islamophobia of 
the far-right and some government narratives and 
practices.
rather than studying europe’s counter-jihad 
movement in isolation, therefore, we examine its 
growth set against the continent’s war on terror. 
this approach contrasts with previous counter-
jihad research, most of which scrutinises the 
movement without contextualising its rise.25 the 
result is a narrow account of islamophobia which 
risks downplaying the extent of the problem. one 
example is the 2013 report by the international 
centre for the study of radicalisation at King’s 
college london, an institute that specialises 
in ‘radicalisation’ research and has received 
Home office funding (perhaps helping to explain 
its reluctance to criticise the basic tenets of 
uK government counter-extremism policy).26 
its treatment of the counter-jihad movement 
largely relegates islamophobia – a term not 
used once in its 68-page report – to a fringe 
phenomenon. in opposition to such analyses, 
“ Rather than studying Europe’s counter-
jihad movement in isolation, we examine 
its growth set against the continent’s 
war on terror”
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we not only acknowledge the damage done by 
counter-extremism policies themselves but also 
seek to scrutinise the ways in which – whether 
inadvertently or not – they may empower the 
far right.
scope and structure of this report
We cannot tell the whole story of the impact 
of counter-extremism policies or other factors 
feeding the far-right (chief among these being 
anti-immigration policies); nor will we examine 
left-liberal forms of islamophobia, neoconservatism 
or Zionism, overlapping movements we view 
as comprising three of the ‘five pillars of 
islamophobia’.27 instead this report focuses on 
the interaction between the final two pillars: the 
state (specifically government counter-extremism 
policies) and the counter-jihad strand of the far-
right.
in Chapter 2 we provide an overview of the 
counter-jihad movement in europe – its beliefs, 
strategies, position within the wider far-right and 
transnational organising activities. case studies 
from three countries – the united Kingdom, 
germany and France – follow, in chapters three 
to five. these were chosen as case studies for 
several reasons: they are the most populous 
countries in europe and have the largest Muslim 
populations;29 former and current leaders of 
all three (cameron, Merkel and sarkozy) have 
famously declared multiculturalism a failure; each 
has seen notable islamophobic movements 
and/or waves of hate crime in recent years; and 
finally, all three have adopted counter-extremism 
and counter-radicalisation policies which share 
significant features in common but also provide 
interesting points of comparison. All three 
countries also held critical elections in 2017.
each case study reviews national counter-
extremism policy and then closely examines that 
country’s counter-jihad groups. this juxtaposition 
and ordering serves an important purpose. While 
it is common to speak of the ‘mainstreaming’ of 
far-right ideas, this preoccupation can obscure 
the fact that influence is not only one-way. in 
each case study, we consider instances in which 
motifs and rhetoric appear to be travelling in the 
opposite direction, in other words, examples 
of the counter-jihad movement appropriating 
elements from official counter-extremism 
policies and practices. in addition, we examine 
personnel – and, on occasion, funding flows – 
which link mainstream counter-extremism actors 
and counter-jihad activities. in the process, we 
show how the racialised discourse of counter-
extremism has proved amenable to the racist 
agenda of this section of the far-right. 
in Chapter 6 we examine the movement’s funding 
sources, especially financial support coming into 
europe from the us.
“ To gain mainstream respectability, 
counter-jihadists contrast themselves 
favourably to neo-Nazi groups whom 
they dub the ‘real’ far-right”
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chapter 2: understanding the counter-jihad 
movement 
the changing face of the far-
right: extreme anti-extremists
the cultural turn in the war on terror saw a 
focus on violence give way to a broader assault 
on ideologies deemed to lead to violence. 
governments now speak of ‘terrorist ideologies’ 
(as opposed to acts)1 and they emphasise the 
need to defend liberal ideas variously claimed as 
‘british values’ or ‘French values’. Meanwhile, 
many on the far-right today also choose to 
focus on values and identity as opposed to 
‘race’. one specific strand, the counter-jihad 
movement, began to galvanise in europe in 2007 
with what would become an annual ‘counter-
jihad conference’, first held in brussels, and later 
in vienna, copenhagen, Zurich, london and 
stockholm. 
As a distinct current on the far-right, the counter-
jihad movement ‘became visible and vocal after 
september 11’.2 As its name suggests, it takes its 
cue directly from the ‘war on terror’, positioning 
itself – just as counter-extremism policies do – as 
opposing political violence, specifically acts carried 
out supposedly in the name of islam. Although the 
islamic concept of jihad literally means ‘struggling’ 
or ‘striving’, it is often considered synonymous 
with religiously inspired violence. counter-
jihadists have adapted it to convey additional 
facets of what Matthias ekman calls the ‘green 
scare’,3 notably the idea of being threatened 
with ‘takeover’ by growing Muslim populations – 
‘demographic jihad’ – and the notion of insidious 
islamic influence in society – ‘stealth jihad’ (but 
also imaginary phenomena such as ‘rape jihad’, 
‘welfare jihad’ and even ‘fecal matter jihad’.)4 the 
terminology of ‘demographic jihad’ links the issue 
of terrorism and generalised anti-Muslim feeling to 
broader anti-immigration sentiment and rejection 
of multiculturalism. the myth of ‘islamisation’, 
popularised by books like bat Ye’or’s Eurabia, 
has a similar purpose.5 it rests on what French 
sociologist raphaël liogier calls a ‘fantasy of 
reverse colonialism’:
europe has, in a sense, a complex about a 
world to which it gave a complex in the past. 
the people that we colonised, in Algeria, 
Morocco, tunisia and so on, are now said 
to be colonising us, from the disadvantaged 
parts of our cities, gradually infiltrating our 
culture in order to adulterate it.6
in this context, movements and organisations 
like identity ireland, bloc identitaire in France 
and the international center for Western values 
A far-right rally against so-called ‘Islamisation’ staged in Hanover, Germany in 2016. Source: Michaela/Flickr
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(icWv) in the netherlands (co-founded by bat 
Ye’or) have emerged. such groups frequently 
express their missions in terms of an implied or 
explicit threat from islam and position themselves 
as defending liberal values. icWv, for instance, 
says it is concerned with ‘fighting antidemocratic 
tendencies and ideologies in europe and 
elsewhere’.7 As we will show, other groups like 
résistance républicaine and bürgerbewegung 
Pax europa, in France and germany respectively, 
also claim to embody classical european values. 
but counter-jihad-inspired mass murderer Anders 
behring breivik, too, saw himself as attempting 
to ‘defend Western freedoms’ – a reminder of the 
racist, exclusionary and even murderous potential 
that lies therein.8 
to gain mainstream respectability, counter-jihadists 
contrast themselves favourably to neo-nazi groups 
whom they dub the ‘real’ far-right, a category 
from which they exempt themselves. in 2010, for 
example, a group of far-right politicians associated 
with the counter-jihad movement, calling 
themselves the european Freedom Alliance (not to 
be confused with european Alliance for Freedom, 
explained later) visited israel.9 Part of the purpose 
of the trip – participated in by leading figures from 
belgium’s vlaams belang, the Austrian Freedom 
Party, germany’s Die Freiheit and the sweden 
Democrats – was to demonstrate that they were 
no longer anti-semitic. While such claims remain 
highly dubious, scholars have recognised a clear 
strategic reorientation by certain elements of the 
far-right. some analysts have begun to speak of 
‘two fascisms in contemporary europe’: one ‘old’ 
form committed to anti-semitism, and another 
‘new’ form – nurtured by the war on terror – fixated 
on islam.10
As we will show in later chapters, another 
disturbing tactic of this second current, the 
counter-jihad movement, is to use the war on terror 
discourse of ‘countering extremism’ as a cover 
for targeting Muslims and strengthening their own 
positions. elements of official counter-extremism 
are being borrowed by the far-right from the 
mainstream, just as far-right ideas can sometimes 
be traced moving in the other direction. As this 
exchange occurs, the centre ground of politics is 
itself moving rightwards in many countries. since 
‘extremism’ is ultimately a relative concept, in these 
circumstances counter-jihadists – especially those 
who call themselves ‘anti-extremists’ – may appear 
less ‘extreme’ or dangerous themselves than they 
are in reality. 
inventing ‘islamofascism’, 
appropriating anti-fascist history
counter-jihadists have made inroads into the 
mainstream not only by donning suits, holding 
press conferences, producing glossy reports and 
contrasting themselves with jack-booted neo-
nazi skinheads. they have also popularised the 
idea of ‘islamofascism’ as a label for the enemy 
they represent themselves as fighting. 
Protests in 2007 against a proposed islamic 
centre near new York’s ground Zero, the site of 
the 2001 attack on the twin towers, included a 
‘rally Against islamofascism Day’ organised by 
christine brim of the center for vigilant Freedom. 
the term portrayed islam as a totalitarian 
political ideology, a classic counter-jihad trope.11 
by 2015 it was being used by then French 
prime minister Manuel valls.12 implying that the 
‘islamic threat’ facing europe constitutes a new 
fascism, this coinage has helped to nurture 
hyper-sensitivity to perceived dangers posed by 
islamist movements. Moreover, the associated 
implication is that anyone who denies this ‘truth’ 
is engaging in ‘appeasement’. thus, anti-racist 
solidarity from non-Muslim leftists who oppose 
islamophobia is demonised as part of a sinister 
‘red-green alliance’. Additionally, the term dhimmi 
is applied to those deemed to have subserviently 
surrendered to future islamic rule.13 Above all, 
inventing ‘islamofascism’, like the ostentatious 
condemnation of traditional far-right anti-
semitism, allows the counter-jihad movement to 
disguise its own fascistic tendencies. 
History is mined for the same purpose. As chetan 
bhatt, a sociologist at the london school of 
economics, observes:
the symbolism of medieval wars against 
‘islam’ travels across the european counter-
“ Elements of official counterextremism 
are being borrowed by the far-right from 
the mainstream, just as far-right ideas 
can sometimes be traced moving in the 
other direction”
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jihad, with organizations rummaging the 
national past for an evocative warrior against 
‘islam’.14 
illustrating what bhatt calls ‘a reverence for myth, 
and masculine martial heroism’, the names of 
figures such as richard the lionheart and vlad 
tepes (‘vlad the impaler’) have been borrowed 
for counter-jihad blogs. similarly, the Frankish 
king charles Martel (‘charles the Hammer’), who 
defeated an invading Muslim army in the year 
732, was figuratively resurrected by counter-
jihadists using the hashtag #JesuischarlesMartel 
– an adaptation of #Jesuischarlie – following 
attacks on the Paris-based magazine Charlie 
Hebdo. the gates of vienna website, a central 
clearing house for news and comment run by 
American counter-jihad blogger and activist ned 
May, is named after the 1683 battle in which the 
ottoman empire’s forces were defeated. the 
counter-jihad movement thus mixes crusader 
imagery, such as the cross of the Knights 
templar, with more recent slogans of extreme 
ulster loyalism like ‘no surrender!’.15 older 
clash-of-civilisations style motifs are combined 
with distorted re-readings of 20th century history. 
Most notably, in germany the far-right has 
attempted to appropriate the language and 
symbols of anti-fascism in order to reinforce the 
idea of ‘islamofascism’. counter-jihad actors 
there claimed to have revived the White rose 
movement – which resisted the nazis – this time 
for the purposes of ‘resisting’ ‘islamisation’ (see 
Chapter 4). 
such perverse historical re-interpretations may 
have been unwittingly assisted by ahistorical ‘anti-
extremism’ frameworks propagated widely by both 
governments and some academics. At times, the 
discourse of counter-extremism seemingly invites 
us to view all ideologies besides liberalism as 
different expression of a single phenomenon called 
‘extremism’.16 but, as liz Fekete of the institute of 
race relations points out:
the left and the right, islamism and Fascism 
have different trajectories; any language that 
equates them prevents us from understanding 
the social (as opposed to the individual) 
provenance of violence.17 
thus, counter-extremism agendas may have 
facilitated a degree of ideological disorientation 
which can distract us from the increasing 
authoritarianism of state power. And, amidst 
this confusion, a clear message about which 
type of extremism poses the greatest threat is 
communicated to us daily. Former uK prime 
minister David cameron, for instance, said the 
‘struggle of our generation’ was to counter 
‘islamist’ extremism.18 
As Arun Kundnani points out, while european 
security officials view jihadist terrorism as a 
strategic threat, far-right violence is treated as a 
public order problem.19 our case studies attest to 
this disparity. european governments rarely see 
counter-jihad actors as an inherent threat and are 
doing little to counter them. instead of recognising 
it as a reincarnation of the european far-right, the 
counter-jihad movement is taken at face value as 
merely a response to the threat of terrorism (or 
‘islamofascism’), which is seen as pre-eminent. At 
times, even some leftist actors appear to perceive 
the potential for a backlash (provoking more 
‘islamist’ extremism) as the main risk posed by 
the counter-jihad movement. 
Working through the state
Part of the reason that counter-jihadists have 
not been seen as particularly threatening is that 
they are not fundamentally opposed to the state. 
Although the hardcore of the movement argues 
that violent civil war is likely, or even inevitable, this 
belief is motivated by a commitment to ‘defending 
national identity’ at the expense of ethnic 
minorities, rather than a revolutionary fervour to 
challenge the state. on the contrary, counter-
jihadists are more likely to engage in what’s been 
called ‘pro-state violence’.20 they tend to show 
support for foreign policy and, like the wider far-
right, often have links to the military (for example 
the group combined ex-Forces, or cxF). Partly 
for this reason, far-right violence is rarely written 
into a bigger storyline and is often deemed by 
the state to be ‘lone wolf’ terrorism. For instance 
Anders breivik – despite his involvement in the 
‘collective’ online counter-jihad movement – was 
described this way.21
in the case of the counter-jihad movement, 
this is also because many right-wing Western 
governments to some extent share aspects of 
its analysis, albeit softer versions. in two major 
policy areas, immigration and counter-extremism, 
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there are significant overlaps in approach. no 
government has gone as far as the counter-
jihadist movement would like: it believes political 
elites are naïve, complacent and must ‘wake up’ 
to the imminent ‘threat’ islam poses to europe. 
At the same time, the movement welcomes 
measures by many governments to limit 
immigration and institutionalise islamophobia as 
steps in the right direction. 
counter-jihadists have sought to deepen and 
speed up such processes by pulling the centre 
of politics to the right. in pursuit of this aim, 
for example, the counter-jihad Warsaw 2013 
conference was scheduled to coincide with 
a meeting of the organization for security 
and co-operation in europe on human rights. 
likewise, the us ‘Defeat Jihad summit 2015’ 
was set up to shadow then us President barack 
obama’s ‘countering violent extremism’ event 
and advocated an even harder line on the issue. 
three people then in the running to be republican 
presidential candidate (ted cruz, newt gingrich 
and bobby Jindal) attended, while british uKiP 
peer lord Pearson, Dutch Party for Freedom 
leader geert Wilders and Danish counter-jihad 
activist lars Hedegaard delivered their talks via 
skype.22 this illustrates an important and unique 
feature of the counter-jihad movement: namely 
that unlike any ‘islamist’ or ‘jihadist’ movement – 
or (at least in north-western europe) any neo-nazi 
party – it has supporters in influential positions in 
Western governments and legislatives.
in the us, many senior political figures have 
links to the counter-jihad movement. Perhaps 
most disturbing is the revelation that Donald 
trump himself attended the launch of a counter-
jihadist group called the united West in Florida in 
2011, where he posed for a picture with one of 
europe’s leading anti-Muslim activists, elisabeth 
sabaditsch-Wolff.23 other examples of key 
figures linked to the counter-jihad movement 
include steve bannon and Walid Phares, 
respectively Donald trump’s ex-strategist and 
former Middle east policy adviser. in addition, 
the center for security Policy’s Frank gaffney, 
a former reagan administration official who is 
now a leading counter-jihadist, has connections 
to several trump officials including Attorney 
general Jeff sessions. sessions has received an 
award from another leading counter-jihad force, 
the David Horowitz Freedom center, presented 
to him by stephen Miller, who later became 
trump’s senior policy adviser and advocated 
the ‘Muslim travel ban’.24 Here lies the counter-
jihad movement’s alarming strength: it is a 
‘spectrum’ with ‘street-fighting forces at one 
end’ (such as the english Defence league) and 
‘cultural conservatives and neoconservatives 
writers at the other’ (from Daniel Pipes to 
Douglas Murray).25 As well as flourishing in 
the blogosphere, it has publishing houses 
(eg. encounter books) and newspapers (eg. 
Dispatch International), produces films (eg. Fitna 
and Obsession), establishes foundations and 
even ‘charities’ (eg. the short-lived outfit victims 
of islamic cultural extremism, or voice uK). 
the counter-jihad movement’s elite wing helps 
lend an aura of respectability to its grassroots. 
one means is by offering access to important 
arenas of power. For instance, on at least one 
occasion a counter-jihad event has been held 
in the european Parliament building, courtesy 
of an MeP from belgium’s far-right vlaams 
belang party. similarly, baroness cox has 
hosted Anne Marie Waters of sharia Watch 
uK in the House of lords. cox also sits on the 
board of the gatestone institute – until recently 
alongside fellow peer lord Finkelstein and ex-
us ambassador to the un John bolton. their 
presence has offered significant legitimacy to 
this new York ‘think tank’ which publishes many 
counter-jihad writers cited in breivik’s manifesto. 
these include norwegian blogger Peder Jensen, 
aka ‘Fjordman’, whose writing contains ‘many 
of the tropes of fascism’, according to academic 
Paul Jackson.26 Another notable instance of 
support from an element of the state in europe 
comes from the czech republic, where president 
Miloš Zeman spoke at a ‘bloc Against islam’ rally 
in november 2015. 
thanks in part to such powerful allies, the counter-
jihad movement has carved out a niche within 
the mainstream. often in the name of ‘security’, 
parliamentarians across europe (and in the usA) 
with counter-jihadist allegiances or sympathies 
have advocated anti-islam legislation, for example 
relating to sharia law, women’s clothing or mosque 
construction. they have succeeded in passing new 
laws in many jurisdictions. As liz Fekete observes, 
far from opposing the state, the ‘realigned right’ in 
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this way pursues its goals through official channels, 
‘using state power to…put into place legal and 
administrative structures that discriminate against 
Muslims’.27 
its potential, however, is greater still. While some 
scholars suggest that the counter-jihad movement 
eschews electoral politics,28 this overlooks 
its links to parties in which its islamophobic 
ideas have a strong foothold. Despite styling 
themselves as non-establishment ‘anti-parties’29 
– and regardless of the deeply anti-democratic 
nature of their racist ideas – radical right parties 
with close links to counter-jihadists have long 
been seeking to seize power via elections. 
several have become key players in european 
governments: for instance, the Danish People’s 
Party became the country’s second biggest in 
2015 and the Party for Freedom (Pvv) became 
the second largest party in the Dutch House 
of representatives following elections in March 
2017. in France, the Front national was runner up 
in the 2017 presidential election. that same year, 
in Austria, the far-right Freedom Party entered 
government as part of a coalition with the centre-
right People’s Party. together with the power of 
the law and Justice Party and Jobbik in nearby 
Poland and Hungary, respectively, this showed 
that, in addition to rampant islamophobia, a clear 
strain of anti-semitism was no barrier to political 
success in central europe.
some analysts argue that the existence of radical 
right parties in the mainstream in countries like 
the netherlands and Denmark explains why 
street-protests like PegiDA did not take root in 
those countries. on the other hand, they note, 
PegiDA thrived in germany when no such party 
existed. this so-called ‘pressure valve hypothesis’ 
appeals most to those with a managerialist view 
of politics, implying a preference for far-right ideas 
to be expressed at the ballot box rather than on 
the streets. However, a quasi-fascist party at the 
helm of a european government – even if such 
power was acquired through legitimate electoral 
means – could produce far more violence than 
any non-state actor. Moreover, the idea that 
street-movements and radical right parties are 
mutually exclusive appears to be false, given the 
rise of Alternative für Deutschland in germany 
alongside – rather than in place of – the PegiDA 
movement (see Chapter 5). the combined effects 
of these top-down and bottom-up forces may 
prove extremely effective for the far-right.
transnational organising
the destructive potential of the far-right also 
increases when actors collaborate across 
borders. by including country case studies in 
this report, we assume that the nation state is 
still relevant in a globalised era. islamophobia 
takes on different inflections in specific contexts, 
for example manifesting itself through laïcité 
(secularism) in France (see Chapter 4). However, 
although the counter-jihad movement is strongly 
associated with nationalist politics, structurally 
it is organised via ‘dispersed, decentralised, 
non-hierarchical networks’ of blogs, think tanks 
and protest groups, with ‘no set command 
and control hierarchy’ and few leaders.30 this 
versatility allows it to organise across borders.
the ideological basis for building counter-jihad 
unity lies in the ‘macro-nationalist’ politics of 
‘Western values’ (through websites like Western 
resistance and groups like united West), 
together with collective hostility to islam. As Farid 
Hafez writes: 
While the main focus on an exclusive 
identity politics in the frame of nation-
states previously divided the far-right and 
complicated transnational cooperation, a 
shared islamophobia has the potential to 
be a common ground for strengthening the 
transnational links of right-wing parties.31
Hafez points to the european Alliance for 
Freedom, a cross-continental far-right grouping 
in the european Parliament – comprising MePs 
from the Dutch Party for Freedom (Pvv), sweden 
Democrats, France’s Front national (Fn), Austria’s 
Freedom Party (FPÖ), Alternative für Deutschland 
(AfD) and others – which produced a manifesto 
suggesting that ‘christian and humanistic roots 
are threatened by the rise of radical islam’. At a 
meeting in vienna in June 2016, party leaders 
including the Fn’s Marine le Pen, FPÖ’s Heinz-
christian strache and AfD’s Frauke Petry were 
among those who sought to deepen this pan-
european alliance, declaring that the climate was 
ripe for what they called ‘a patriotic spring’.32 
Far-right leaders from across europe met again 
in January 2017 in the german city of Koblenz, 
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seeking to capitalise on the surge in right-wing 
populism evidenced by Donald trump’s election 
and the uK’s brexit vote.33
Alongside attempts to build high-level political 
alliances, transnational counter-jihad organising 
also occurs at the grassroots. under various 
names, the same ideas have been mobilised 
across borders: the stop the islamisation of 
Denmark movement spawned others, including 
sio europe, sio Deutschland, sio France, sio 
england and sio America, collectively known 
as stop the islamisation of nations (sion); 
the english Defence league was replicated in 
scotland, germany and norway, amongst others, 
and a european Defence league was launched in 
Aarhus, Denmark in 2012, though without much 
success. Most recently, the german movement 
PegiDA has inspired copycat movements in 
many countries including Austria, sweden and 
the uK. 
counter-jihadists’ attempts to organise 
transnationally are proving quite successful. the 
growth of islamophobia in eastern europe shows 
that the movement’s grand narrative does not 
even require the presence of a significant Muslim 
minority in order to resonate. Yet in contrast to the 
loud calls for greater intelligence sharing about 
jihadist movements after the March 2016 attacks 
in brussels, european governments have faced 
little pressure to intervene or track transnational 
counter-jihad organising, despite the cross-border 
coordination described.
islamophobia as ‘free speech’
Across the counter-jihad movement, in europe 
and beyond, ‘freedom of speech’ is a key rallying 
cry.34 somewhat ironically – given that Muslims’ 
freedom of speech has been subject to a ‘chilling 
effect’ as a result of counter-extremism policies – 
organisations such as the international Free Press 
society and international civil liberties Alliance 
claim that free speech is under threat from islam. 
this notion sits within a wider conservative 
struggle against ‘political correctness’, and a 
perceived ‘right’ to offend, often by demeaning 
minorities. ever since Danish newspaper Jyllands-
Posten caused global uproar in the Muslim world 
in 2005, by publishing cartoons of the islamic holy 
prophet Mohammed, this has become a favourite 
activity of counter-jihadists. some analysts see 
such ‘Muslim baiting’ as a deliberate attempt 
to provoke tensions – and, ultimately, incite civil 
war.35 on occasion, there have indeed been 
violent responses. in 2015, swedish artist lars 
vilks was targeted in an attack on a copenhagen 
café which killed one; later that year a texas 
‘draw Mohammed’ contest hosted by Atlas 
Shrugs blogger Pamela geller was attacked by 
gunmen, who were killed by police. in 2016, a 
plan by counter-jihad activist Anne Marie Waters 
to stage a similar uK event featuring geert 
Wilders, was called off.
When offensive speech becomes incitement, 
european hate speech legislation applies. Yet 
counter-jihad actors – and at times a wider 
coalition of libertarians, liberals and some 
leftists – represent anti-racism campaigners’ 
ongoing attempts to strengthen laws against 
islamophobia as stifling critiques of ‘islamism’, 
or even as apologism for terrorism.36 they 
campaign instead for the dilution or complete 
removal of hate speech laws. but under 
existing statutes, several prosecutions have 
been launched against high profile far-right 
figures like geert Wilders, Marine le Pen and 
PegiDA founder lutz bachmann.37 charges 
have also been brought against small-time 
counter-jihadists such as christine tasin of 
French group résistance républicaine. the 
organised islamophobia movement has pushed 
back – in the name of ‘free speech’ – with 
financial help that often comes from the usA. 
the final chapter of this report discusses the 
critical importance of this us backing in helping 
sustain and spread the counter-jihad movement 
in europe.
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chapter 3: the united Kingdom
this case study begins by examining the british 
government’s counter-extremism policies and 
practices. it argues the government has created a 
climate of fear and mistrust, in which Muslims are 
an officially suspect community. We then examine 
the counter-jihad movement in the uK and show 
how it has thrived in this atmosphere.
scrutinising the interactions between counter-
extremism and the counter-jihad movement, 
we highlight three key issues. Firstly, we point 
to the existence of counter-jihad actors within 
the british political elite. secondly, we note that 
some of these counter-jihad actors and their allies 
use ‘counter-extremism’ as a cover for waging 
anti-Muslim campaigns. this means that not only 
have certain far-right ideas been ‘mainstreamed’ 
but also that a section of the far-right has found 
mainstream counter-extremism discourse 
amenable to its racist agenda.
Finally, we look at official responses to the 
counter-jihad movement. We find that practical 
action to counter this strand of the far-right 
has been very limited. indeed, some counter-
jihad actors have not even been recognised 
by the state as ‘far-right’. instead, those who 
position themselves as ‘centrist’ and claim to 
be countering ‘islamic extremism’ have at times 
been taken seriously by both government and the 
press. given these observations, we conclude 
that when – in January 2015 – the Muslim council 
of britain compared some of the government’s 
practices to those of ‘members of the far-right’, it 
was not being entirely outlandish.1
uK counter-extremism policies 
and practices
the first phase of Western governments’ ‘war 
on terror’, prompted by the 9/11 attacks in 
2001, focused on military interventions in Middle 
eastern countries notoriously dubbed the ‘axis 
of evil’ by george W. bush in 2002. reminded – 
partly by the 7/7 attacks in london in 2005 – that 
terrorism could be ‘homegrown’ too, attention 
shifted to the ideological plane.2 in the uK, 
the Prevent programme, first introduced by a 
labour government in 2006 as one strand of 
its counter-terrorism strategy, said it aimed to 
prevent violence by ‘winning hearts and minds’.3 
it targeted the Muslim community. As Arun 
Kundnani’s report Spooked! How not to prevent 
violent extremism showed, money allocated 
to local authorities for Prevent was based on a 
crude algorithm which took the size of the Muslim 
population in an area as a proxy for the threat of 
A march by the far-right English Defence League held in Newcastle, England in 2010. Source: Gavin Lynne
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extremism. this made Muslims, he noted, into an 
officially ‘suspect community’.4
the basic remit of Prevent has not changed. 
However, it was broadened in 2011 by the 
coalition government with the revised strategy, 
aimed at ‘promoting shared values’, widening 
its focus to include non-violent extremism. its 
rationale rested on models of ‘radicalisation,’ 
which imagined individuals moving from the thin 
end of a wedge of potential terrorist-sympathy 
along a conveyor belt, with a few going on to 
commit violent acts. those behind such theories 
suggested interventions could and should be 
made before this final stage – in the ‘pre-criminal 
space’ – before any laws had been broken. 
the entire Muslim community – seen as the 
larger pool potentially vulnerable to (or guilty 
of) a vaguely defined ‘non-violent extremism’ – 
thus became increasingly subject to ideological 
policing. in the 2011 revision of Prevent, the 
Home office defined ‘extremism’ as:
vocal or active opposition to fundamental 
british values including democracy, the rule of 
law, individual liberty and mutual respect and 
tolerance of different faiths and beliefs.5
in this abstract definition, no single group appears 
to be targeted. However, it was developed in order 
to counter what the government defined as the 
‘greatest risk’ to the uK’s security: groups which 
it said have a ‘distorted interpretation of islam’.6 in 
practice, the disproportionate numbers of Muslims 
referred under Prevent demonstrate that it has 
been applied in a discriminatory manner.7
Despite growing criticism of Prevent, government 
practices still appear to reflect the underlying belief 
that Muslims potentially pose the pre-eminent 
security threat. in early 2016 the Guardian revealed 
that the Home office’s research information 
and communications unit had been covertly 
outsourcing the task of producing anti-extremist 
propaganda to a london Pr firm, breakthrough 
Media. the firm fed the ‘counter-narratives’ it 
designed to a network of Muslim civil society 
groups, essentially used as ‘sock-puppets’, 
because it believed that Muslim groups would have 
a level of credibility with its target audience which 
counter-extremism messages known to come from 
government would lack. the audience which the 
government hoped to target remained the same: 
british Muslims.8 
in January 2018 uK home secretary Amber rudd 
announced the creation of a commission for 
countering extremism to ‘stamp out extremist 
ideology in all its forms’, and the appointment of 
sara Khan as ‘lead commissioner for countering 
extremism’. the choice of Khan has been widely 
criticised as demonstrating a continuation of the 
same approach from government. not only is she 
an outspoken supporter of the Prevent agenda, 
but her close ties to the Home office include 
co-authoring a book called The battle for British 
Islam with a consultant for breakthrough Media, 
the firm which orchestrated the government’s 
propaganda campaign described above.9 Khan’s 
group, inspire, had even delivered a campaign 
called ‘Making a stand’ – which received 
support from the prime minister theresa May 
– that was revealed to have been produced by 
the Home office’s research information and 
communications unit.10
the counter-terrorism and security Act 2015 
has exacerbated the situation further. couched 
in ‘safeguarding’ language, it requires all public-
sector bodies to ‘have due regard to the need to 
prevent people from being drawn into terrorism’.11 
in practice, this means an unprecedented number 
of doctors, lecturers, prison officers and even 
primary school teachers and nursery staff are 
trained to be vigilant for signs of ‘radicalisation’. 
critics argue it has encouraged ethno-religious 
profiling and surveillance, eroding trust in critical 
areas like health and education.12 Against this 
backdrop of mistrust, we now examine the 
islamophobic far-right in britain. 
“ while DCLG [the Department for 
Communities and Local Government] was 
slashing funding for Muslim charities, a 
counter-extremism body close to it was 
channelling money to an unrepentant  
far-right activist”
“ The climate of suspicion towards 
Muslims nurtured by government 
counterextremism policies has offered 
the counter-jihad movement in the UK 
opportunities to express its racism”
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the uK counter-jihad movement
the climate of suspicion towards Muslims 
nurtured by government counter-extremism 
policies has offered the counter-jihad movement 
in the uK opportunities to express its racism.
At times, there have been clear overlaps between 
the rhetoric of uK prime ministers and leading 
british counter-jihad activists. For example, both 
ex-prime minister David cameron and former 
english Defence league (eDl) leader stephen 
Yaxley-lennon (aka tommy robinson) – later 
head of PegiDA uK and then a pundit for the 
far-right rebel Media channel – view extremism 
as a predominantly Muslim problem. both 
men therefore see it as vital that ‘moderate’ or 
‘reforming’ Muslims speak out against extremism. 
cameron has said:
this is how…we can win the struggle of 
our generation. countering the extremist 
ideology by standing up and promoting our 
shared british values. taking on extremism 
in all its forms – both violent and non-violent. 
empowering those moderate and reforming 
voices who speak for the vast majority of 
Muslims that want to reclaim their religion.13
in similar terms, lennon has argued:
there’s a big struggle going on… between 
decent modern Muslims and salafist, Wahhabi 
extremist sects of islam…to succeed in this 
country we have to support and stand with 
the Muslims that wish to take on this extremist 
ideology and political islam.14
As well as affinities in language and logic, there 
are some crossovers in policy prescriptions. 
both men see ideology as the problem, spread 
by certain individuals (predominantly from 
abroad) against whom harsh measures must 
be taken. cameron stated: ‘We must make it 
impossible for the extremists to succeed…we 
must ban preachers of hate from coming to our 
countries’.15 Meanwhile, lennon has claimed: ‘if 
someone wants to be an islamist in this country 
we need to make it really difficult for them’.16 
though there are also many obvious differences 
between their thinking and practice, both men – 
albeit in different ways – cultivated harassment 
of Muslims in the uK. 
We can go deeper than discursive parallels. 
Downing street – using figures from an opaque 
government unit called the extremism Analysis 
unit – is guilty of having presented correlation 
as causation. For example, it publicised a list of 
‘radicalised foreign fighters who have studied 
in the uK’ to justify the demand for more 
stringent counter-extremism policies in the higher 
education sector, without providing any evidence 
of a causative connection.17 stephen Yaxley-
lennon has mimicked this faulty logic still more 
crudely. After leaving the eDl and setting up 
PegiDA uK, he told a newspaper in December 
2015 that the group planned to protest in 
birmingham – home to the uK’s biggest Muslim 
population – because the city ‘is where most 
of the terrorists have been from, it’s where six 
Muslims who wanted to blow us up were from’.18 
in fact, the government appeared to have 
reached much the same conclusions about 
birmingham five years before lennon. in 2010, 
a unique project code-named Project champion 
– according to police sources ‘the first of its kind 
in the uK that seeks to monitor a population 
seen as ‘at risk’ of extremism’ – saw hundreds of 
cameras installed in two Muslim areas of the city, 
sparkbrook and Washwood Heath. ostensibly 
to improve safety but secretly financed with 
£3 million in counter-terrorism funding, the 
scheme was only dropped after being exposed 
in the press.19 thus, when lennon declared 
birmingham ‘the continued epicentre for 
terrorism’ he was, in a way, only echoing a 
diagnosis made by the authorities.
While both the government and the counter-jihad 
movement have eyed Muslim communities with 
suspicion, counter-jihadists have also taken note 
of government intervention in other issues said 
to be related to ‘extremism’. in December 2013, 
the prime minister, David cameron, intervened 
in a row over gender segregation at events 
held on university campuses by student islamic 
societies – though the evidence of a widespread 
problem was dubious at best.20 nonetheless, 
within months some uK counter-jihadists had 
taken up the issue. in May 2014, members 
of britain First, a party with links to christian 
fundamentalism, ulster loyalism and the far-right 
british national Party, began a series of ‘mosque 
invasions’ across the country. Although not 
normally women’s rights advocates (the party 
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has opposed abortion, for example), when britain 
First activists marched into crayford mosque in 
london they declared their aim was to ‘demand 
removal of sexist mosque signs’ designating 
separate entrances for men and women. Police 
investigated, but no arrests were made.21 
this was not the first time the islamophobic 
far-right had taken its cue from government 
counter-extremism agendas. Despite limited 
evidence, the uK has witnessed several years 
of scaremongering from certain ministers and 
press outlets, about universities being ‘hotbeds 
of extremism’.22 by early 2013, counter-jihad 
groups had decided to take matters into their own 
hands. student rights, part of the neoconservative 
think tank the Henry Jackson society, had been 
instrumental in the aforementioned gender 
segregation furore and again played a critical 
role here. (its founder, raheem Kassam, would 
later try to stand for leadership of uKiP, the 
united Kingdom independence Party, while his 
successor, elliot Miller, would be filmed delivering 
an islamophobic rant)23. When student rights 
raised the alarm about several allegedly ‘extreme’ 
events planned at universities, casuals united 
and the eDl intervened. ‘concerned patriots’ 
from the football hooligan-linked casuals ran a 
phone campaign against the university of essex 
and in nottingham demonstrated outside the 
university. in reading, far-right activists appeared 
on campus and intimidated the student islamic 
society. A number of events were cancelled for fear 
of violence.24 the links between counter-jihadists 
and neoconservatives – including transnationally 
– were confirmed in november 2017 when the 
Henry Jackson society’s Alan Mendoza and 
Douglas Murray spoke at the David Horowitz 
Freedom center’s ‘restoration Weekend’.25 Also 
listed as speakers were former trump White House 
strategist steve bannon and alt-righter richard 
spencer, who was banned from entering the uK in 
2013 due to his anti-Muslim rhetoric.
the echo chamber created by official counter-
extremism narratives, media pundits and right-
wing think tanks seems to have emboldened 
some counter-jihadists and legitimised the 
targeting of Muslims. As criminologist Fahid 
Qurashi has reflected, it appears that Prevent 
‘gives people permission to hate’.26 counter-
jihadists were quick to exploit several attacks in 
2017 for precisely that purpose, notably those in 
Westminster, Manchester and london bridge. 
Following the Westminster attack in March, in 
which six people including the attacker died, 
stephen Yaxley-lennon rushed to the scene. He 
recorded a video for rebel Media of himself near 
the Houses of Parliament in which he called islam 
‘a fascist violent ideology’ and claimed ‘islam 
is at war’ with britain.27 three weeks after the 
Manchester arena bombing in late May, which left 
22 people dead (many of them children), lennon 
spoke at what co-organisers rebel Media billed 
as a ‘silent march’ to ‘honour the dead’ in the 
city. Although it was organised under the banner 
‘uK Against Hate’, a pig’s head was waved in a 
clear gesture of hatred towards Muslims and eDl 
protestors clashed with police.28
interactions between counter-
extremism policy and the 
counter-jihad movement
Counter-jihadists within the 
political elite
counter-jihadists in the uK often seek to work 
through the state. stephen Yaxley-lennon and 
his cousin and eDl deputy Kevin carroll joined 
the british Freedom Party (bFP) in 2012. later 
that year carroll ran for office as Police and crime 
commissioner in luton.29 the strategy has been 
to shake off the ‘far-right’ label they had been 
given by the media. For instance, bFP’s then 
chairman Paul Weston claimed the party was 
‘central’ in orientation.30 And, after leaving the 
eDl, lennon told an interviewer:
What i want to do is…to take this 
mainstream…what we’ve been saying was 
criticised or ignored and pushed to the margin 
because of [the] far-right extremist tag they 
managed to give us… since leaving the eDl i 
believe people are listening now…rather than 
dismissing us after two minutes.’31
When Weston, lennon and Anne Marie Waters 
(see below) formed (the now defunct) PegiDA 
uK, they said in 2016 they aimed to make the 
group ‘something that is possible for Middle 
england to follow’.32
the mainstream already accommodates other 
counter-jihad actors; some are even members 
of the uK’s political elite. importantly, the same 
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cannot be said of neo-nazis, or any ‘islamist’ 
activists. one example of this counter-jihad elite 
is gerard batten, a uKiP MeP. His long-standing 
links to the anti-Muslim movement include 
speaking at the inaugural counter-jihad brussels 
conference in 2007, and meeting with eDl donor 
and strategist Alan Ayling (aka Alan lake) in 2011. 
in 2010, batten called for a ban on the building 
of new mosques and in 2014 it emerged that he 
had commissioned a document described as a 
‘Proposed charter of Muslim understanding’, 
suggesting Muslims be required to sign a five-
point declaration including a rejection of violence. 
but the claim that many Muslims quietly tolerate 
violence without actively participating in it has also 
been made by leading politicians. in 2011, David 
cameron condemned ‘organisations that, while 
non-violent, are certainly in some cases part of the 
problem’.33 eric Pickles, the former communities 
secretary, wrote to a thousand Muslim leaders in 
england telling them they had ‘more work to do’ 
promoting ‘british values’ following the January 
2015 attacks on Paris.34 two months later theresa 
May, as home secretary, claimed there was 
‘increasing evidence that a small but significant 
number of people living in britain – almost all of 
whom are british citizens – reject our values’, and 
emphasised the threat of ‘islamic extremism’.35 
batten’s colleague lord Malcolm Pearson (a 
former uKiP leader) is a counter-jihad actor 
even more deeply embedded in britain’s 
political establishment. in 2013, he instigated a 
parliamentary debate during which he declared, 
‘i fear the dark side is moving strongly within 
islam.’ He justified his prejudice with a security 
rationale, claiming that ‘large and growing 
Muslim communities’ represented ‘thousands 
of home-grown potential terrorists’.36 in 2014 
he said Muslims need to ‘address the violence 
in the Koran’,37 a claim similar to that made by 
far-right german politician rene stadtkewitz 
(see Chapter 4). Pearson has also attended and 
spoken at various counter-jihad conferences 
since 2007, most recently the 2015 Defeat 
Jihad summit in Washington (see Chapter 2), 
where he spoke via skype along with notorious 
us islamophobes robert spencer and Pamela 
geller – and not for the first time.38 Pearson 
has also twice attempted (once successfully) 
to host Dutch politician geert Wilders – a key 
european counter-jihad figurehead – in the 
british parliament. His accomplice in both cases 
was baroness caroline cox, a christian Zionist 
crossbench peer with uKiP sympathies. As 
noted in Chapter 2, she sits on the board of the 
gatestone institute, an islamophobic new York 
think tank, and promotes counter-jihad ideas 
from within the House of lords.39
counter-jihadists waging 
‘counter-extremism’
Sharia Watch UK
several uK counter-jihadists have used ‘counter-
extremism’ as an excuse to target Muslims. 
baroness cox has been a powerful ally for some 
such groups, offering them a platform – and a 
dangerous veneer of legitimacy – in the House 
of lords. one group, sharia Watch uK, is led by 
Anne Marie Waters, who was nearly selected as 
a labour party candidate for brighton Pavilion 
in 2013 before she joined uKiP. sharia Watch 
has pushed the bizarre islamophobic conspiracy 
theory that sales of halal meat fund terrorism.40 
Despite this, the group has been quoted by the 
Sunday Telegraph and Daily Mail newspapers as 
an authority on extremism, the latter promoting 
its claim that ‘islamic extremists’ were ‘infiltrating’ 
scout groups.41 baroness cox dissociated 
herself from sharia Watch after intense media 
scrutiny of the group’s plan to host a provocative 
‘Mohammed cartoon exhibition’ in september 
2015, which ultimately fell through. but Waters – 
as well as working with stephen Yaxley-lennon 
on PegiDA uK – cooperated with him to launch 
yet another self-declared ‘counter-extremism’ 
group called voice (victims of islamic cultural 
extremism) which claimed it opposed ‘left and 
right-wing extremists’.42 
since losing her high-profile bid for the uKiP 
leadership in september 2017, Waters has set 
up her own anti-islam political party, ‘For britain’. 
this, she claims, aims to ‘reach the people who 
have been forgotten and left behind’.43 Waters 
has also been linked to members of the new uK 
branch of the pan-european generation identity 
movement (see Chapter 5).
Stand for Peace
baroness cox also hosted an organisation 
called stand for Peace (sFP) in the House of 
lords. like sharia Watch and voice, sFP styled 
islamophobia in europe: counter-extremism policies and the counterjihad movement • 25
itself as a ‘counter-extremism’ body. but once 
again this professed mandate merely provided 
cover for targeting Muslims whilst obscuring the 
extreme views of its own staff. sFP founder sam 
Westrop is also a ‘distinguished senior fellow’ at 
the gatestone institute, which reportedly funded 
sFP’s report Don’t fund extremism.44
Yet the Department for communities and local 
government (Dclg), where a government drive 
to root out perceived ‘extremism’ was already 
underway, was receptive to Westrop’s claims – 
and once again the right-wing media was a key 
intermediary. in september 2014, sFP claimed 
member organisations of the Muslim charities 
Forum (McF) had links to the union of the good, 
a body designated a ‘sponsor of terrorism’ by the 
us government (but not the uK government).45 
the next day the Telegraph picked up the ‘story’46 
and although McF steadfastly insisted that its 
work was purely humanitarian, before long Dclg 
had halted both its funding and that of McF 
member islamic Help.47 communities secretary 
eric Pickles said this decision ‘follow[ed] a formal 
review of the project, which included examination 
of allegations made in the press’.48 We filed 
a freedom of information request to Dclg in 
January 2015 and after 18 months of refusals, it 
eventually released documents which suggested 
sFP’s claims had been influential.49 
in 2017 Westrop and sFP were sued for 
defamation by Mohamed Ali Harrath, a tunisian 
dissident who had been tortured and imprisoned 
by the ben Ali regime. the judge decided sFP’s 
description of Harrath as a ‘convicted terrorist’ 
was libellous. However, it was little more than 
a symbolic victory for the truth since Westrop’s 
lawyers said neither he nor his organisation had 
assets in the uK and therefore could not pay 
costs or damages.50 by that time, Westrop had 
moved to the us, where he now runs the Middle 
east Forum’s ‘islamist Watch’ project.51 
Stephen Yaxley-Lennon and the 
Quilliam Foundation
equally noteworthy has been the willingness 
of some counter-extremism actors with close 
proximity to state power to associate with 
counter-jihadists. in october 2013, the Quilliam 
Foundation (which received almost £3 million from 
the british government between 2008 and 201252 
and in 2016 was linked to breakthrough Media’s 
state-funded propaganda campaign) held a joint 
press conference with stephen Yaxley-lennon, 
dramatically announcing his exit from the eDl. 
As author Hsiao-Hung Pai observed, by simply 
declaring himself ‘opposed to extremism’ at ‘both 
ends of the spectrum’ the ‘former leader of a far-
right movement was suddenly a liberal’.53
on the same day this spectacle was staged, 
Quilliam’s Maajid nawaz wrote to the Dclg 
to request funds for his organisation – and for 
lennon – to ‘cut off [his] … dependency on 
eDl donors’ (funds were not forthcoming).54 He 
later also tried to arrange a speaking tour for 
lennon in secondary schools.55 Just one month 
after, lennon was in touch with us counter-
jihadists Pamela geller and robert spencer, 
confirming that his views had not in fact changed. 
nonetheless, in December 2015 it transpired that 
lennon – by this time involved in PegiDA uK – 
had received around £8,000 from Quilliam over 
six months in 2013.56 
thus, while Dclg was slashing funding for 
Muslim charities, a counter-extremism body close 
to it was channelling money to an unrepentant 
far-right activist. And while the Home office was 
demanding that educational establishments 
prevent the ‘radicalisation’ of young minds, the 
same body was attempting to secure lennon a 
platform to speak in schools – all in the name of 
‘countering extremism’.
official responses to the counter-
jihad movement
the british government has paid some 
attention to opposing islamophobia and right-
wing extremism. Actions taken to counter it, 
however, have been limited. last year the former 
independent reviewer of the government’s 
terrorism laws, David Anderson Qc, warned 
that far-right extremism in britain could be ‘as 
murderous as its islamist equivalent’. this was 
recently illustrated clearly when Darren osborne – 
an avid consumer of counter-jihad content online 
who had declared his intention to ‘kill all Muslims’ 
– murdered 51-year old Makram Ali in Finsbury 
Park, north london, in June 2017.57 Despite 
Prime Minister theresa May’s rhetoric after this 
attack, which stressed the need to counter 
‘extremism of any kind, including islamophobia’, it 
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has yet to be matched with policies that treat far-
right ideology as seriously as radical ‘islamism’.
As we have seen, counter-jihadists often claim to 
abhor racism and the far-right, saying they oppose 
only ‘extremists’ and are not against ‘individual 
Muslims’. but they also condemn ‘islam as an 
ideology’.58 David cameron’s famous 2011 Munich 
speech criticised this view. He said:
the hard right ignore this distinction between 
islam and islamist extremism and just say islam 
and the West are irreconcilable, this is a clash of 
civilisations…these people fuel islamophobia. 
And i completely reject their argument.59
in addition, the 2013 extremism task Force 
report asserted, albeit in passing, opposition 
to ‘islamophobia and neo-nazism’.60 both 
labour and conservative home secretaries have 
prevented counter-jihadists from entering the uK: 
Jacqui smith stopped a planned visit by Dutch 
politician geert Wilders in 2009 and theresa 
May denied Pamela geller and robert spencer 
in 2013. other indicators that the authorities 
may appreciate the severity of the counter-jihad 
threat include the police decision to provide 
protection to radical Muslim activist Anjem 
choudary after threats from britain First.61 in late 
2017, two britain First leaders – including Jayda 
Fransen, who gained notoriety worldwide after 
Donald trump shared her islamophobic tweets 
– were arrested and charged in connection 
with speeches made at a rally in August called 
northern ireland Against terrorism.62
However, the state has not targeted the far-right 
with anything near the level of propaganda and 
surveillance directed at the Muslim population. 
this is despite the emergence of new anti-
Muslim groups – such as generation identity, 
which originated in France (see Chapter 4) but 
also surfaced in the uK in 2017 – and despite 
waves of islamophobic violence which some 
have argued should be classified as political 
violence (rather than hate crime) when motivated 
by far-right nationalist politics.63 Most of the 2013 
extremism task Force’s policy recommendations, 
for example, were geared towards policing – 
rather than protecting – Muslim communities. 
Perhaps the only comparable practices are those 
covert policing operations used to infiltrate and 
undermine left-wing groups, such as anti-racism 
campaigners, animal rights and environmental 
activists, who have also sometimes been labelled 
and monitored as ‘extremists’.64 While a unit 
monitoring the far-right reportedly exists, the few 
known cases of police covert infiltration appear to 
have targeted neo-nazi groups like the bnP and 
not counter-jihadists like the eDl.65 
in fact, since its emergence, the state has not 
categorised the eDl as far-right. When the group 
first surfaced in 2009, chanting ‘Muslim bombers 
off our streets’, it claimed to oppose only ‘islamic 
extremism and terrorism’. that same year, the 
bbc reported that ‘four specialist national police 
units are investigating the eDl’ but in september, 
Metropolitan Police commissioner sir Paul 
stephenson declared that the eDl and stop the 
islamisation of europe were not extreme right-
wing groups. His main concern, he said, was 
‘how groups like that either willingly or unwillingly 
allow themselves to be exploited by very extreme 
right-wing groups like the national Front’.66 even 
in 2016, the national Domestic extremism unit still 
reportedly classified the eDl in a unique category 
called ‘defence leagues’, and not as part of the 
far right.67
not classifying the eDl as far-right seems to 
ignore its racism, nationalism and clear links to 
violence. lennon himself has predicted civil war 
on more than one occasion, for example stating: 
60 per cent of british people think that there’s 
going to be a bloody civil war between 
Muslims and non-Muslims. i think that… if that 
is the case, at which point do those 60 per 
cent start preparing for that war?
He has also confessed that Michael rafferty 
of the combined ex-Forces (cxF) wing of the 
eDl ‘talked about bombing the Muslim protests 
in london’.68 Meanwhile, at an eDl demo in 
birmingham in october 2014, one speaker – who 
addressed his audience clad in full chain-mail 
– was introduced as a ‘Knights templar’. Mass 
murderer Anders breivik claimed to have re-
founded this ancient crusading organisation with 
nine other people in london in 2002. Prosecutors 
at his trial said they did not believe the group 
existed, although breivik insisted it had two more 
active cells that would continue his work.69
on 16 June 2016, a week before the uK 
referendum on eu membership (which itself 
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sparked a wave of hate-crime), 53-year-old 
thomas Mair murdered labour MP Jo cox. 
Mair was obsessed with nazism, fascinated 
by breivik, and screamed ‘britain First’ before 
attacking cox, a known supporter of migrants 
and anti-islamophobia causes. A photo emerged 
of him reportedly protesting with britain First’s 
northern brigade activists in the year prior.70 this 
brutally underlined the violent potential of the 
far-right, as well as the inter-mingling of neo-nazi 
and counter-jihad ideas. Yet despite their close 
connection, the government continued to regard 
counter-jihadists as less dangerous. in December 
2016, the viciously anti-semitic group national 
Action was banned as a terrorist organisation 
but despite a call that same month from labour 
MP louise Haigh for britain First to be similarly 
outlawed, neither it nor any other anti-Muslim 
group has been proscribed.71 
equally indicative of mainstream political 
complacency about the far-right was how 
David cameron while prime minister in 2013 
invited MePs from germany’s Alternative für 
Deutschland (AfD) party to sit with a group he 
created in the european Parliament, despite 
AfD’s links to the anti-islam PegiDA movement 
(see Chapter 4). Although its MePs were 
eventually expelled from cameron’s group in 
2016, this conferred respectability on what 
was then a fledgling party and likely helped it 
to grow. illustrating the same complacency on 
a smaller scale was the Afzal Amin scandal, 
which came to light in early 2015. Aspiring 
tory MP Amin was secretly filmed meeting with 
then eDl chief, steve eddowes, and its former 
head stephen Yaxley-lennon. remarkably, in 
return for helping stage-manage a fake anti-
mosque demonstration which he planned to 
take credit for calling off, Amin promised to be 
an ‘unshakeable ally’ to the eDl in parliament.72 
in other words, he would take credit for a 
‘counter-extremism’ coup while actually 
cooperating with and promoting the group. 
in December 2017, the former independent 
reviewer of uK terrorism legislation, David 
Anderson Qc, published a report on confidential 
internal reviews conducted into intelligence-
handling leading up to the various attacks that 
year. it described an operational improvement 
review by senior members of Mi5 and counter-
terrorism policing, which proposed a ‘step-change’ 
in handling of so-called ‘domestic extremism’ 
cases, intended to ‘ensure the equivalence of 
processes in analysing and dealing with all kinds of 
terrorism, irrespective of the ideology that inspires 
them’.73 While this recognised the ‘XrW’ (extreme 
right-wing) threat in particular and the need for it 
to be taken as seriously as other types of threat, it 
was also an acknowledgement that this was not 
currently happening.
conclusion 
We have argued in this chapter that the british 
government’s drive to turn public sector workers 
into informants has created an environment in 
which the islamophobic paranoia of the counter-
jihad movement thrives. the language of counter-
extremism and its targets have suited the agenda 
of this strand of the far-right, which takes its cue 
from the ‘war on terror’. in the uK, some counter-
jihadists exist within the political elite. others, 
we have shown, even masquerade as ‘counter-
extremists’, such is the flexibility and slipperiness 
of the concept of ‘extremism’. Moulded to suit 
the ideological agenda of the counter-jihad 
movement, ‘counter-extremism’ becomes a 
weapon allowing them to attack Muslims with 
impunity while masking their own extreme 
islamophobia.
the government has historically been unwilling 
or unable to see the counter-jihad movement 
as extreme or far-right. this may be because 
the meaning of ‘extremism’ turns on what 
Arun Kundnani calls ‘the racial subtext to the 
entire discourse of counterterrorism’.74 in the 
uK context specifically, the counter-extremism 
apparatus and Prevent strategy were created with 
a particular threat in mind, hence the reference to 
so-called ‘british values’ against which extremism 
is to be defined. 
given this genealogy, we should not be surprised 
that the counter-jihad movement tends to 
slip through the net. While the ‘old’ far-right 
– traditional neo-nazis – are recognised as 
extremists, the authorities appear to have taken 
the counter-jihadists’ distancing of themselves 
from such groups as evidence of a lesser threat. 
underlying this assumption are the overlaps in 
the thinking of mainstream counter-extremists 
and counter-jihadists, recognised for example by 
stephen Yaxley-lennon, who in explaining his 
reasons for working with the Quilliam Foundation 
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said: ‘i realised our views were similar’.75 this 
should raise serious questions about the 
foundations of government counter-extremism 
policies as well as their effects. Despite repeated 
assertions that ‘all forms of extremism’ must 
be taken seriously, the recent controversial 
appointment of a commissioner for countering 
extremism suggests that Muslims remain a 
suspect community while organised islamophobia 
causes far less official concern.
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chapter 4: germany
When a mosque in the west german city of 
saarbrücken was vandalised in november 2015 
– a few days after attacks in Paris, France, killed 
130 people – the word ‘murderers’ was scrawled 
on the door. According to a report in Deutsche 
Welle, Aiman Mazyek, from the central council of 
Muslims responded by calling on politicians and 
the media to ‘stop asking us [Muslims] to distance 
ourselves from these attacks’, attributing rising 
islamophobia to a culture of collective blame.1 
this case study suggests that germany’s rapidly 
intensifying counter-extremism policies have 
started to institutionalise this culture of collective 
blame and suspicion. it also shows that these 
policies have shaped a climate in which the 
counter-jihad strand of the far-right has grown, 
both through parties like Alternative for germany 
(AfD) and through street-movements like PegiDA. 
While counter-extremism policies in germany do 
target the far-right to some extent, they principally 
focus on traditional neo-nazi organisations, from 
which counter-jihadists ostentatiously attempt 
to distance themselves. several counter-jihad 
groups, we show, in fact style themselves as 
‘counter-extremists’, finding the emphasis on 
islam/ism useful. though some signs suggest that 
neo-nazi politics in germany may be declining, 
the increasingly mainstream presence of counter-
jihad ideas suggests the country cannot afford to 
be complacent about any form of far-right politics. 
government counter-extremism 
policies 
Political violence in german history includes 
examples of attacks by leftist revolutionaries the 
red Army Faction (aka baader-Meinhof gang) 
in the 1970s, and Palestinian political violence 
such as the Munich olympics killings of 1972 and 
the lufthansa flight hijacking of october 1977. 
entrenched far-right violence is also a problem. 
A notable example was the series of racially 
motivated murders of mostly turkish victims by 
the neo-nazi national socialist underground 
(nsu).2 one estimate of people killed by far-
right violence since 1990 puts the total at 184.3 
Another source claims a more recent (and higher) 
average of 17 race-related killings annually.4 
germany also admitted a million migrants 
in 2015. in the same year, there were 1,005 
recorded attacks on asylum seekers’ shelters (a 
five-fold annual increase), 90 per cent of which 
were believed to have been committed by far-
right activists.5 
germany had not, however, suffered any large-
scale ‘islamist’ terrorist attacks in the post-9/11 era 
until 2016. Prior to this, several plots were thwarted 
German Chancellor Angela Merkel speaking on a platform of the European People’s 
Party, the largest centre-right grouping in the European Parliament. Source: EPP
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including the so-called ‘sauerland group’, who had 
reportedly planned a series of bombings.6 in the 
summer of 2016, four attacks – two carried out 
by asylum seekers – heightened the securitisation 
of the immigration issue in public debates and 
deepened the perception of terrorism as a ‘foreign’ 
threat. then in December 2016, in an attack 
claimed by isis, a man killed 12 people by driving 
a truck into a crowded christmas market. Although 
germany has long had a decentralised intelligence 
gathering architecture – to prevent an entity such 
as the nazi gestapo or stasi intelligence service of 
east germany re-emerging – this spate of violence 
prompted the government to add unprecedented 
new surveillance laws to the country’s criminal 
code in June 2017.7 
germany’s federal interior ministry defines 
extremist activities as:
those which oppose our democratic 
constitutional state and its fundamental values, 
norms and rules, and aim to overthrow the 
liberal democratic order and replace it with one 
in line with the ideas of the respective group. 
it states that extremists ‘often accept, promote 
and actually use’ violence, but compiles statistics 
on non-violent ‘extremists’ too. the national 
internal intelligence agency, the Federal bureau 
for the Protection of the constitution (bfv), 
conceptualises three types of extremism: right-
wing, left wing and islamist.8 For instance, in 2014 
it categorised 27,200 individuals as ‘left-wing 
extremist’, said to include those with revolutionary 
Marxist or anarchist ideas.9 of these, 7,600 were 
‘considered to belong to the violence-oriented 
left-wing extremist spectrum’.
official narratives about extremism in germany 
do not, therefore, focus exclusively on Muslims. 
However, according to the federal interior ministry 
‘ ‘islamist’-motivated international terrorism is 
now, and will for the foreseeable future remain, 
the greatest threat to the security of the Federal 
republic of germany and the West’.10 Due to this 
belief, and the difficulty of defining ‘extremism’ 
clearly, counter-extremism programmes have 
targeted germany’s entire Muslim population. Yet 
the statistics cited above point to racist violence 
in germany killing far more people than ‘islamist’-
linked attacks. indeed, according to one analyst, 
the authorities failed in the nsu case partly 
because ‘they considered islamist terrorism the 
far-larger problem’ and showed a lack of interest 
in far-right violence.11
‘islamist’ extremism and counter-
measures
the bfv acknowledges that ‘islamism in germany 
is no uniform phenomenon’ but the authorities 
are particularly concerned about salafism, an 
ultra-conservative current of islam.12 in 2014, the 
bfv classified 43,890 people in germany with 
‘islamist’ potential, around 7,900 of whom were 
deemed salafists – ‘a new high-point’, according 
to agency chief Hans-georg Maassen.13 but as 
journalist ben Knight, writing in Deutsche Welle, 
observes, the definition of salafist ‘remains 
somewhat nebulous’.14 the government argues 
that there is ‘no clear dividing line’ between 
salafists who reject violence and those who 
favour it, because it holds the ideology to be 
a ‘breeding ground for ‘islamist’ radicalisation 
towards…jihad’.15 Partly as a result of this 
vagueness, counter-extremism programmes have 
targeted germany’s entire four million Muslim 
population.16 
in 2006, the government set up the annual 
german islam conference. but already by the 
second event, one of four major german Muslim 
organisations – the central council of Muslims 
in germany – had pulled out, citing lack of 
Muslim representation and failure to prioritise 
discussion of islamophobia.17 the german islam 
conference’s three priorities, in early 2017, were 
‘promoting cooperation and integration’, ‘gender 
equality’ and ‘preventing extremism’.18
the government also launched two hotlines 
targeting Muslim communities: the first, in 
2010, was HAtiF (Arabic for ‘phone’ as well as 
a german acronym for ‘leaving terrorism and 
‘islamist’ fanaticism),19 followed in 2012 by the 
‘radicalisation counselling centre’. Friends and 
relatives were encouraged to inform on anyone 
believed at risk of ‘radicalisation’.20 However, a 
poster campaign to publicise the latter in Muslim 
neighbourhoods in berlin, Hamburg and bonn 
prompted four out of six Muslim organisations 
to withdraw cooperation, complaining that the 
campaign generalised suspicion of all Muslims.21 
Yet the underlying attitude of collective blame and 
collective suspicion has not changed since; in 
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July 2016 chancellor Angela Merkel stated that 
Muslim community leaders should more clearly 
reject terrorism.22 
Meanwhile a ‘de-radicalisation’ programme 
focused on Muslim extremists called Hayat 
(Arabic for ‘life’) is modelled on a similar scheme 
run by eXit-Deutschland to de-radicalise neo-
nazis. but whereas individuals self-refer to eXit’s 
programme, Hayat relies on informants among 
families, friends or employers of potentially 
‘radicalised’ Muslims. And the decision on 
whether someone is ‘in danger of becoming 
violent or whether it’s a harmless case of 
increasing religiosity’ is also left to state officials.23
right-wing extremism and 
counter-measures
We found that greater emphasis is placed on 
combatting ‘right-wing extremism’ in germany 
than in either the uK or France. in February 2017, 
for instance, the regional counterterrorism chief 
in the state of thuringia stephan Kramer warned 
that far-right terror cells could pose a ‘serious risk’ 
to ‘democracy and our open society’.24 the bfv 
classified 21,000 people as right-wing extremist 
in 2014; of whom it estimated 10,500 might use 
violence. the government financially supports 
the not-for-profit eXit-Deutschland (co-founded 
by former neo-nazi, ingo Hasselbach) which 
describes itself as ‘an initiative to help anyone 
who wants to break with right-wing-extremism 
start a new life’.25 since 2001 the bfv has also 
run its own dropout programme, encouraging 
individuals to quit the far-right. 
the bfv has noted the growth of islamophobia, 
stating:
in recent years, islamophobia as a modern 
form of xenophobia has become increasingly 
important as a field of action for the right-
wing extremist scene. right-wing extremists 
try to arouse the population’s fear of ‘foreign 
domination’ and its prejudices against the 
religion of islam and Muslims.26
some plans for far-right violence motivated by 
this ideology have been thwarted. For example, 
in May 2015 members of a group called the 
oldschool society who planned to attack homes 
for asylum seekers and mosques were arrested 
and charged.27 For the most part, however, the 
government’s counter-extremism programmes 
targeted at the far-right remain heavily focused 
on neo-nazism. For instance, besides ‘islamist’ 
groups, most organisations banned by the state 
are neo-nazi actors, with minimal attention 
paid to counter-jihadists.28 even here, as was 
clear in the aftermath of the national socialist 
underground scandal, official counter-action is 
deeply flawed. Moreover, understanding of – and 
opposition to – newer far-right currents which 
promote islamophobia while claiming to reject 
anti-semitism, lags even further behind.
the next sections look at the counter-jihad 
movement in germany. Firstly, we examine those 
actors seeking to work through the state within 
political parties, who are generally law-abiding 
– and therefore often fall outside the purview 
of counter-extremism programmes – but are 
nonetheless extremely dangerous. 
counter-jihad movement
the bfv states that membership of ‘right-wing 
extremist’ groups has suffered ‘years of decline’ 
(though its website also notes that this trend 
was bucked in 2015).29 Data showing falling 
support, over the long term, for the neo-nazi 
national Democratic Party (nPD) is no cause for 
complacency, however. right-wing extremism in 
germany may merely be changing shape. 
A closer look at the recent history of 
‘bürgerbewegung pro nrW’ (known simply 
as ‘Pro nrW’) illustrates this transformation. 
Founded in 2007, the far-right populist group 
(named after the north rhine Westphalia region 
of germany) is a party which grew out of the 
Pro bürgerbewegung (‘citizens’ movement’) 
network. specifically, it is linked to Pro Köln, 
based in the region’s biggest city cologne 
(Köln). Pro Köln was itself founded in 1996 as 
an offshoot of the nazi Deutsche Liga fur Volk 
und Heimat by Markus beisicht (a lawyer and 
‘fascist activist’30) and Manfred rouhs (a former 
nPD member). Despite this heritage, its offshoot 
Pro nrW has attempted to dissociate itself 
from anti-semitism. instead, it has embraced 
islamophobia and campaigns against what it calls 
the ‘islamisation’ of north rhine Westphalia and 
against mosque construction. When us counter-
jihad activist robert spencer was criticised over 
an invitation to speak to a Pro Köln event in 
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cologne, he emphasised this shift, denying that 
the group was far-right by saying: ‘real neo-
nazis…despise and repudiate them for their 
pro-israel stance’.31 As Chapter 2 explained, this 
realignment typifies a wider trend on the far right.
However, a new political force in germany has 
more successfully managed to ‘avoid the nazi 
label’.32 Alternative for germany (Alternative für 
Deutschland, AfD) is a fast-growing, right-wing 
populist party founded in 2013. As Chapter 3 
observed, the AfD was given an early boost by 
former uK prime minister David cameron who 
conferred respectability on the fledgling party by 
inviting its MePs to sit with a group he created 
in the european parliament (though they were 
later expelled).33 When Frauke Petry became AfD 
leader in July 2015, more moderate co-founders 
bernd lucke and Konrad Adam quit, because 
her ascendancy signalled a move from the party’s 
original euroscepticism towards a hard-line anti-
refugee stance. in January 2016 Petry made 
world headlines by declaring ‘people must stop 
migrants from crossing illegally [into germany]’, 
and ‘if necessary, [they] should use firearms.’34 
Despite this, the party made strong gains in 
regional german elections in March 2016, 
entering state parliament for the first time in three 
states.35 soon after, it hardened its islamophobic 
policies to complement its anti-immigrant stance, 
calling for a ban on minarets and the burqa.36 
(A bavarian faction of the party called for AfD 
to advocate a complete ban on all mosques.)37 
in september 2016 AfD won 14 per cent of 
votes in berlin and pushed Merkel’s christian 
Democratic union (cDu) party into third place in 
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania.38 
AfD’s onward march continued with a historic 
shakeup of german national politics in 2017. 
Winning nearly 13 per cent of the vote and 94 
seats in the bundestag, this was the strongest 
showing by a far-right party in any post-war 
german election. Frauke Petry quit the party 
two days after this dramatic result to serve as an 
independent MP for saxony and criticised AfD 
for holding views too far outside the mainstream. 
However, while its success was considered by 
some a sign of opposition to Merkel and other 
mainstream parties, its popularity has continued 
to grow.39 by February 2018, a poll commissioned 
by Bild newspaper suggested that the AfD had 
for the first time surpassed the centre left social 
Democratic Party (sPD) in popularity.40 
the AfD has enjoyed such success partly 
because it has strongly denied the label ‘far-
right’. Former leader Frauke Petry has insisted, 
for example, that ‘right and left are terms that 
haven’t fitted for a long time’, declaring that 
instead politicians ‘either recognise that we 
need concepts that lead to solutions or not’.41 
but the AfD is closely linked to the counter-jihad 
strand of the far-right. it has been called ‘the 
political arm of PegiDA’, a grassroots counter-
jihad movement examined below. Petry met with 
PegiDA members and her successor as AfD 
leader Alexander gauland attended one of its 
protests in December 201442 and declared his 
party ‘the natural allies’ of PegiDA. evidence 
supports this view. An Economist straw 
poll suggested that nine out of 10 PegiDA 
supporters backed the AfD above germany’s 
two major parties, the cDu and sPD. AfD 
officials openly wooed PegiDA members just 
before the 2017 national elections at a joint rally 
in Dresden aimed at boosting the party’s vote 
and PegiDA founder lutz bachmann explicitly 
told supporters to vote for the AfD.43
importantly, just as bachmann would be caught 
up in an anti-semitism row (explained below), it 
emerged showing that AfD figures in at least one 
state (saarland) sought to recruit known neo-
nazis to the party.44 this clearly undermines the 
AfD’s self-presentation as being separate from 
anti-semitic currents. the evidence outlined in 
the next section demonstrates, however, that 
parties like the AfD and movements like PegiDA 
have also flourished partly as a result of counter-
extremism policies which encourage generalised 
suspicion of Muslims.
counter-jihadists waging 
‘counter-extremism’
We have examined the german government’s 
counter-extremism approach, which islamic 
organisations have argued casts suspicion upon 
all Muslims, while the focus of the less strenuous 
efforts to counter far-right extremism is on neo-
nazism. We have also looked at the turn towards 
islamophobia on the far-right and the growth 
of parties like the AfD which reject the label 
‘far-right’. As was noted in the uK case study 
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(Chapter 3) some anti-islam activists borrow 
aspects from mainstream counter-extremism 
frameworks. We look now at similar patterns 
among german counter-jihadists and how the 
so-called ‘counter-extremism’ they wage serves 
both to legitimise their politics and provides a 
powerful discourse with which to attack Muslims.
PEGIDA
PegiDA – which derives its name from the 
german acronym Patriotische Europäer Gegen 
die Islamisierung Des Abendlandes (‘Patriotic 
europeans Against islamisation of the West’) 
– initially attracted crowds in the dozens or 
hundreds, when it began holding weekly rallies 
in Dresden in october 2014. but by December 
2014 it was drawing over 10,000 people to 
the city’s schlossplatz square. its 12 January 
2015 demonstration, just after the Paris attacks, 
drew a record 25,000 crowd. the movement 
spawned many copycat efforts, both nationally 
– notably in leipzig (legiDA), berlin (bergiDA), 
cologne (KÖgiDA), Düsseldorf (DÜgiDA) and 
many other german cities – and internationally 
(including Pegida France, Pegida uK, Pegida 
swerige,  Pegida Danmark and Pegida 
Österreich). Although these have proved less 
successful, the size of the protests, and speed 
with which the meme and the message spread, 
prompted alarm in germany, across europe 
and beyond.
PegiDA’s message was often packaged in 
the language of liberal counter-extremism. its 
leaders declared that the movement was against 
‘preachers of hate, regardless of what religion’ 
and ‘radicalism, regardless of whether religiously 
or politically motivated’.45 in a clear nod to the 
german government’s approach – rejection of 
left, right and ‘islamist’ extremism – PegiDA’s 
logo depicts the Anti-Fascist network logo, 
the communist hammer and sickle, the nazi 
swastika and the isis flag being thrown in a 
dustbin all together. the accompanying slogan 
reads ‘Away with all the radical trash!’ insofar as 
such positioning can be taken at face value, it 
demonstrates that mainstream german political 
culture has succeeded in stigmatising explicit anti-
semitism. However, PegiDA distances itself from 
neo-nazi currents only to replace anti-semitism 
with its islamophobic and xenophobic agenda. 
notably, by placing isis in the same category 
as nazism, the PegiDA logo evokes the notion 
of ‘islamofascism’. Placing explicitly anti-fascist 
left wingers in the same category, meanwhile, 
illustrates the way counter-extremism frameworks 
which decontextualise political violence and 
equate ‘islamism’, fascism and far-left politics are 
used by organised islamophobes. they appear 
to have created space for the counter-jihad 
movement – which masks its racism in talk of 
liberalism, democracy, legality, free speech and 
civil liberties – to advance its goals.
PegiDA’s rejection of anti-semitism is 
questionable. german newspapers published 
photographs of founder lutz bachmann posing 
as Adolf Hitler in January 2015, forcing him 
to resign as leader. but he returned in March, 
claiming the photos had been doctored by the 
‘lügenpresse’ (lying media), and despite being 
convicted of inciting hatred in May 2016, following 
derogatory comments about asylum seekers.46 
(bachmann later set up a new political party, 
the liberal Direct Democratic People’s Party, in 
June 2016). PegiDA’s ‘manifesto’ emphasises 
migrants and Muslims, calling for the immediate 
deportation of asylum seekers with criminal 
convictions and demanding the preservation of 
so-called ‘Judeo-christian Western culture’. it has 
attracted support from groups like the far-right 
Hooligans Against salafists (Hogesa), whose 
chosen name echoes official concerns that 
this conservative strand of islam is a domestic 
security threat, as outlined earlier. ironically 
Hogesa is itself known for violence. 
rene stadtkewitz, who in 2010 founded 
the single-issue anti-islam party Die Freiheit 
(‘Freedom’) has also welcomed PegiDA. 
speaking at its Dresden protest on 23 February 
2015, stadtkewitz portrayed the islamic holy 
book as a direct cause of violence, saying: 
i call on all Muslims: stand up and tear the 
violence and the hatred out of the Koran. 
Write a new Koran 2.0. only then can there be 
peaceful co-existence. only you can do that!
“ PEGIDA’s message was often packaged in 
the language of liberal counter-extremism. 
Its leaders declared that the movement 
was against ‘preachers of hate, regardless 
of what religion…’”
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this recalls a remark made by the uK’s lord 
Pearson for Muslims to ‘address the violence 
in the Koran’ (see Chapter 3). both comments 
illustrate rasmus Fleischer’s observation that:
anti-Muslim racism is typically articulated in an 
inductive way by generalising the behaviour 
of individuals, claiming that this behaviour is 
determined by ‘islam’ and that it is emblematic 
for all persons coming from a Muslim 
background.47
but stadtkewitz’s claim that Muslims can act to 
prevent political violence – which also implies that 
they are responsible for causing it – only echoes 
more bluntly the call made by Angela Merkel for 
german Muslims to ‘clearly reject terrorism’.
Bürgerbewegung Pax Europa
like PegiDA, bürgerbewegung Pax europa 
(bPe) – where stadtkewitz is deputy chairman 
– presents itself as a counter-extremism body 
but promotes islamophobia. Founded in 2008, 
the pressure group describes itself as a ‘human 
rights organisation’ which stands for ‘freedom 
and democracy’ and ‘against islamization’. in 
January 2015, bPe issued a press release in 
support of PegiDA, declaring ‘islamisation’ a 
real and existential threat to ‘liberal democratic 
societies’ in europe. but beneath this veneer 
of democratic values and liberal rhetoric lies 
racism. bPe regularly lobbies at the organization 
for security and cooperation in europe (osce) 
– often represented by anti-Muslim activist 
called elisabeth sabaditsch-Wolff – where it has 
collaborated with the pan-european counter-jihad 
group the international civil liberties Alliance 
and the us-based center for security Policy 
run by Frank gaffney. (sabaditsch-Wolff and 
gaffney, as Chapter 2 noted, were pictured with 
Donald trump at a counter-jihad conference 
in 2011, before he became us president).48 
bPe’s submissions to the osce include a 2014 
statement recommending that member states 
‘repeal all hate speech legislation’ and a 2013 
paper which made unsubstantiated claims that 
‘sweden has the second highest rape rate in the 
world’ where ‘in most cases the perpetrator is a 
Muslim immigrant’.49
bPe’s national secretary conny Axel Meier is 
notable for a 2012 attempt to appropriate anti-
fascist history for the far-right. With others, he 
claimed to have revived the anti-nazi resistance 
Weiße Rose (White rose) movement, for 
the purposes of resisting ‘islamisation’ and 
‘islamofascism’. in an interview, Meier stated that 
‘today through historical misrepresentation’ the 
original White rose group (active between 1942-
43) had been ‘pushed into proximity with so-
called anti-fascists’ but was in fact, according to 
him, ‘a national-conservative, liberal movement’.50 
At the counter-jihad brussels 2012 conference, 
Meier explicitly compared germany’s Muslim 
minority to members of the nazi party.51 
Stresemann Stiftung 
Working closely with bPe in germany and at the 
osce is the stresemann stiftung (foundation). it 
describes itself, in innocuous-sounding terms, as 
‘committed to the preservation and advancement 
of the liberal-democratic legal system’ and calls 
its namesake gustav stresemann (leader of 
the german People’s Party between 1918-1929) a 
‘great statesman’ who ‘understood the necessity 
of shielding germany from extremist forces from 
the left as well as from the right’. in 2012 the 
organisation published a paper dismissing the idea 
of islamophobia52 and in March 2013 launched a 
website called ‘islam Debate germany’. Another 
site, ‘leftist extremism in germany’, followed. 
both projects purported to give ‘information on 
ideologies which pose an acute danger to our 
democracy and liberal democratic constitution’.
this language closely echoes the german 
government’s definition of extremism, highlighting 
how counter-jihadists have used counter-
extremism ideas to their own advantage. using 
this rhetoric and backed by ‘regular’ funding from 
the us-based think tank Middle east Forum until 
at least 2013,53 stresemann has gained some 
profile in mainstream arenas; for instance, its 
managing director Felix strüning has spoken in 
the european Parliament. 
“ by placing ISIS in the same category 
as Nazism, the PEGIDA logo evokes 
the notion of ‘Islamofascism’”
the german counter-jihad ideas 
in the mainstream
Few major public figures in germany would 
survive if they expressed support for isis, Al 
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Qaeda or a neo-nazi group. Yet a key factor in 
the growing power of counter-jihad actors in 
germany has been the articulation of aspects 
of counter-jihad ideology by several prominent 
personalities within the mainstream.
While much attention is paid to profiling young 
Muslim men, and investigating how and why a 
few may come to see violence as a legitimate 
response to grievances, little is said about another 
phenomenon: the tendency for some – typically 
white, male, middle-class conservatives – to turn 
towards racism and xenophobia in response 
to societal problems. their trajectories suggest 
that not only do far-right ideas penetrate the 
mainstream, but that centrist or soft conservative 
journalists and politicians are also becoming 
attracted to far-right politics through a process 
that might well be called radicalisation.
one example was udo ulfkotte who died in 
2017. Formerly a journalist with Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung he joined stop islamisation of 
europe and then co-founded bürgerbewegung 
Pax europa. ulfkotte later left bPe on bad 
terms but threw his weight behind PegiDA and 
spoke at a rally for its bonn variant (bogiDA) 
in December 2014, offering 16 arguments in 
favour of the ‘anti-islamisation’ movement. 
Another high profile journalist calling for an end to 
Muslim immigration to germany – but retaining 
a mainstream public platform (writing for Der 
Spiegel and Die Welt) – is Henryk broder, who 
also wrote the book Hurray! We capitulate: on 
the desire to cave in. As liz Fekete of the institute 
of race relations notes, this book’s premise is 
familiar: that ‘through omission, through naivety, 
through an unwillingness to act or even recognise 
the dangers ahead, liberal elites leave europe 
vulnerable to islamisation’.54 Germany abolishes 
itself by thilo sarrazin articulated the same 
themes. Published in 2010, it rapidly becoming 
the bestselling german-language political book in 
a decade. sarrazin – a former senator of finance 
for the state of berlin (January 2002 – April 
2009) and a Deutsche bundesbank executive 
board member – has also commented that 
‘all Jews share a certain gene…that distinguishes 
these from other people’ and claimed that ‘no 
immigrant group other than Muslims is so strongly 
connected with claims on the welfare state and 
crime’. Yet he remains an influential figure. 
Perhaps the most notorious case of radicalisation 
within officialdom is that of rainer grell, who 
once held high office in baden-Württemberg’s 
interior ministry. He caused controversy by 
developing a ‘values test’ for migrants seeking 
german citizenship, that initially applied only 
to applicants from organization of the islamic 
conference countries or those ‘appearing to be 
Muslims’.55 (Questions included: ‘Do you think 
women must obey their husbands, and if they 
don’t, should husbands be allowed to beat them?’ 
and ‘Do you think the september 11th attacks 
were committed by terrorists or freedom fighters?’). 
grell later became a prominent figure within bPe.
these examples help to explain why some in 
the german government are ambivalent about 
condemning movements like PegiDA. While 
Angela Merkel herself has strongly criticised 
PegiDA, her vice-chancellor, the social Democrat 
leader sigmar gabriel, admitted in January 2015 
that he had attended a Dresden forum, and had 
talked with PegiDA supporters. some politicians 
even cite the ‘deeply middle-class’ background 
of many PegiDA supporters and leadership and 
its sheer size as a reason to engage rather than 
condemn.56 saxony interior minister Markus 
ulbig of the cDu, for example, has said: 
We cannot label 10,000 people as right-wing 
extremists. that creates more problems than it 
solves…there are many middle-class citizens 
among them…and you can’t toss them all into 
the same neo-nazi pot.57 
According to Der Spiegel this same trait means 
that the far-right nPD view PegiDA as ‘a chance 
to take their worldview directly to the middle 
class’58 (recalling Paul Weston’s comments 
that PegiDA uK seeks to be a movement for 
‘middle england’; see Chapter 3). this veil of 
respectability arguably makes PegiDA – whom 
some have labelled ‘nazis in pinstripes’ – more 
dangerous than street-fighting skinheads. indeed, 
the same ostensible respectability is helping the 
political wing of the counter-jihad movement, the 
AfD. As german novelist Konstatin richter notes, 
the party retains ‘enough bourgeois respectability’ 
to attract mainstream conservatives.59 
A series of thefts and sexual assaults in front of 
cologne’s central station on new Year’s eve 2015 
– allegedly carried out by migrants, many said to 
be Muslims – raised the intensity of xenophobia 
islamophobia in europe: counter-extremism policies and the counterjihad movement • 37
and islamophobia in germany. the incident 
influenced migration legislation which has become 
more exclusionary, as well as hardening public 
opinion: one poll from May 2016 suggested that 
two-thirds of germans did not believe that islam 
‘belongs’ in the country.60 in December 2016, 
chancellor Angela Merkel called for a ban on the 
burqa ‘wherever legally possible’ and the run-up to 
the 2017 german elections saw the centre-ground 
of political debate dragged sharply to the right. 
Breitbart News, the so-called ‘alt-right’ website 
previously headed by ex-trump adviser steve 
bannon, was accused of spreading inflammatory 
fake news about events in germany.61 similarly, the 
us-based gatestone institute heavily promoted 
AfD politician björn Höcke.62
ultimately, Merkel‘s party failed to halt the 
meteoric success of the AfD at the ballot box that 
saw it gain seats in 14 of germany’s 16 regional 
parliaments. From becoming the country’s third 
largest party in the 2017 election, one poll in 
early 2018 suggested the party might even have 
beaten the social democrats into second place. 
the AfD’s political power will make it increasingly 
difficult for other parties to ignore and there are 
no obvious signs that the party is softening its 
counter-jihadist stance.
conclusion
Although german government counter-
extremism policies exist to target the far-right as 
well as ‘islamism’, only the latter has produced 
sweeping initiatives that foster a generalised 
suspicion of Muslims – even though most 
statistics suggest racist violence claims more 
lives in germany than ‘islamist’-linked terrorism. 
this, together with an understanding of ‘far-
right’ politics that uses a group’s professed 
attitude to anti-semitism as the key litmus test, 
has allowed room for organised islamophobic 
groups to make gains. evidence that some 
such groups have become ostensibly 
respectable through expressing their ideas in 
terms of liberal values and echoing the rhetoric 
and symbolism of official ‘counter-extremism’, 
suggests that these government policies may 
in fact be strengthening the counter-jihad 
movement, rather than offering counter-
narratives to it.
Helped by mainstream figures showing support 
for its ideas, the counter-jihad movement has 
not only altered the face of the far-right, it is 
changing and challenging the mainstream of 
german politics. thousands of germans have 
protested against the PegiDA movement. but 
it retains much support and recent events show 
that its politics are increasingly finding voice at 
the ballot box through parties like the AfD. unless 
government policies problematising islam are 
radically re-thought, it may be difficult to halt the 
counter-jihad movement’s progress. 
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chapter 5: France 
France is thought to be home to five million 
Muslims, more than any other country in europe. 
However, since France does not collect data on 
ethnicity or religion – because of the foundational 
republican myth of a colour-blind society – this 
figure is only an estimate of French citizens 
of north African heritage, used as a proxy for 
assumed Muslim faith.1 We can be certain, 
though, that islamophobia has been widespread 
for many years and continues to grow. 
between 2013 and 2014, the collectif contre 
l’islamophobie en France (cciF) recorded a 10 
per cent rise in islamophobic acts; in 2015 this 
rose by 19 per cent.2 
islamophobia has also been institutionalised 
through legislation. its specific contextual 
inflection in France is often marked by what 
has been called ‘weaponised laïcité’ – the use 
of secularism as a tool to enforce assimilation 
in exclusionary ways.3 Female clothing is a 
prominent example: in 2004, it became illegal for 
schoolgirls to wear headscarves; a law banning 
the face veil (burqa or niqab) followed in 2011 
(upheld by the european court of Human rights 
in 2014 and extended to the right of companies 
to ban religious symbols at work in 2017)4. 
the extent to which Muslims had come to be 
considered a threat to the French republican 
or ‘Jacobin’ tradition was revealed by an iPsos 
poll in 2013, which suggested that 75 per cent of 
French people viewed islam as incompatible with 
French society.5 
islam, then, and by extension Muslims in France, 
were already suspect. but this situation has 
worsened greatly since 2015, a year book-ended 
by two major terror attacks in the country. the 
atmosphere deteriorated further after the July 
2016 nice truck attack killed 80 people and, 
soon after, a catholic priest was murdered. this 
case study examines the counter-terrorism and 
counter-extremism policies that France has 
adopted, arguing that they have been shaped 
by – and shape – the climate of islamophobia. 
it looks at the activities of the counter-jihad 
movement as well as islamophobia within 
intellectual and political elites in the country, 
showing how the rise of the far-right Front 
national (renamed rassemblement national, 
‘national rally’ in March 2018) has been enabled, 
rather than undermined, by official responses that 
opened the back door to extreme nationalism.
Former French prime minister Manuel Valls in 2015 used the term ‘Islamofascism’ to describe 
the perceived threat of militant ‘Islamism’. Source: Parti Socialiste / Philippe Grangeaud
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French counter-extremism 
policies and practices
Political violence in France has a long history. 
indeed, the term ‘terrorism’ itself stems from the 
fearsome violence of the state following the 1789 
revolution.6 During decolonisation, the national 
liberation Front of Algeria engaged in violent 
attacks against French rule, while the French army 
used brutal violence, including torture. in France 
itself, the vitry-le-François train bombing of 
18 June 1961 by the far-right organisation de 
l’Armée secrete (oAs) – which opposed Algerian 
independence – killed 28 people. later that year 
in october, Paris witnessed the massacre by 
the police of ‘perhaps as many as 250 Algerians 
peacefully protesting against a curfew placed on 
the entire north African population of the city’. 7 
the november 2015 attack in Paris which killed 
130 people – for which isil claimed responsibility 
– was, thus, the second most deadly atrocity on 
French soil. 
it has been observed that terrorism’s biggest 
impact ‘is usually the government’s response, 
not the attack itself’.8 some scholars explain 
terrorism as ‘blowback’ from a nation state’s 
foreign policies,9 while others point to high rates 
of youth unemployment, social exclusion, and 
racism experienced by residents of the deprived 
banlieues (working class estates) as factors in 
so-called ‘home-grown’ terrorism. the French 
government, however, has largely ignored these 
factors. Apparently unconcerned about the 
possible re-emergence of far-right terrorism, it 
emphasises an ideology dubbed ‘radical islam’.
to counter the perceived threat, the government 
has passed new laws and carried out large-
scale security operations. in 2014 new anti-
terrorism laws gave wider surveillance powers 
to intelligence agencies. Following the attacks 
on magazine Charlie Hebdo and a Jewish 
supermarket in January 2015, another new law – 
dubbed a ‘French PAtriot Act’ – again extended 
their power.10 French authorities also announced 
an extra 425 million euros would be spent 
creating 2,600 more counterterrorism jobs.11
After the november 2015 attacks President 
François Hollande declared a state of emergency. 
France’s borders were temporarily closed and 
an internal crackdown ensued. Police searched 
4,000 houses and within two months had placed 
382 people under house arrest, suspected of 
links to terrorism, although not tried or convicted 
of any crime.12 A plan to potentially revoke the 
French citizenship of dual-nationals convicted 
of involvement in terrorism was eventually 
dropped – soon after justice minister christiane 
taubira resigned in protest13 – but the state of 
emergency was extended six times over two 
years.14 According to analyst Yasser louati, 
formerly of cciF, 2016 was thus ‘the year of 
state-sponsored islamophobic violence under 
the state of emergency’.15 these measures not 
only discriminated against Muslims but also 
undermined liberty, equality, and fraternity more 
broadly – the very ‘French values’ they were 
ostensibly intended to protect.16 When the official 
state of emergency ended in november 2017 it 
was replaced with new anti-terrorism legislation 
that enshrined elements of the state of emergency 
into law, albeit with some modification.17
the government has also launched several 
‘counter-radicalisation’ initiatives.18 Francesco 
ragazzi of sciences Po notes that this represents 
‘a departure from a counter-terrorism policy 
justified mainly by a judicial approach’ and a 
move towards uK practice (see Chapter 3).19 
Whereas the uK’s counter-extremism policy 
does not nominally target a single ethno-religious 
community (though in practice Muslims have 
been disproportionately affected), elements of the 
French programme explicitly focus on Muslims. 
in January 2015 the French government 
launched a propaganda campaign called ‘stop 
Djihadisme’.20 Along with a video exposing myths 
propagated by isil, it published a chart displaying 
‘possible indicators’ of radicalisation, apparently 
including ‘changes in diet’, ‘rejection of certain 
family members’, ‘no longer listening to music’ 
and ‘changes in clothing (especially girls wearing 
clothes to cover their bodies)’.21 the chart was 
published soon after the introduction of the 
Numero Vert (green number), an anonymous 
hotline which families, friends, neighbours 
“ The French government’s ‘Stop Djihadisme’ 
campaign uses strikingly similar terminology 
to the far-right actors who self-identify as 
the ‘counter-jihad’ movement”
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or colleagues of any person suspected of 
‘radicalisation’ were encouraged to call to inform 
authorities of their suspicions. Anti-racism 
campaigner Yasser louati says he has ‘dealt with 
various cases of people being informed on by 
their neighbours’ for no good reason. the hotline, 
he claims ‘led to an open door to denunciation – 
you don’t like your neighbour, call the police on 
them’.22
Academic Franceso ragazzi argues French 
counter-radicalisation policies have created 
‘an atmosphere of suspicion’ and ‘a sense of 
discrimination’.23 of around 20,000 people who 
have had a ‘Fiche s’ (s card) – designating 
them a threat to state security – attached to 
their police record, 10,500 are Muslims.24 Fear 
of terrorism had been used, ragazzi warns, 
to ‘legitimise the extension of police action 
beyond its usual purview’ into areas such as 
education and religion.25 schools were already 
seen as a battleground for ‘French values’, when 
in April 2013, the education minister vincent 
Peillon announced a plan for schools to hold 
compulsory weekly classes on morale laïque 
(secular morality) from september 2015.26 
in the sphere of religion, the French government 
has been seeking for some time to ‘manage’ 
islam. the French council of islam was created 
in 2003 with government backing and remains 
close to the state.27 in 2015 its president Anouar 
Kbibech called for imams to be tested on their 
adherence to ‘French values’, required to sign a 
charter agreeing to abide by the law, and issued 
with a certificate to preach ‘like a driving licence‘ 
(a similar idea to the proposed ‘charter of Muslim 
understanding’ in britain – see Chapter 3 – or the 
german ‘values test’ for migrants – see Chapter 
4).28 After the november 2015 attacks, the interior 
minister bernard cazeneuve shut down three 
mosques, the first time religious institutions had 
been closed on grounds of ‘radicalisation’.29 
in August 2016 the interior ministry stated that 
20 Muslim places of worship had been shut 
since December 2015.30 Four further allegedly 
‘extremist’ mosques were closed down in 
november 2016.31 
there are doubts whether this raft of measures will 
be effective in preventing political violence; some 
argue they could even be counter-productive.32 
the first of a clutch of new government ‘de-
radicalisation’ centres opened in september 2016; 
the outcomes remain to be seen.33 What is clear 
is that the scrutiny of Muslims in the name of 
counter-extremism has certainly not hindered, and 
may in fact have assisted, the far-right. 
the French counter-jihad 
movement
the French government’s ‘stop Djihadisme’ 
campaign uses strikingly similar terminology 
to the far-right actors who self-identify as the 
‘counter-jihad’ movement. semantic overlaps can 
also be seen in the names chosen by two militant 
French groups within this anti-islam movement: 
‘résistance républicaine’ and ‘riposte 
laïque’ clearly signal their affiliation to ‘French 
values’, demonstrating that the concepts of 
republicanism and laïcité (secularism) can be put 
to work in the service of an islamophobic agenda. 
on the surface, therefore, such groups appear 
to speak the same language as the state and 
frame the causes of – and solutions to – ‘islamist’ 
political violence in a very similar way.
there also appears to be a degree of 
convergence in terms of government and far-right 
policy solutions. résistance républicaine and 
riposte laïque – led respectively by christine 
tasin and Pierre cassen – jointly organised an 
‘anti-islamisation’ demonstration in January 
2015, shortly after the attacks on Paris (and in 
part also inspired by the success of the PegiDA 
movement in neighbouring germany). At the 
protest, activists demanded ‘salafists / islamists 
out!’. Another counter-jihad group, calling itself 
luciDe (Luttons Unis Contre l’Islamisation 
de l’Europe) was even more explicit in linking 
terrorism and the islamic faith, saying: ‘no more 
deaths: islam out of europe!’. less than a year 
later, following the november attacks, such policy 
prescriptions hurtled into the mainstream at an 
alarming pace. Marine le Pen, leader of the far-
right yet increasingly mainstream Front national 
party, called for deportations of ‘islamists’;34 then 
Hollande promised to speed up deportation 
of foreigners who pose a ‘grave threat to the 
security of the nation’.35 
other analogies between the French 
government’s counter-radicalisation efforts 
and counter-jihad activities can be seen in the 
spotlight placed on mosques. As we have seen, 
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France’s interior ministry has administratively 
closed down more than 20 Muslim places of 
worship between 2015-17, arguably a form of 
collective punishment. Meanwhile, the far-right 
direct action group génération identitaire (gi) 
protested against the public funding given a 
mosque in lyon days after the July 2016 attack 
in nice, as if holding all Muslims responsible.36 
this was not the group’s first such action. in 
november 2012, gi activists occupied a mosque 
in Poitiers – the site where Frankish king charles 
Martel had defeated an invading Muslim army 
during the crusades in the year 732. (Martel 
was referenced by the far-right again in January 
2015 when the hashtag #Jesuischarlie went 
viral on social media following the Charlie Hebdo 
murders. in an attempt to tap into this outrage 
and translate it into a more hardline anti-Muslim 
attitude, far-right tweeters used the hashtag 
#JesuischarlesMartel.)
génération identitaire began life as the youth 
wing of bioc identitaire, which promotes anti-
immigration politics and takes inspiration from 
French figures of the ‘nouvelle Droit’ such as 
Alain de benoist and guillaume Faye. At one 
bloc protest in 2010, activists gathered at the Arc 
de triomphe to eat pork and drink wine. these 
symbols of ‘French-ness’ used by the far-right 
to signal and enact Muslim exclusion have more 
recently been adopted by elements of the state. 
regional governments in some French towns 
introduced new menus to school canteens and 
Muslim children have reportedly been told their 
options are ‘pork or nothing’.37 
bloc chairman Fabrice robert – a former elected 
representative of the Front national (discussed 
later) – marched alongside christine tasin and 
Pierre cassen’s groups at the January 2015 anti-
islamisation’ demonstration. Another key counter-
jihad figure at the rally was American Daniel Pipes, 
who heads the Philadelphia-based Middle east 
Forum (MeF) introduced in Chapter 2. A key funder 
of european counter-jihad actors, MeF covered 
legal costs for christine tasin when she appealed 
a conviction for inciting hatred against Muslims 
(see Chapter 6). she had called islam a ‘cesspit’ 
when demonstrating at an abattoir, but with MeF’s 
backing, tasin won her appeal, calling the decision 
a ‘victory for free speech’, and adding proudly ‘i 
claim my islamophobia’.38 
it would be wrong to portray this us funding 
as the main reason islamophobia in France 
has spread, however. We have argued that 
government counter-extremism policies were 
both informed by and exacerbate islamophobia; 
the ideas of the counter-jihad movement have 
also been amplified by elite intellectual figures and 
mainstream French politicians. 
islamophobia within the elite
islamophobia in France has not grown on the 
far-right in isolation. As Daniel Pipes correctly 
observed, street activists’ growing boldness 
‘fits into a much larger pattern’, which he 
characterised as ‘French social conservatives 
finding their voice’.39 some liberals and leftists 
have also promoted islamophobia.
Intellectuals
A continuing thread of islamophobia links 
the radical right fringe groups to the heart of 
government, via cultural and political elites. 
islamophobia is not a working-class phenomenon 
or necessarily related to education levels. As 
sociologist raphaël liogier notes, a collective of 
French intellectuals who ‘portray themselves as 
defenders of european culture’ have long been 
gaining prominence in the country. the so-called 
nouveaux réactionnaires (new reactionaries) 
include figures like Alain Finkielkraut, former 
professor at the École Polytechnique, now a 
member of the Académie Française and author 
of The unhappy identity; eric Zemmour, a former 
adviser to ex-president nicolas sarkozy, now 
associated with the Front national, who wrote the 
book France’s suicide and has been prosecuted 
for racism;40 and renaud camus, who spoke 
at the above-mentioned anti-islamisation rally 
and whose book The great replacement argued 
that France is being colonised by Muslims.41 (in 
anticipation of last year’s French elections, camus 
published a series of interviews with Phillipe 
Karsenty in a book entitled ‘2017: Last chance 
before the great replacement’).
“ Of around 20,000 people who have had 
a ‘Fiche S’ (S card) – designating them a 
threat to state security – attached to their 
police record, 10,500 are Muslims”
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the bestselling novel Submission by Michele 
Houllebecq imagined a future French caliphate, 
nodding to the themes of bat Ye’or’s Eurabia.42 
Meanwhile Le Figaro journalist ivan rioufol’s latest 
book The coming civil war articulated the common 
counter-jihad trope of an inevitable, bloody ‘clash 
of civilisations’.43 Another mainstream journalist, 
Yves Mamou, formerly of major French daily 
Le Monde has claimed in an article for the us 
gatestone institute (see Chapter 2) that ‘the civil 
war has already begun’.44 cultural products like 
these have helped to popularise islamophobic 
ideas and push the mainstream further to the right. 
but these intellectuals have not acted alone.
Politicians
Key members of France’s political elite have also 
used language of the counter-jihad movement. 
After a June 2015 attack inspired by Al-Qaeda, 
the mayor of nice, christian estrosi – a close 
associate of ex-president sarkozy – tweeted: 
‘this dramatic attack in isere reminds us of the 
presence of a fifth column in Fr [France].’ soon 
after, former government minister nadine Morano 
also used the phrase ‘fifth column‘, catching on to 
a trend originally set by the former Front national 
politician Aymeric chauprade who first used the 
term following the January 2015 attacks, when he 
accused French Muslims of being ‘sympathetic to 
terrorism’.45
Former Parti socialist prime minister Manuel 
valls, too, has used the language of the right and 
far-right. in June 2015, he referred to a ‘clash 
of civilisations’46 and, after the november 2015 
massacres, declared that France had an ‘enemy 
within’.47 He has stated that France needs to 
fight a phenomenon he insisted on labelling 
‘islamofascism’48 – perhaps the first time a serving 
european political leader has used this term. 
valls said, too, that he refuses to use the word 
‘islamophobia’, claiming it is used to ‘silence’ 
critics of ‘islamist ideology’.49
this type of rhetoric has long been more familiar 
within the counter-jihad movement. All these 
phrases and concepts can be found, for instance, 
in posts by us activist edward May who runs 
the website gates of vienna and blogs under the 
pseudonym baron bodissey. He spoke in 2005 of 
the need for the west to fight ‘the enemy within’,50 
has used the term ‘islamofascism’ for at least a 
decade, 51 and in 2011 attacked ‘the pedigree 
of the word islamophobia’, claiming its function 
was ‘to delegitimise the opponents of islam’.52 
May also approvingly posted a speech given 
by geert Wilders who quipped that the ‘war’ 
between islam and the netherlands was less a 
‘clash of civilisations’ and more ‘a clash between 
barbarism and civilisation’.53
the rise of the Front national 
Far-right rhetoric from intellectuals and politicians 
has been a gift to the Front national (Fn). the 
party is not limited to counter-jihad style politics 
but its views on islam and migration chime with 
the movement perfectly. its recent transformation 
also reflects the rise of this strand of the far-right. 
the Fn’s roots are anti-semitic. the country was 
shocked when former leader Jean Marie le Pen, 
a convicted Holocaust-denier, made the second 
(and last) round of the French presidential election 
in 2002. He was expelled in 2015 as part of his 
daughter Marine le Pen’s quest to sanitise and 
re-brand the party. under her leadership, the Fn 
has taken the conscious, strategic decision to talk 
more of culture and less of race, and to exploit 
widespread islamophobia whilst claiming to reject 
anti-semitism. Marine le Pen has attracted more 
female voters to the party – generally less likely to 
support the far-right. the party has also benefited 
from significant russian funding, enjoying a 
good relationship with figures in the Kremlin and 
receiving loans of at least 9.4m euros (£7.4m) 
from a Moscow bank. it also reportedly sought 
funding from the united Arab emirates.54 Above 
all, le Pen’s message has gradually begun to 
appear less extreme as far-right ideas have been 
normalised by the mainstream. 
Just as former Prime Minister valls has spoken 
of ‘islamofascism’, Marine le Pen has herself 
associated islam and fascism, using the phrase 
‘green fascism’ to do so.55 she was also 
prosecuted for comparing Muslims praying in the 
street to the nazi occupation of France.56 the 
favourite counter-jihad phrase ‘islamofascism’ 
was also behind the use of the slogan ‘la sharia 
ne passera pas’ (sharia will not pass) at the 
aforementioned riposte laïque / résistance 
républicaine demonstration. by appropriating 
the spanish anti-fascist slogan ‘no pasaran!’, the 
counter-jihadists associated islam with fascism, 
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making themselves more credible in ‘resisting’ 
it and undercutting accusations of racism. For 
the Fn, the notion of ‘green fascism’ helpfully 
obscures the neo-fascism of its own political 
history and policies.
the Fn has roots in the right-wing networks 
that resisted Algerian decolonisation, some of 
whom, as we noted earlier, were involved in 
acts of terrorism via the oAs. not only have 
French counter-extremism policies apparently 
overlooked this history, instead crudely focusing 
on Muslim communities, but the Fn has been 
allowed to break into the mainstream in recent 
years. in March 2014, the party won control of 
a dozen local authorities. it topped the polls in 
european elections in May 2014, winning 25 
per cent,57 and won 6.8 million votes in regional 
elections in December 2015 elections58 – its 
largest ever score.59 le Pen emerged as a serious 
presidential contender in the 2017 election and 
while candidates from France’s two main parties 
were eliminated, she won over 10 million votes 
and made it to the second round, but eventually 
lost to the independent centrist emmanuel 
Macron, who won two-thirds of the final vote in 
May.60 Macron had succeeded partly by tacking 
right in line with the political climate, for instance 
pledging to re-introduce compulsory youth 
military service. in February 2018, he declared 
his intention of ‘restructuring’ islam in France, 
including the aforementioned French council of 
islam.61 the Fn, meanwhile, won fewer seats in 
the 2017 legislative elections that it had hoped 
to but received a boost in February 2018 when it 
was revealed that Marine le Pen’s niece Marion 
– a darling of the French far-right – would be a 
headline speaker at a prominent gathering of us 
conservatives, set to include us vice President 
Mike Pence and President Donald trump.62
official responses to the far-right
Despite valls’ rejection of the word, both former 
president François Hollande and former prime 
minister bernard cazeneuve used the term 
‘islamophobia’, recognising it as a specific form 
of prejudice and discrimination based on religious 
affiliation.63 Anti-semitic and islamophobic 
hate crimes are recorded as such in France 
and the data is published. Following attacks 
on Muslim and Jewish communities, both 
mosques and synagogues have been provided 
with extra security. After one such attack on a 
mosque in strasbourg, both the local mayor and 
cazeneuve, then interior minister, issued explicit 
condemnations.64 
However, cazeneuve notably called it an ‘isolated’ 
incident. in fact, attacks on mosques and on 
Muslims in France form part of worrying pattern: 
cciF recorded a 400 per cent increase in acts 
of mosque degradation in the six months after 
the January 2015 Charlie Hebdo attacks.65 the 
problem is merely low on the government’s 
list of priorities. it has engaged in very few 
efforts to deploy ‘counter-narratives’ to combat 
islamophobia or the far-right. instead, as we have 
seen, government counter-extremism policies 
stigmatise and blame Muslims while several 
mainstream actors indulge in islamophobic 
rhetoric that overlaps with that of the far-right.
French authorities have finally noticed the threat 
posed by the counter-jihad movement. Patrick 
calvar, head of the domestic security service 
Direction générale de la sécurité intérieure 
(Dgsi) warned of the danger several times in 
2016. in February, for instance, he said: ‘far-
right extremists are just waiting for more terrorist 
attacks to engage in violent confrontation’.66 
in May he told parliamentarians that his 
agency was not only looking at isil and Al-
Qaeda linked terrorism but was also turning 
its attention to ‘far-right movements who are 
preparing a confrontation’ for fear that ‘one or 
two more terrorist attacks and we may well 
see a civil war’.67 in July he warned French 
parliamentarians once more of the threat. clearly 
the Dgsi has become aware, albeit somewhat 
belatedly, of the far-right’s violent potential – at 
least at street level.
on the political level, though, now that the Fn has 
successfully punctured the cordon sanitaire which 
previously kept it quarantined, it may prove far 
more dangerous. Part of former president nicolas 
sarkozy’s response to the rise of the far-right was 
to attempt to ‘woo’ Fn supporters by shifting 
his own party’s stance to the right. this strategy 
appears to have backfired and rather than 
hindering the far-right, seems to have benefited 
it by re-defining ‘moderate’ and ‘extreme’.68 (the 
same re-labelling of far-right positions was visible 
when author and intellectual renaud camus, 
mentioned earlier, declared ‘there is nothing 
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right-wing about me’ – before announcing that he 
planned to vote for the Fn.69)
the Fn’s politics have not changed merely by 
virtue of its proximity to power. instead, as Jim 
Wolfreys points out, ‘when sarkozy declared that 
the Fn, hitherto considered beyond the pale, 
was now “compatible with the republic”, [it] said 
more about the drift of republican values than 
any progressive evolution on the part of the Fn’.70 
but the so-called ‘Lepenisation’ of sarkozy’s 
les republicains party is, as we have seen, not 
the only problem. As Parti socialist rebel Pascal 
cherki observed, the centre-left cannot effectively 
oppose the far-right while it too is ‘appropriating 
measures from its programme’.71 
in other words, the far-right’s rise to apparent 
respectability evolved all the more smoothly 
because of a genuine shift in the centre-ground 
in French politics. this has both partly created, 
and is partly a symptom of, a ‘rapid shift in 
French public opinion’ – what seems to be a 
radicalisation of the mainstream. A Guardian 
journalist analysing opinion polls explains:
the change in mood has been primarily in 
the acceptance of ideas that previously were 
considered dangerous – in other words, not 
simply a greater polarisation but at the same time, 
the values of previously marginalised ideas now 
compete with the mainstream.72 
Preventative action to stop the Fn politically has 
so far been limited to electoral withdrawals and 
vote-swapping between the two centrist parties, 
a tactic that allows the Fn to pose as a victim. 
therefore, although groups like bloc remain small, 
there is little cause for celebration in France. 
Despite current Fn infighting, given longer term 
trends, the real possibility of a triumphant Marine 
le Pen one day is far more worrying.
conclusion
islamophobia in France, as well as a series of 
recent attacks, have shaped French counter-
extremism policies in a way that almost exclusively 
focuses on Muslims. the resulting climate of 
suspicion has in turn helped to further mainstream 
islamophobia. significant numbers of French 
intellectuals and politicians – from both left and 
right – have legitimised counter-jihad language 
and ideas, the only winner from this process being 
the Front national, despite its own historic links to 
networks that waged terror from the far-right. 
Just as the european network Against racism 
reports that France’s law against the veil may 
have encouraged hostility,73 heavy-handed actions 
to shut down mosques – effectively endorsing 
collective blame for the attacks – have to some 
extent granted social license to the likes of bioc 
identitaire to target the same institutions. A shift 
to the right of the ‘centre-ground’ has opened 
the backdoor to the Fn. in the long run, even 
though it is currently using the legitimate means 
of the ballot box, the far-right may pose a much 
greater threat to the fabric of society than the 
still-small number of violent islamists with whom 
government and media remain preoccupied.
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Chapter 6: counter-jihad movement funders
While the case studies in this report focus on 
three countries in western europe, the us 
counter-jihad movement is critical to facilitating 
flows of ideas, people and money into europe 
via its transatlantic network. closely examining 
the funding of the movement – ‘following the 
money’ – helps us to see where power lies in the 
network and the extent of its reach. Many in the 
counter-jihad movement go to great lengths to 
keep their benefactors secret, and vice versa. 
unpicking their finances is no easy task. even 
those registered as non-profits in europe and 
in the us are not obliged to reveal who funds 
them. charitable donors must declare who they 
are giving money to, however, many don’t. in 
addition, a lack of real time disclosure means it 
can be years before we are able to learn who 
is funding whom. Many of the hundreds of tax 
records of the groups and foundations reviewed 
here are only available up until 2014, with patchy 
coverage of 2015 and 2016.
this chapter first examines the growing 
importance of shadowy non-profit finance 
in fuelling islamophobia in both the us and 
europe. it then discusses the core us counter-
jihad activists and groups promoting anti-
Muslim hate, their european activities and 
their ties to self-declared ‘counter-extremism’ 
organisations operating in europe. Finally, we 
profile the top us charitable foundations and 
billionaires who are funding these key groups 
linked to europe. 
the shadow giving system 
fuelling islamophobia across the 
Atlantic: donor-advised funds
us philanthropy has experienced an 
unprecedented boom in ‘donor-advised’ funds 
(DAFs) over the past decade. these funds offer 
higher tax breaks than private foundations1 and 
allow people to anonymously route their dollars 
to preferred non-profits – a key selling point for 
anyone keen to support controversial groups, 
including those targeting islam.2 An upsurge in the 
use of DAFs ‘for politicised giving by donors of 
all stripes is a prime example of the transparency 
problem in philanthropy today’ notes Inside 
Philanthropy editor David callahan, who has 
called for reform of this $14 billion a year shadow 
giving system.3 
our research found this trend has greatly 
bolstered the finances of the transatlantic 
islamophobia network in recent years, and 
increasingly helps to shield its funders from public 
scrutiny. in the following section, we examine 
the key donor-advised funds whose anonymous 
donations are helping amplify anti-Muslim feeling 
across the us and europe. 
Donors Capital Fund and 
DonorsTrust
two major league donor-advised funds are the 
Donorstrust and its Donors capital Fund (DcF) 
offshoot. Dubbed the ‘dark money AtM of the 
conservative movement’, they most famously 
have been used by the libertarian billionaire 
Koch brothers to cloak their financing of many 
divisive causes, from climate denial and anti-
union projects to charter schools.4 
they are also the biggest sponsor of right-
wing anti-islam propaganda in the us, having 
first emerged in the decade after 9/11. DcF 
in 2008 most famously channelled nearly $17 
million to the clarion Fund to distribute the 
fearmongering 2005 film Obsession: Radical 
Islam’s war with the West to 28 million voters in 
swing states ahead of us presidential elections.5 
(An accountant’s error on the tax filings shows 
the donor as industrialist barre said, a big 
republican donor,6 though he and DcF issued 
a denial7 and others have speculated that 
casino magnate sheldon Adelson was involved.) 
Produced by clarion’s founder raphael shore, 
Obsession compared the threat of islam with 
nazism and was cited approvingly by norwegian 
mass killer Anders breivik.8 
our investigation of us non-profit tax filings found 
that, since 2009, these twin slush funds have 
funnelled another usD$14.8 million to a handful 
of anti-Muslim groups with links to europe. 
We discovered, too, that their reach directly 
extends to britain, with the neoconservative 
Henry Jackson society (HJs) think tank – which 
played an important role in some of the incidents 
discussed in Chapter 3 – accepting us$40,000 
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from Donorstrust via its us fundraising arm 
between 2014-15.
the biggest beneficiary of DcF/Dt largesse – 
pocketing usD$11.375 million between 2009 and 
2015 – was Daniel Pipes’ Middle East Forum 
(MeF) which, as we will discuss in the next 
section, both finances and works with european 
counter-jihad activists. this sum, we calculated, 
is almost five times what the twin funds gave MeF 
in the decade prior and represents over a third 
of MeF’s total income over that period. given 
that MeF’s financial accounts list substantial 
programme spending in the Middle east and 
europe, and that Daniel Pipes advocates for 
political leaders to work with far-right groups such 
as the Austrian Freedom Party,9 it seems likely 
this secret money plays a part in influencing the 
debate over islam well beyond us shores.
Anti-Muslim conspiracy theorist Frank gaffney’s 
Center for Security Policy, which also works 
with activists in europe, received $2.08 million 
from DcF/Dt. the David Horowitz Freedom 
Center (DHrc), which funds anti-Muslim 
Dutch MP geert Wilders and recently hosted 
british ‘freedom fighter’ Katie Hopkins and 
HJs’ director Douglas Murray at his exclusive 
annual islamophobic weekend fundraiser in 
Florida, received $802,000. other controversial 
grantees include the aforementioned clarion Fund 
($425,000), Pamela geller and robert spencer’s 
American Freedom Defense Initiative 
($45,000) and their related Jihad Watch website 
($20,000), which operates under the umbrella of 
Horowitz. Former Dutch MP Ayaan Hirsi Ali, who 
has described islam as a ‘destructive, nihilistic 
cult of death’ that needs to be ‘defeated’, was 
gifted $100,000 via DcF for her new York-based 
AHA Foundation in 2015.10 
Altogether, this handful of groups received 
us$14.8 million from Donorstrust/DcF between 
2009-15. it is impossible for the public to know 
exactly whom is behind this clandestine financing. 
While the twin funds do disclose who receives 
grants from their coffers they don’t divulge the link 
between a client and their chosen causes. ‘even 
the irs doesn’t know where a particular donor’s 
money goes after it gets to Donorstrust’, notes 
the center for responsive Politics.11 so unless 
the donor chooses to declare this themselves, it 
remains secret.
Donor-advised Jewish community 
funds 
the picture grows murkier in that Donorstrust /
DcF grantees are often themselves donor advised 
and money can be transferred between DAFs 
in both directions. the Jewish United Fund/ 
Federation of Metropolitan Chicago (JuF), in 
particular, has been criticised by the us-based 
Jewish voice for Peace for receiving us$5.1 
million in contributions via Donor’s trust/DcF in 
2013 and also using Donorstrust/DcF to make 
over $100,000 in donations since 2010. Despite 
a commitment to ‘stand together to say “no” to all 
forms of hate’, JuF also contributed funds to the 
Middle east Forum ($668,850 between 2011-
201612) and the investigative Project on terrorism 
($26,000). in doing so, critics argue that JuF is 
‘contributing to the political and ideological trends 
that have helped to mainstream islamophobia’ 
and create a ‘climate of intolerance and bigotry.13 
JuF executive vice-president Jay tcath, however, 
rejects that grants to either Donorstrust or 
counter-jihad groups violate JuF’s mission.14
Another intermediary, the donor-advised 
Jewish Communal Fund (JcF) stands similarly 
accused of investing in islamophobia.15 by our 
calculations it channelled $1.58 million between 
2009/10-2015/6 to groups with a focus on 
europe. it notably gave $165,000 to Pamela 
geller’s American Freedom Defense initiative 
(AFDi) group.16 geller, who is banned from 
entering britain, calls islam ‘the most anti-semitic, 
genocidal ideology in the world’.17 she helped 
raise funds for the family of ex-english Defence 
league founder stephen Yaxley-lennon (aka 
tommy robinson) while he was in prison.18 other 
core counter-jihad actors regularly receive JcF 
money: grantees in this period include Middle 
east Forum ($252,770), clarion Fund ($304,642), 
David Horowitz ($215,870), investigative Project 
on terrorism (iPt) ($419,010) and gatestone 
institute $180,536.19 
Further afield, the british Henry Jackson 
society’s us charitable arm accepted $45,000 in 
anonymous grants for ‘unrestricted support’ via 
JcF between 2014-15, plus $25,000 for ‘public/ 
society benefit’ from the donor-advised Jewish 
Community Federation of San Francisco, 
a key contributor to the core counter-jihad 
groups. between 2009-16 it gave $322,100 to 
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MeF, $177,000 to clarion, $550,000 to steve 
emerson’s iPt, $76,000 to Horowitz and $50,000 
to gatestone institute.20
Another community-based donor, the Combined 
Jewish Philanthropies of Greater Boston also 
funded the Middle east Forum ($36,600) and 
iPt ($221,000) between 2010-15. the Jewish 
Community Foundation of Los Angeles also 
gave $215,610 to MeF in this period.
Fidelity, Vanguard and Schwab 
Charitable donor-advised funds 
and trusts
several other giant corporate donor-advised 
funds are used to inject millions into the counter-
jihad network. the self-declared ‘terrorism expert’ 
steve emerson, whose ‘investigative Project on 
terrorism’ (iPt) aims to ‘investigate, analyse and 
expose Muslim infiltration in the us’ received 
an unusually disclosed us$3 million21 from the 
eugene and emily grant Foundation via Fidelity 
Charitable, one of the three biggest us non-
profit DAFs. ex-journalist emerson’s activities 
include claiming europe is riddled with ‘no-go 
zones’ which non-Muslims dare not visit. in 2015 
he earned global ridicule, including from british 
prime minister David cameron, after falsely 
claiming on Fox News that all of birmingham and 
parts of london were such zones. 
Another big counter-jihad donor, ‘Dr bob’ 
shillman who has funded Dutch MP geert 
Wilders’ us trips and ex-english Defence 
league founder stephen Yaxley-lennon and 
Katie Hopkin’s roles as rebel Media’s ‘shillman 
Fellows’, also uses Fidelity charitable (gift 
Fund). tax filings show that he transferred $10 
million – the bulk of his private foundation’s 
donations – via Fidelity to unnamed groups and 
individuals from 2010-2015.22 
the giant Vanguard Charitable Endowment 
Program has provided the Henry Jackson 
society with us$317,500 (2013-16) – the think 
tank’s biggest total us grants from a single 
source that we found. vanguard is another 
favoured conduit for shady counter-jihad donors 
– also giving gaffney’s center for security Policy 
$899,000 in anonymous grants between 2009-
2016. David Horowitz’s think tank received 
$744,186 in this period too, and robert spencer’s 
Jihad Watch project a one-off $250,000 in 2012. 
other vanguard grantees from 2009-16 include 
Middle east Forum ($276,500), iPt ($175,270), 
AFDi ($50,000), clarion ($202,000) and American 
Freedom Alliance.23
the Schwab Charitable Fund is another 
right-leaning DAF processing over $1billion a 
year for charitable purposes. in the five years 
from 2011-2016 it passed $2.7 million of 
secret donors’ money to the key us counter-
jihad groups: nearly $1.5 million to Horowitz, 
$573,600 to gaffney, $439,080 to Middle east 
Forum, $110,000 to clarion and $100,360 to 
emerson’s iPt. it also contributed $151,000 to 
british counter-extremism think tank Quilliam 
Foundation.24
in conclusion, such donor-advised grants, 
and the many others examined in this chapter, 
represent just a fraction of the counter-jihad 
movement’s global funding. it is important to 
note that despite exhaustive trawling of many 
hundreds of irs tax filings for both known and 
new private foundations and donor-advised 
funds, often we could only identify much less 
than half of the us core players’ total grants 
from all donors. 
And while three of the seven us foundations 
identified as financial lynchpins in the 2011 
expose ‘Fear Inc: The roots of the Islamophobia 
network in America’ – the russell berrie 
Foundation, Fairbrook Family Foundation, and 
newton and becker charitable Foundations 
– seem to have ceased direct donations to 
islamophobic groups, tax filings do show them 
using donor-advised funds. the beckers’ tax 
filings for example reveal $1.6 million in recent 
grants to schwab charitable and $340,000 
from 2011-16 to the Jewish community 
Federation of san Francisco.25 As we have 
shown, schwab gives large sums to Horowitz, 
Pipes, gaffney and clarion, and JcsF also 
funds Pipes, gatestone and clarion. billionaires 
Aubrey and Joyce chernick’s Fairbrook 
Foundation is housed under the donor-advised 
california community Foundation (ccF). 
Fairbrook’s filings show many millions in grants 
to ccF and to the Jewish Federation of los 
Angeles, both of which fund steve emerson’s 
organisations. nevertheless, there’s no way of 
linking these grants for certain unless a donor 
declares them in their own filings.
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transatlantic funding flows and 
in-kind alliances: the key players 
American donor money coming into europe 
has aided the expansion and visibility of the 
counter-jihad movement and helped sustain 
its transatlantic reach over the past decade. 
smaller european groups relying upon American 
largesse have, for instance, lamented how hard it 
is to raise funds at home. george igler, a british 
financier and a self-described ‘counter-jihad fixer’, 
mothballed his Discourse institute ‘think tank’ 
in 2016 after six years of supporting ‘individuals 
who dared to criticise islam’, among them the 
uK’s stephen Yaxley-lennon, France’s christine 
tasin, and germany’s Heidi Mund and Michael 
stürzenberger, both associated with the anti-
islam PegiDA. 
‘europeans are not really that interested in paying 
money for their own survival… i had to spend a 
lot of time crossing the Atlantic, and a lot of time 
talking to Americans,’ igler told a us radio show. 
‘i’d like […] to thank the legal Project of the 
Middle east Forum (MeF), who were astonishingly 
helpful.’26 
right-wing us donors have similarly propped 
up two mainstream british counter-extremist 
think tanks, the Quilliam Foundation and Henry 
Jackson society (HJs). Quilliam’s abrupt loss 
of uK government funds after 2010/11 saw it 
seek donations stateside,27 reaping $2.3 million 
from 2012-16 from the tea Party-backing John 
templeton Foundation, another $1.08 million 
from the conservative stuart Family Foundation, 
and $75,000 from the bradley Foundation, which 
stands accused of fanning anti-Muslim hysteria 
by funding Horowitz and gaffney. HJs’ income 
likewise soared after it turned to us donors, 
whom it has refused to divulge, even to britain’s 
parliamentary commissioner for standards.28 our 
latest research has uncovered $890,000 from us 
donors in recent years, almost all of them also 
funding other counter-jihad-linked groups.
Meanwhile, the closely-tied Middle East Forum 
(MEF) and Gatestone Institute focus heavily on 
europe in their outreach strategies, emphasising 
the importance in their estimation of encouraging 
european anti-islam sentiment. gatestone, in 
particular, has increased its spending on the 
region seven-fold since 2012 according to its 
tax returns, and employs more european-based 
contractors than in the us. Dutch government 
disclosures dating back to 2013 also reveal 
gatestone has twice paid the far-right MP geert 
Wilders’ us tour expenses.29 MeF grantee David 
Horowitz Freedom Center (DHRC) emerged 
as another one of Wilders’ largest known 
funders, donating ‘at least €150,000’ – around 
us$175,000 – between 2013-2015 and $25,000 
in 2016.30 DHrc board member billionaire trump 
donor robert shillman also funds Wilders’ us 
activities via the ‘international Freedom Alliance 
Foundation’, which in 2016 also received $25,000 
from another big counter-jihad donor, real estate 
mogul Myron Zimmerman. shillman recently 
funded the counter-jihadist stephen Yaxley-
lennon – britain’s loudest anti-Muslim voice – for 
half of his year-long stint at rebel Media, a far-right 
canadian online platform run by MeF grantee ezra 
levant. shillman also funds fellowships at MeF 
and the clarion Project. no direct funding of these 
could be found in tax filings. 
Frank gaffney’s infamous Center for Security 
Policy (CSP) and the high-profile grassroots Act 
for America network, whose radical leader brigitte 
gabriel conflates Muslims with terrorists and 
claims ‘europe has already become eurabia’,31 
have close european links too, though little 
traceable funding data exists. both csP and Act, 
which have multi-million dollar budgets and boast 
of a ‘direct line’ to President trump, regularly 
collaborate with german ngo burgerbewegung 
Pax europa activist elizabeth sabaditsch-Wolff, 
holding joint events at osce hearings in brussels 
and issuing statements challenging definitions 
of free speech and islamophobia. gaffney has 
also run conferences in Washington and europe 
with the Danish-based international Free Press 
society’s lars Hedegaard and ingrid carlqvist, 
a counter-jihad gates of vienna blogger and 
gatestone fellow. recently, his ‘secure Freedom’ 
radio show hosted a four-part interview with 
british anti-Muslim pundit Katie Hopkins on ‘the 
death of europe’ – the same theme as gaffney’s 
interview with us white nationalist Jared taylor 
in 2015.32
the following section explains how these four 
interrelated us think tanks – MeF, gatestone, 
csP and DHrc – backed by a wealthy web of 
neoconservative and pro-israel donors, have 
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increasingly helped fund and promote fear of 
islam in europe over the past decade.
Middle East Forum (MEF)
Founded by Daniel Pipes in 1990, the 
Philadelphia-based MeF is one of the key think 
tanks ‘primarily responsible for orchestrating 
the majority of anti-islam messages polluting … 
national discourse today’.33 it is a crucial source 
of funds for the counter-jihad movement in the 
us and beyond, spending us$11.2 million in total 
between 2011 and 201534 via a ‘MEF Education 
Fund’ (MEFEF) set up to support writers, 
researchers, investigators, ‘moderate Muslims’35 
and activists working on ‘the Middle east and 
islam’. Altogether, MeF says it has supported 
over 80 domestic and overseas organisations 
and individuals since it created the fund in 2008,36 
which by 2012 accounted for 71 per cent of its 
programme services spend. Although select 
MeFeF grantees are named on MeF’s website, 
some past european recipients such as the 
german stresemann Foundation37 are not listed.
A few groups like the now defunct Discourse 
institute have received support under both 
MeFeF and a separate MEF Legal Project 
strand, which arranges for ‘pro bono and reduced 
rate counsel for victims of islamist lawfare’. the 
latter helps fund ‘free speech’ cases in europe, 
most famously for Dutch MP geert Wilders, 
whom Pipes in 2015 called ‘the most important 
european alive today’.38 ‘the importance of 
the MeF’s legal Project in reclaiming free 
expression and political discourse ... cannot be 
overestimated,’ Wilders declared when acquitted 
of hate speech in 2011.39
Although MeF rarely reveals specific case costs, 
its public audited accounts show that it disbursed 
$140,000–$177,000 a year via the legal Project 
between 2011-2014.40 in Wilders’ case, Pipes 
told Reuters MeF had sent money direct to his 
lawyer bram Moscowitz.41 other successes 
cited42 include a 2014 appeal overturning the 
conviction of christine tasin, the president of 
French anti-islam riposte laïque/résistance 
républicaine, after she was fined and sentenced 
for inciting hatred against islam (see Chapter 5).43 
Another grantee is Philippe Karsenty,44 an ex-
stockbroker and one-time deputy mayor of neuilly 
France. He sits on the international Free Press 
society’s advisory board and runs a French media 
watchdog that focuses on ‘the rise of militant 
islam in France’. in 2013, MeF paid Karsenty’s 
legal fines of $13,500 (€10,000) arising from his 
infamous libel case over France 2 tv’s reportage 
of the shooting of a Palestinian child, Muhammed 
al-Dura in 2000. 45 
Peder Jensen, aka Fjordman – the blogger 
norwegian killer Anders breivik cited as a great 
source of inspiration46 – also received MeF 
legal Project ‘help with my legal bills (and only 
that)’, during the breivik trial. 47 so too did oslo-
based American writer bruce bawer who said 
MeF funds helped him retain a lawyer to get his 
name dropped from the breivik witness list.48 
bawer nowadays blogs for both gatestone and 
Horowitz’s FrontPage magazine. Jensen later 
received a ‘generous’ MeF grant for a 2013 trip to 
Jerusalem, greece and rome.49 
French journalist veronique chemla,50 who has 
published favourable interviews with eurabia 
ideologue bat Ye’or51 also receives MeFeF grants 
(which chemla described as ‘scholarships’), most 
recently in 2016.
the MeF educational fund pays for european 
conferences too. For example, it co-hosted 
the october 2016 ‘Dangerous Words 250’ 
conference in stockholm with MeF grantee the 
Danish Free Press society. ostensibly held to 
celebrate the 250th anniversary of the swedish 
Freedom of the Press Act, it featured talks from 
sharia Watch uK’s Anne Marie Waters and HJs 
director/ gatestone fellow Douglas Murray, who 
spoke alongside MeF’s Daniel Pipes.52
one MeFeF grantee making big inroads into 
europe is canadian ex-tabloid editor ezra levant, 
whose far-right, xenophobic rebel Media/rebel 
edge website broadcasts a litany of anti-Muslim 
views. He set up a british rebel outpost in 2017, 
hiring counter-jihadist stephen Yaxley-lennon 
ahead of the uK general election. the ex-eDl 
and failed PegiDA uK leader used the rebel 
Media platform opportunistically to whip up 
islamophobia after isis-inspired attacks, including 
filming at PegiDA protests and an Alternative 
für Deutschland (AfD) conference in germany in 
early 2018.53 
MeF’s president Daniel Pipes, who earned 
$254,000 in 2016, has also appeared on rebel 
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tv to warn of the danger islam poses to europe, 
notably after the nice attack in July 2016, in 
a video that also featured gatestone’s logo.54 
the extent of MeF’s past or current financial 
relationship with levant, however, is unknown 
as MeF’s accounts do not list specific grants. 
rebel Media sells itself as ‘100% user-funded’ 
via subscriptions and direct donations.55 Former 
insiders told Vice News that while this pulls in $1 
million a year, levant still relies on mega-donors, 
especially tech billionaire robert shillman. in 
August 2017, stephen Yaxley-lennon proudly 
tweeted he had become a ‘shillman Fellow’. 
levant, who claims no donor contributes over 2% 
of rebel’s annual income56 refused to say how 
much shillman paid towards lennon and a co-
presenter’s salaries. 
in september 2017 lennon, whose team includes 
his ex-eDl cousin Kevin carroll, announced a 
£100,000 crowdfunder for a new tv studio to host 
a daily chat show. by mid-February 2018 though, 
the crowdfunder webpage was gone and rebel’s 
paywall for his high-traffic videos removed.57 soon 
after, lennon revealed he had left rebel to set up 
his own ‘tommy robinson.com’ outlet.58 in June, 
however, he was jailed for 13 months after breaking 
contempt of court laws by Facebook livestreaming 
outside a leeds crown court rape trial. His arrest 
sparked violent ‘Free tommy’ protest marches in 
the uK, including two in london organised, staffed 
and funded by MeF, one of which was headlined 
by geert Wilders and gerard batten MeP and drew 
over 15,000 supporters.59 other protests were 
held as far afield as new Zealand, demonstrating 
the counter-jihad movement’s potent online reach. 
in canada, ex-boss ezra levant also launched a 
rebel crowdfunder to pay for a legal appeal despite 
lennon’s guilty plea, which remarkably led to his 
dramatic release on bail, (pending a new hearing) 
in August.60 
notorious ex-Daily Mail columnist Katie Hopkins is 
now rebel Media’s sole shillman Fellow. shillman 
also ‘generously support[ed]’ MeF’s ‘shillman-
ginsburg writing fellow programme’, (part-funded 
by stan and Arlene ginsberg) which paid out 
$233,482 to a number of fellows between 2012-
14.61 european recipients have included raheem 
Kassam, the ex-breitbart london editor and 
author of ‘No-go zones: how sharia law is coming 
to a neighbourhood near you’ (2017). Kassam 
co-founded the Henry Jackson society’s student 
rights project, and is an ex-aide to uKiP leader 
nigel Farage (see Chapter 3). He reportedly 
organised the ‘Free tommy’ london protest.62
Another shillman-ginsburg fellow, Michel 
gurfinkiel, runs the neocon Jean-Jacques 
rousseau institute in France. He’s an advocate 
of renaud camus’ eurabian ‘grand replacement 
theory’, explained in Chapter 5. Meanwhile us 
fellows like Phyllis chesler (also listed as a MeFeF 
grantee) write of their sojourns in europe, for 
example an op-ed about a 2016 london visit 
entitled ‘How long until Arabs and Muslims rule, 
britannia?’. replete with anti-Muslim imagery 
such as women in ‘black burqa-like body bags’, 
the piece claimed that ‘certain british government 
offices are run as sharia enterprises’.63 Although 
MeF does not disclose what it pays each fellow, 
its tax filings do show chesler’s company was 
paid $125,750 from 2010-15.64
MeF also funds ’fact-finding’ tours of europe that 
bring counter-jihad activists into contact with the 
region’s politicians and policymakers. in september 
2016, gatestone fellow and clarion Project advisory 
board member raheel raza65 joined Pipes and ‘33 
activists, academics and ordinary citizens’ from 
the us, Australia, canada and the uK on a six-day 
trip to Paris, berlin and stockholm. their itinerary 
included meetings with academics and officials in 
both sweden and France’s ministries of interior. 
raza’s post-trip prognosis was that ‘europe is like a 
keg ready to blow’.66 
the following month raza was invited to speak in 
the House of lords by her gatestone associate, 
baroness caroline cox, who has also facilitated 
similar platforms for uK counter-jihad activists 
as Chapter 3 discussed. raza later blogged that 
‘interested and supportive’ british politicians had 
attended, including Fiona bruce MP, lord West, 
lord Dholakia and lord tebbit.67 Days later she 
attended a conference organised by uK Mothers 
Against radical islam and sharia (MAriAs). Her 
own canadian group ‘Muslims Facing tomorrow’  
is listed as a supporting member of baroness 
cox’s uK-based ‘equal and Free’ organisation, 
which campaigns against shariah law.68 
Aside from its donations to gatestone, which 
we will examine shortly, MeF passed often large 
sums between 2009 and 2015 to collaborators 
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such as steve emerson’s investigative Project 
(us$1.4 million), gaffney’s center for security 
Policy ($485,000), David Horowitz’s Freedom 
center ($26,000) and its Jihad Watch project 
run by robert spencer ($20,000) – further 
demonstrating the interconnectedness of the 
us counter-jihad constellation. MeF also gave 
$115,000 up until 2016 to charles Jacob’s Zionist 
outfit Americans for Peace and tolerance, whose 
‘counter-extremism arm’ MeF ‘absorbed’ in early 
2017 into its ‘islamist Watch’ project. the latter is 
now headed by samuel Westrop, whose british 
‘counter-extremism’ outfit stand for Peace we 
examined in Chapter 3. 
Another group receiving MeF funds is the 
california-based American Freedom Alliance 
(AFA), which geert Wilders declared as paying 
for his expenses to speak at its Heroes of 
conscience conference in May 2017, and for a 
speech on the ‘future of europe’ in 2013.69 AFA, 
which ‘promotes, defends and upholds Western 
values and ideals’ mainly through islamophobic 
propaganda, is designated as a hate group by the 
southern Poverty law center. european speakers 
at AFA conferences have included gatestone/AFA 
fellow guy Milliere and Philippe Karsenty from 
France, and Pax europa’s elizabeth sabaditsch-
Wolff in september 2016, alongside robert 
spencer, Pamela geller and Frank gaffney.70 
Donors to the Middle east Forum itself include a 
mixture of donor-advised funds, and pro-israel and 
neoconservative foundations. We identified $22.9 
million in grants out of MeF’s total $34.9m grant 
income reported between 2009-16. While the 
Donors capital Fund and Donorstrust funnelled 
$11.2 million – the largest slice of MeF’s known 
grants between 2009-2016 (figure 1), another 
$6.1m of contributions from nina rosenwald’s 
Abstraction Fund and two related family funds 
(Anchorage charitable and William rosenwald 
Family Fund, both now dissolved) dwarfed those 
of any other private donors. Altogether they 
accounted for half – $17.3m – of MeF’s total 
$34.9m grant income to 2016. Four key Jewish 
community donor-advised funds acted as a 
conduit for an extra $1,412,780. All four, while 
not specifically Zionist in outlook, are generally 
supportive of israel, but fund diverse causes, 
many of them secular and non-political, probably 
indicating a wide range of ultimate donors.
Figure 1:  
Middle East Forum donors breakdown 2009-16 
our analysis of hundreds of us non-profit tax 
records identified many other MeF donors, 
many of them pro-israel, who similarly 
bankroll other islamophobic activists with 
links to europe. these include the lynde & 
Harry bradley Foundation, eugene and emily 
grant Foundation, edgerly Foundation, MZ 
Foundation, Helen Diller Family Foundation, 
Koret Foundation and the ed snider Foundation. 
Although tax filings for two other big-name 
MeF donors identified in Fear Inc, the Fairbrook 
Foundation and newton and rochelle becker 
Foundation reveal no direct grants since 2012 to 
either MeF, Horowitz, AFA or csP, the beckers 
gifted the Henry Jackson society $7,000 in 
2015 for ‘educational programs on foreign 
affairs’ and have funnelled money since 2010 
to unknown groups via the Jewish community 
Federation of san Francisco, which as detailed 
earlier in this chapter funds counter-jihad groups 
such as MeF and clarion among others.71 
Gatestone Institute
sitting alongside MeF at the epicentre of this us-
european counter-jihad network is sears roebuck 
heiress nina rosenwald, a major funder of us 
neocon and islamophobic advocacy groups. As 
Chapter 2 noted, her gatestone institute think tank 
is a key clearing house for anti-Muslim propaganda 
online, with powerful political links. in April 2018 
gatestone’s chairman, former un ambassador 
John r bolton, became President trump’s new 
national security adviser.
gatestone’s latest public tax filings show it 
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received $2.3 million in contributions in 2016 and 
held $347,077 in total assets. it spends more on 
europe than anywhere else, including the us. 
its annual programme spend in the region has 
increased more than seven-fold since gatestone 
was founded in 2012 – up from $47,804 to 
nearly $397,072 in 2015 and $362,847 in 2016. 
Altogether, it spent $1.25 million in the five years 
from 2012 – six times its us programme costs.72 
Much of this goes on paying overseas contributors 
to its multilingual website; gatestone tax returns 
show just four european employees/contractors 
in 2013 rising to 26 in 2016 (albeit down from a 
peak of 32 in 2015). in contrast, it employs just 
five us-based contractors.73 gatestone also 
has a european ‘board of governors’ comprised 
of two writers and ‘distinguished fellows’, Amir 
taheri and Ann-elisabeth Moutet, and numerous 
other european fellows. they include France’s 
guy Milliere, a university of Paris viii professor 
who also posts at the far-right Riposte Laique 
website, and a bunch of britons: Douglas Murray 
of HJs, right-wing activist Denis Maceoin, ex-
british Army colonel richard Kemp, ex-uKiP 
senior aide/ ex-Breitbart editor raheem Kassam, 
Telegraph journalist con coughlin and MeF’s sam 
Westrop. Another gatestone fellow, german / 
spanish political analyst soeren Kern, was paid 
us$130,000 in 2016 as ‘head writer’.74
in early 2017, gatestone set up a new 
european site in the netherlands with four 
Dutch contributors. ‘gatestone eu’ web editor 
and ‘distinguished fellow’ timon Dias told the 
Washington Post the aim was ‘to swing the 
debate ahead of european elections … to deliver 
a tide of anti-immigrant leaders to office in the 
netherlands, France, germany and elsewhere’.75 
revelations of Wilders receiving us funds from 
gatestone, MeF and Horowitz drew anger. ‘it’s 
foreign interference in our democracy’, Dutch MP 
ronald van raak told the New York Times.76
Yet rosenwald’s funding of Wilders’ flights 
and hotel bills for us speaking tours dates 
back to 2008, whilst a board member of the 
neoconservative Hudson institute. From 2012 
onward she hosted him at special ‘gatestone 
briefing council’ events for ‘members’ who 
had given $10,000 or more.77 before the Dutch 
election, rosenwald expressed hope that trump’s 
Figure 2: Middle East Forum known donors contributing above US$50,000
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success would play out in similar european 
victories. ‘everyone is finally breathing freely after 
eight nightmarish years,’ she told Politico, 
adding she’d happily support Wilders ‘in any 
way legally permissible’.78 by mid-March 2017 
though, gatestone eu was inexplicably offline, 
its social media accounts locked. by May’s 
French presidential runoff, no trace remained. 
it is unknown whether rosenwald fell afoul of 
the Dutch or us authorities, or changed tack. 
gatestone us continued publishing europe-
focused articles, and its inflammatory fake news 
stories stoking anti-Muslim fears were syndicated 
ahead of germany’s september 2017 elections 
across counter-jihad-linked sites such as 
Politically Incorrect, and heavily promoted by far-
right AfD politicians.
in britain, gatestone held an event on 2 March 
2017 titled ‘in conversation at the House of 
lords’, headlined by key figures from its elite 
board of governors: John r. bolton, former uK 
conservative Party policy adviser and Times 
political columnist lord Finkelstein, and baroness 
caroline cox.79 no public record exists of what 
was discussed, who attended or whether the 
speakers were paid. Finkelstein, who attended 
another ‘in conversation’ event at the lords in 
February 2018 with gatestone senior fellow 
Khaled Abu toameh,80 has previously declared 
four gatestone speaking events in the lords’ 
register of interests as remunerated above the 
£500 threshold.81 
gatestone’s tax filings also show John bolton 
as earning $310,000 as an ‘event speaker’ over 
three years (2014-16); its events list shows he 
did just one ‘council briefing’ a year in 2015 and 
2016.82 curiously neither cox nor Finkelstein 
have ever declared their gatestone governor 
roles – both previously listed on gatestone’s 
website as ‘in formation’ since late 2014.83 nor 
is there any record of whether cox was paid for 
a 2014 gatestone talk on ‘islamic extremism 
in europe and Africa’.84 (gatestone’s filings do 
show, then however, a one-off $10,000 grant that 
same year to cox’s us charity arm Humanitarian 
relief Aid trust inc.)85 in total, the filings show 
gatestone spent $561,816 on speakers from 
2014 to 2016.86 one panel event held in Paris 
in 2014 featured lord David trimble, Friends of 
israel initiative’s Madrid-based director rafael 
bardaj and gatestone’s soeren Kern. gatestone’s 
expenses that year show nearly $393,000 went 
on conferences and meetings, $120,000 on travel 
and $172,000 on outreach.
gatestone itself is mostly bankrolled by the 
Abstraction Fund, rosenwald’s own private 
foundation. the Middle east Forum initially acted 
as a conduit for nearly $3 million in grants to 
gatestone from 2012-13. since 2013 though, 
Abstraction has paid gatestone over $2 million 
directly. this coincides with gatestone becoming 
tax exempt in 2013. grants to MeF concurrently 
dropped to $335,000 in 2014 and $260,000 
in 2015, with only a fraction of these sums – 
$28,00087 – then being paid out by MeF back 
to gatestone over those two years. MeF and 
Abstraction are identified as ‘related’ tax exempt 
organisations on gatestone’s 2013 and 2014 tax 
filings; only Abstraction is listed in 2015 and 2016. 
gatestone’s most politically significant donations 
have come from republican mega-donors robert 
and rebekah Mercer. Dubbed the masterminds of 
the trump presidential campaign and the money 
behind Breitbart News,88 this libertarian, hedge 
fund billionaire father and daughter duo have 
given gatestone us$250,000 via their Mercer 
Family Foundation.89 rebekah joined gatestone’s 
board of governors in March 201790 and Breitbart 
often cross-posts gatestone’s material. While 
on trump’s transition team, rebekah lobbied 
(unsuccessfully) for gatestone chair John bolton 
to be us deputy secretary of state91 in 2016 – 
her role in his appointment as national security 
adviser in 2018 is not known. the Mercers are 
reportedly ‘good friends’ with ex-uKiP leader 
nigel Farage too.92
other donors we identified after 2014 are linked 
to rosenwald’s own neocon and pro-israel 
circles. Four counter-jihad network donors 
contributed $50,000 each – the emerson Family 
Foundation, MZ Foundation, shillman Foundation 
and gatestone/MeF governor robert immerman 
through his namesake foundation (he also funds 
MeF).93 edward sugar, whose wife rebecca is 
also a gatestone governor also gave $50,000 
though it is not known if he funds other groups. 
other notable counter-jihad donors are the 
Jewish communal Fund ($180,536) and Diana 
Davis spencer Foundation ($25,000). us hedge 
fund billionaire israel englander gave gatestone 
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$10,000 in 2015 and MeF $15,000 in 2012. 
rosenwald personally donated $384,680 in 
2015. overall, we identified almost two-thirds 
($5,957,445) of gatestone’s total $9.1 million 
grant income between 2012-16. 94 
David Horowitz Freedom Center
Founded in 1988 by David Horowitz and Peter 
collier, this los Angeles-based think tank was 
originally called the center for the study of Popular 
culture. it ‘combats the efforts of the radical left 
and its islamist allies to destroy American values 
and disarm this country’. Horowitz, aka the 
‘godfather of the anti-Muslim movement’, boasts 
of receiving the financial support of ‘over 100,000 
donors’ for his Freedom center and assorted 
projects. Among them are some of the largest 
neoconservative and pro-israel donors in the us, 
who provide a sizeable chunk of DHrc’s yearly 
income of $6.2-$7.5 million. 
Horowitz is the highest paid of his counter-jihad 
peers; DHrc tax returns show that in 2015 
alone he received an astonishing $583,000 
salary package.95 employees include robert 
spencer who has run the Jihad Watch website 
since 2003 and was paid $170,000 by DHrc 
in 2015. Although part of DHrc, Jihad Watch 
is set up as a separate non-profit. its tax returns 
name Pamela geller as its vice president and 
her American Freedom Defense initiative as a 
‘related organisation’, which received $447,313 
in grants from Jihad Watch between 2011-15. 
banned along with geller in 2013 from entering 
the uK to speak at an eDl demonstration, 
spencer has described europe as besieged by an 
‘islamic invasion’. 
Horowitz is a close friend of ex-uKiP leader 
nigel Farage. Days after trump was elected 
President in 2016, Farage – as ‘Mr brexit’ – 
received a standing ovation as he took the 
stage at Horowitz’s annual restoration Weekend 
fundraiser in Florida.96 the latest summit in 
Figure 3: Who funds the Gatestone Institute? 
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november 2017 included four equally controversial 
anti-Muslim british speakers: media pundit Katie 
Hopkins, who tweeted herself hugging ex-trump 
terrorism adviser sebastian gorka; alt-righter 
Milo Yanniopolous; and Douglas Murray of HJs 
(also joined by HJs colleague Alan Mendoza). 
Past speakers at Horowitz’s fundraisers include 
Dutch MP geert Wilders in 2014 and dozens 
of prominent us conservatives, among them 
vice-president Mike Pence and attorney general 
Jeff sessions. As Chapter 2 noted, these link 
Horowitz closely to the trump White House.97 such 
fundraisers are lucrative – tax filings show Horowitz 
raised $351,000 at his 2015 restoration Weekend.
Horowitz, like nina rosenwald, has sponsored 
geert Wilders since at least 2008, including at 
a us fundraiser worth $75,000 in 2009. the 
Dutch MP calls him a ‘dear friend and ally’. Just 
how much Horowitz has paid him is unknown 
– Dutch authorities have only required Wilders 
to declare his donations since 2013. these 
show multiple payments totalling $134,000 
(€126,354) in 2014 and 2015 from Horowitz to 
Wilders’ Dutch political party’s fundraising arm 
‘Friends of the Pvv Foundation’. the Dutch 
press flagged a discrepancy between the figures 
Wilders disclosed and those of DHrc. The 
Intercept website also pointed out DHrc had 
failed to declare any foreign grants in its 2014 tax 
return – possibly violating irs non-profit rules – 
and argued that donations to a foreign political 
campaign were also a violation. (DHrc confirmed 
the donations, though ignored the Intercept’s 
request for clarification).98
since then, newer Pvv parliamentary disclosures 
reveal that DHrc also paid for Wilders’ us flight 
and hotel in August 2017, though no amounts 
are given. this tallies with Wilders speaking at a 
gala event that month honouring DHrc board 
member bob shillman,99 who also chairs Wilders’ 
us fundraising arm, the international Freedom 
Alliance Foundation (iFAF). Wilders’ own records 
also show a May 2017 trip paid by the American 
Freedom Alliance (a MeF grantee).100
neither iFAF, whose purpose is ‘education about 
multiculturalism’ nor Horowitz declare who gives 
them the money for Wilders. our investigation 
discovered, however, that his secret financiers 
include the well-respected Helen Diller Family 
Foundation in california. its tax filings reveal two 
payments of $25,000 earmarked for Wilders 
– one via DHFc for his legal defence fund in 
2014/15 and another via iFAF in 2015.101 
We calculated too that Diller is now one of 
Horowitz’s top three known donors, contributing 
$975,000 between 2009-15. the foundation, 
whose mission states that it operates ‘exclusively 
for charitable, educational or religious purposes 
by conducting or supporting activities for the 
benefit of, or to carry out the purposes of the 
Jewish community Federation of san Francisco 
Marin Peninsula & sonoma counties’, also funds 
Pamela geller, Daniel Pipes, Frank gaffney, steve 
emerson, and the tea Party. Another top donor 
similarly funding both Horowitz and Wilders is the 
MZ Foundation, which gave Horowitz $501,600 
up to 2016.
Horowitz is bankrolled by a mixture of 
neoconservatives and pro-israel foundations 
and donor-advised funds. chief among 
these are the neoconservative lynde and 
Harry bradley Foundation, which contributed 
$2.29 million between 2009-2016, and sarah 
scaife/ Allegheny Foundations, which gave 
$3.8m to 2015. Anonymous donors funnelled 
$1.413m via Donors’ trust/DcF ($802,000 to 
2015) and vanguard charitable. ($611,686). 
More anonymous grants came via the Jewish 
communal Fund ($216,500) and Jewish 
community Federation of san Francisco 
($76,500). While both these funds give to 
Zionist and pro-israel groups they also support 
a multitude of secular and non-political causes. 
republican (and trump) mega-donor sheldon 
Adelson gave Horowitz $50,000 in 2015 via 
his family foundation,102 which gives millions 
to Zionist and pro-settlement causes and has 
previously funded steve emerson.103 other 
big Horowitz pro-israel benefactors similarly 
funding counter-jihad activists from 2009-15 
are the snider Foundation ($831,041), claws 
Foundation ($250,000), Harry and Jeannette 
Weinberg Foundation ($300,000), sandra 
and lawrence Post Foundation ($269,000), 
Abstraction Fund ($128,750 to 2016) and 
emerson Family Foundation ($105,000). 
in total, we could only identify us$11.5 million of 
Horowitz’s $41.8m in grants received between 
2009-16.
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Center for Security Policy
the Washington-based center for security Policy 
(csP) brings together a number of hardline 
neoconservatives, led by Frank gaffney, a reagan-
era Pentagon official. Former ciA director James 
Woolsey and trump’s new security adviser John 
bolton have long advised csP, and gatestone’s 
nina rosenwald has served on csP’s board. 
During the us presidential campaign trump used 
a widely discredited csP poll, which claimed that 
25 per cent of American Muslims agreed violence 
against Americans is justified as part of the global 
jihad, to argue for his immigration plan.104
As Chapter 2 explained, csP in 2015 sponsored 
an invitation-only ‘Defeat Jihad Summit’ in 
Washington at which several european counter-
jihadists spoke via skype, including geert Wilders 
MP, lars Hedegaard and british uKiP peer lord 
Pearson. in the year after this summit, csP’s 
grant income soared to $7.057 million by June 
2016 – up from $4.5 million. its expenditure 
of nearly $6.5 million that year included hefty 
consultancy fees of $150,000 each to the Middle 
east Forum and csP counsel David Yerushalmi’s 
own American Freedom law center. gaffney’s 
salary package was $353,441.105
csP discloses no financial information for its 
collaborations with european activists or overseas 
spending on its tax filings. but it has worked for 
years with german ngo Pax europa, which – as 
Chapter 4 explained – lobbies against definitions 
of free speech and islamophobia at osce 
Human Dimension implementation meetings. 
in 2017 Pax’s elizabeth sabaditsch-Wolff and 
csP’s senior vice president clare lopez held 
a joint event in Warsaw and a panel on free 
speech in Washington. sabaditsch-Wolff, who 
was convicted of hate speech in Austria in 2011, 
also runs the international chapter of anti-Muslim 
group Act for America which has links to the 
christian coalition.106 she is a regular face at us 
counter-jihad-aligned events and enjoys access 
to high-level us politicians like Kansas secretary 
of state Kris Kobach. Aside from a blog donate 
button, it is unclear who funds her transatlantic 
trips. (the gates of vienna blog says Act gives 
financial support.107)
in total, we identified $12.1 million of csP’s 
$25.7 million in grants between 2009-15. like 
Horowitz, gatestone and MeF, gaffney’s funders 
encompass neocons, pro-israel/Zionist and 
donor-advised funds. they also include billionaires 
like controversial junk bond investor ira rennert 
and his wife ingeborg (a gatestone governor), 
texas oil tycoon financier t. boone Pickens (chair 
of bP capital) and the late John templeton, 
whose private foundation is british counter-
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extremist group Quilliam Foundation’s biggest 
donor, and has strong ties to right-wing christian 
networks and the us tea Party. A rare glimpse 
into csP’s non-redacted tax filings posted online 
by journalist eli clifton reveals that, in 2013 alone, 
csP received $50,000 contributions from rennert 
and Pickens, and that templeton personally gave 
csP $150,000 directly and another $450,000 
via his templeton giving Fund.108 it is not known 
whether these billionaires are regular donors, but 
this tiny insight into usually opaque tax records 
sheds some light on gaffney’s elite and powerful 
backers. the us’s largest pro-israel lobby group 
AiPAc was also recently exposed by eli clifton as 
a csP donor, contributing $60,000 via its spin-off 
citizens for nuclear Free iran.
Clarion Project 
the clarion Project (officially clarion Fund inc) 
describes itself as a 501(c)3 non-profit media 
organisation that educates ‘both the public and 
policymakers about the growing phenomenon 
of islamic extremism’ and the ‘dangers of 
radical islam’. Although Washington-based, its 
focus extends ‘to islamic extremism in europe 
and the Middle east’. Founded in 2006 by 
rabbi raphael (robert) shore109 of the radical 
Zionist group Aish Hatorah, clarion received 
millions of dollars two years later via the Donors 
capital Fund to distribute the incendiary film 
Obsession, as discussed earlier. Founding 
advisory board members include Frank gaffney 
and Daniel Pipes.
clarion claims 85-million people have seen its 
‘award-winning’ propaganda films. some have 
even been ‘screened on capitol Hill and in the 
uK, canadian and european Parliaments’ and 
at the un. one short film hosted by clarion 
spokeswoman and advisory board member 
raheel raza, on the topic of Muslim opinions and 
demographics, was shown in the british House of 
lords in 2016.110 raza, who is also a gatestone 
fellow, has close links to british baroness caroline 
cox, and the now defunct, gatestone-backed 
stand for Peace. clarion’s british editor-in-chief 
David Harris, an ex-bbc and reuters journalist, 
hosts clarion’s Facebook live updates, covering 
issues such as French schools banning pork,111 
and publishes slick e-newsletters with articles 
about the islamisation of europe, for example 
‘belgium – europe’s first islamic state?’. 
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clarion’s annual grant income has more than 
doubled since 2010 to more than $2.49 million 
in 2016. However, we could only identify $1.82m  
of its total $13.89m income between 2009-16. 
Most of this came via opaque donor-advised 
funds as detailed earlier; Donorstrust/DcF, 
Jewish communal Fund, JcF san Francisco, 
schwab charitable and vanguard charitable. 
other notable counter-jihad donors included 
the newton D. & rochelle F. becker Foundation 
($65,000 from 2010-12) and the Abstraction Fund 
($20,000). clarion’s (now removed) crowdfunding 
page for its soon-to-be-released 2018 film, The 
Jihad Generation, stated that donations would 
be matched by ‘generous’ (unnamed) funders 
while a June 2018 e-fundraiser announced that all 
donations would be tripled. 
counter-extremism groups: 
transatlantic funding and in-kind 
alliances 
Four self-declared european ‘counter-extremism’ 
organisations and associated individuals are 
linked to the aforementioned us counter-
jihad think tanks and individuals either through 
overlapping donors, personnel or advisers. such 
connections, however, appear to pose little 
hindrance to their movement within government 
and academic circles within europe (or indeed in 
the us), and their influence on counter-extremism 
policy in the region. 
Stand for Peace/ Sam Westrop 
As Chapter 3 described, samuel Westrop is a 
‘senior fellow’ of the gatestone institute. it helped 
fund his british ‘counter-extremism’ / ‘Jewish-
Muslim interfaith organisation’ stand for Peace 
(sFP) to produce a report and campaign called 
‘Don’t Fund extremism’ in november 2013. 
Although nina rosenwald has denied directly 
funding sFP, archived web pages clearly state the 
campaign had gatestone ‘support’.112 A fellow 
since 2008, Westrop was also described on bbc 
tv as a gatestone analyst whilst promoting stand 
for Peace work.113 
Faced with a uK libel action in 2015, Westrop 
moved stateside to join anti-Muslim Zionist outfit, 
Americans for Peace and tolerance (APt) in 
boston, which both rosenwald and the Middle 
east Forum (MeF) have funded. in March 2017, 
MeF appointed Westrop director of its islamist 
Watch project after it ‘absorbed’ APt’s counter-
extremism arm. With a yearly budget of circa 
$180,000,114 islamist Watch uses similar smear 
tactics to sFP; lobbying for grassroots Muslim 
groups to be de-funded by private foundations 
and government, for instance the Homeland 
security Department’s countering violent 
extremism programme. it is not known who 
paid Westrop’s defence costs in the libel case 
he lost against islam channel founder Mohamed 
Ali Harrath in early 2017 (see Chapter 3). it is 
worth noting that MeF’s legal Project supports 
european ‘islamist lawfare’ cases. Although stand 
for Peace’s website remains online, uK company 
records show that Westrop resigned as its sole 
director in August 2016115 and it was dissolved 
June 2017.
Student Rights/Henry Jackson 
Society
Another gatestone and MeF senior fellow 
is ex-Breitbart editor raheem Kassam, a 
controversial ex-aide to former uKiP party 
leader and MeP, nigel Farage. Kassam 
has extensive links within counter-jihad and 
neoconservative circles in europe and the us. 
in 2009, he set up student rights, the ‘counter-
extremism watchdog’ arm of the Henry 
Jackson society (HJs) think tank, a crucial 
intermediary between counter-jihadists and 
counter-extremists as Chapter 3 observed. HJs 
has also hosted london events for high-profile 
republican politicians like louisiana governor 
bobby Jindal, who claimed certain immigrants 
were seeking to ‘colonise’ the West.116
current students rights director rupert sutton 
asserted in 2014 that his campaign fundraises 
independently of HJs117 but no separate accounts 
substantiate this. Despite HJs’s refusal to name 
its financiers in europe or elsewhere, our research 
indicates an ever-increasing reliance on us 
donors, most of whom also happen to fund us 
counter-jihad groups. in total, we have uncovered 
$890,500 in new grants to HJs from us donors 
since 2013/14. the largest amount, as detailed 
earlier, came as anonymous grants totalling 
$317,500 via vanguard charitable. 
new important HJs backers include the bodman 
& Achelis Foundation, which is chaired by the 
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Hudson institute’s russell Pennoyer. it gave 
HJs $80,000 for operating costs in 2016 and 
funds various counter-jihad organisations. the 
emerson Family Foundation gave HJs $50,000 
in 2015 – it also funds gatestone, MeF, Horowitz 
and the clarion Project – as does another new 
controversial donor, Myron Zimmerman. His MZ 
Foundation gave HJs $50,000 in 2016.
notably, HJs has accepted $20,000 from nina 
rosenwald’s Abstraction Fund, plus $7000 in 
2015 from the newton and rochelle becker 
charitable trust, both named as top islamophobia 
donors in Fear Inc in 2011. the latter’s grant was 
for ‘educational programs on foreign affairs’.118 
other pro-israel HJs donors also financing 
counter-jihad groups were the Hertog Foundation, 
which gave $30,000 in 2014-15 and has funded 
Pipes, gaffney and Horowitz’s think tanks, as 
has the Koret Foundation, which gave HJs 
$4000. Additional grants came from the libitzky 
Family Foundation chaired by Moses libitzky, 
which contributed $87,000 between 2013-
16; goodman Family supporting Foundation 
($105,000 from 2013-15); rosenblatt charitable 
trust ($50,000 from 2013-2015); lisa and 
Michael leffell Family Foundation ($15,000); 
Meidar Family charitable trust ($15,000) and the 
tina and steven Price Foundation ($15,000). As 
detailed earlier, HJs also accepted anonymous 
grants via the Jewish communal Fund ($45,000), 
JcF san Francisco ($25,000 in 2014), and Jewish 
endowment Foundation ($5000). 
in the uK, HJs donors have included the Atkin 
charitable Foundation (which also funds groups 
active in settlement related activities in the 
occupied West bank);119 former uK conservative 
Party treasurer lord stanley Kalm’s traditional 
Alternatives Foundation; and the stanley Kalms 
Foundation. lord Kalms is chairman of Henry 
Jackson society’s strategy committee. 
Quilliam Foundation
the british-headquartered Quilliam Foundation 
which pitches itself as the world’s first counter-
extremism think tank, worked closely with HJs’ 
student rights project in its early years. As 
Chapter 3 explained, it also linked itself to the 
gatestone institute when two senior Quilliam 
directors co-signed a statement published by 
gatestone in a New York Times advert in 2015 
that called upon all Muslims to condemn violence 
after the Paris terrorist attacks. evidence emerged 
too of how eDl founder stephen Yaxley-lennon 
received £8,000 from Quilliam after he quit the 
eDl in 2013.120 
Quilliam has accepted money from several 
counter-jihad network funders. these include the 
us conservative bradley Foundation ($75,000 in 
2013), which stands accused of fuelling anti-
Muslim hatred via its financing of Horowitz, Pipes 
and gaffney. it has received us$2.1 million since 
2011 from the John templeton Foundation, which 
has close ties to right-wing christian networks 
and the us tea Party,121 and whose founder, as 
detailed earlier in this chapter, donated to Frank 
gaffney’s think tank in 2013.122 Another gaffney 
funder, the conservative stuart Family Foundation, 
has contributed $1.08m to Quilliam.
Quilliam has also received us$40,000 from 
controversial new-atheist sam Harris, who argues 
‘there is a direct link between the doctrine of islam 
and Muslim terrorism’,123 and funds the counter-
jihad activist and ex-Dutch MP Ayaan Hirsi Ali. 
other non-financial counter-jihad ties include the 
clarion Project which says it ‘backs’ Quilliam and 
has published favourable interviews with Quilliam 
staff, whom it describes as progressives.124 
clarion’s raheel raza and Quilliam’s Maajid 
nawaz have shared platforms with HJs’ Douglas 
Murray, including in 2016 at the uK national 
secular society’s 150th anniversary conference in 
london.
Counter Extremism Project
Another American outfit working in europe, 
almost exclusively focused on islamic extremism, 
is the counter extremism Project (ceP). 
With offices in london and brussels, ceP is 
embedded within europe’s political elite, boasting 
several european ex-ministers and strong 
alignment with us and european government 
counter-extremism efforts. it is co-run by ex-us 
senior government homeland security adviser 
Frances townsend and former bush-era un 
diplomat and lobbyist Mark Wallace, also an ex-
homeland security official. Former british Foreign 
office minister Mark simmonds was ceP’s 
chief operating officer from 2015-16.125 ceP’s 
european advisory board includes luminaries 
like former northern ireland first minister lord 
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trimble (also a founding signatory of the Henry 
Jackson society), british conservative MeP 
charles tannock, former uK diplomat and 
counter-terrorism chief sir ivor roberts, and the 
ex-head of germany’s federal intelligence service 
August Hanning, among others.126 its us advisers 
include neocon ex-senator Joseph lieberman 
and raymond Kelly, the ex-new York Police 
Department head who presided over deeply 
controversial and discredited racial profiling and 
spying on American-Muslims.127
ceP shields the identity of its financial backers, 
citing security issues but was set up as a 
501{c3} non-profit as ‘a fundraising technique’ 
to encourage wealthy patrons. ‘Keeping our 
donors secret inspires them to give,’ Wallace 
explained at ceP’s launch in september 2014.128 
exactly how much of its us$5.5 million in grants 
that year; $6m in 2015 or $7.5m in 2016 might 
have originated from counter-jihad donors is thus 
impossible to gauge. 
clues as to their identities though can be gleaned 
from ceP’s tax filings129 under its non-profit 
‘doing business as’ (DbA) name, green light 
Project inc. these reveal ceP/green light as 
a spin-off from the hawkish united against a 
nuclear iran (uAni), an American advocacy outfit 
also run by ceP bosses Mark Wallace and David 
ibsen. its advisory board includes militarists like 
trump’s national security adviser ex-gatestone 
chairman John bolton130 alongside HJs chairman 
lord stanley Kalms, plus several ex-british 
security services and military top brass: baroness 
Pauline neville Jones, sir richard Dearlove, sir 
graeme lamb and lord charles guthrie.131 in 
2016, uAni’s main donors were exposed by 
Lobelog as casino billionaire sheldon Adelson 
and mining magnate thomas Kaplan.132 As 
detailed earlier, Adelson gave counter-jihadist 
David Horowitz $50,000 in 2015 via his Adelson 
Family Foundation133 and is a known past funder 
of steve emerson.134 the Jewish communal Fund 
directs anonymous money into uAni too.135 More 
recently, Lobelog reported that leaked emails 
revealed discussions of potential funding from the 
united Arab emirates to both ceP and uAni.136
We also know that, just as the british Quilliam 
Foundation benefited from state funding in its 
early years, ceP gets us government grants. 
these include a two-year us$298,760 grant 
‘for building capacity’ from the us Homeland 
security department in 2016 under the obama 
administration’s countering violent extremism 
programme, which works with grassroots 
Muslim groups.137 
us tax filings show that ceP/green light tripled 
its spend on its european ‘education and 
advocacy’ programme services from $250,000 
when it first started in 2014 to $750,000 by 
2015. its latest available tax filings for 2016 show 
a similar $755,000 payment albeit marked as a 
grant for ‘consulting and operations’. Funds are 
wired to ceP brussels, a belgian non-profit that 
green light ‘helped form’ in order to expand its 
projects to europe.138
ceP brussels is headed by roberta bonazzi. 
she also runs her own neocon think tank, the 
european Foundation for Democracy (eFD), 
which is named jointly with ceP on conferences 
and publications and espouses similar views. 
eFD itself is partially funded by pro-israel 
foundations routed via its us-based philanthropic 
arm, the Friends of the european Foundation 
for Democracy (FDD), which cronin et al have 
shown is closely linked to and bankrolled by 
the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies 
(FDD), a us-based pro-likud and anti-iran think 
tank dedicated to fighting ‘terrorism and militant 
islamism’.139 FDD receives substantial funding 
from both counter-jihad movement and pro-
settlement donors. 
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us donors funding counter-jihad and counter-
extremism groups with links to europe
this section profiles a selection of the us private 
foundations and billionaires who between 
2009-16 contributed more than $100,000 to 
the european and us counter-jihad activists 
and counter-extremism think tanks examined 
in this chapter. their donations, which include 
the millions of dollars routed anonymously 
through us donor-advised funds, have proven 
a lifeline to such groups, and underscore the 
transnational, and particularly transatlantic, nature 
of islamophobia funding. it should be noted 
however that many of these donors fund widely 
varied causes across the political spectrum, not 
just those detailed in this report.
1. DONORS CAPITAL FUND & DONORS 
TRUST: Contributed $15 million
set up in 1999 by libertarian activist Whitney ball 
as a spinoff from the conservative Philanthropy 
roundtable, the virginia-based non-profit 
Donorstrust (Dt) and its sister outfit Donors 
capital Fund (DcF) were ‘formed to safeguard 
the charitable intent of donors who are dedicated 
to the ideals of limited government, personal 
responsibility and free enterprise’. 
in 2015, Dt’s income was $85.5 million and 
DcF’s was $61.4m. As mentioned earlier, 
these two funds bankroll the us conservative 
movement, channelling hundreds of millions from 
anonymous donors to aid the right’s assault on 
unions, climate scientists, public schools and 
economic regulation. According to Donorstrust, 
80 per cent of its grants ‘go to groups that 
advance liberty’.
the funds also offer the biggest source of cash 
for the core anti-Muslim us and european activists 
and groups examined in this report, contributing 
nearly $15 million between 2009-15. As noted, 
most of this – $11.3m – went to Daniel Pipes’ 
Middle east Forum. given MeF’s funding of 
counter-jihadists in europe, this money has likely 
influenced the debate on islam beyond America. 
british think tank Henry Jackson society also 
accepted $40,000 from unknown sources via 
DcF in 2014-2015. ex-Dutch MP and counter-
jihadist Ayaan Hirsi Ali similarly received $100,000 
via this route for her us foundation.
2. ROBERT AND REBEKAH MERCER: 
Amount unknown – likely $10million +
billionaire robert Mercer, whose renaissance 
technologies hedge fund is one of world’s most 
profitable, set up the Mercer Family Foundation 
in 2004. He and daughter rebekah went on 
to bankroll the rise of the anti-Muslim Breitbart 
News, spending at least $10 million from 
2011. they also invested $15m into setting up 
cambridge Analytica, the online data mining 
firm hauled before a uK parliamentary inquiry in 
2018 after it was exposed as a propaganda and 
disinformation machine used by, among others, 
the brexit leave.eu campaign.140 this highlights 
the transnational (and particularly transatlantic) 
nature of islamophobia funding. 
GRANTEES 2009-15
Donors 
Capital Fund
DonorsTrust TOTAL
Middle east Forum 11,190,000 128,500 11,318,500
center for security Policy 1,830,000 256,200 2,086,200
David Horowitz Freedom center 481,000 321,000 802,000
clarion Fund 125,000 225,000 350,000
American islamic congress 135,000 85,000 220,000
AHA Foundation 100,000  - 100,000
Henry Jackson society  - 40,000 40,000
Jihad Watch  - 20,000 20,000
investigative Project on terrorism  - 5,000 5,000
TOTAL $13,861,000 $1,080,700 $14,941,700 
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As trump’s 2016 presidential campaign backers, 
the duo wield huge political clout. ‘the Mercers 
laid the groundwork for the trump revolution,’ 
ex-adviser steve bannon boasted in 2016. 
‘irrefutably, when you look at donors during the 
past four years, they have had the single biggest 
impact of anybody, including the Kochs’.141 
set up with just $500,000, the Mercer 
foundation’s early donations were mostly to 
medical research and general charities. by 2008, 
under rebekah’s direction, it was funding a 
network of ultraconservative ‘interconnected and 
politically tinged’ groups, writes the New Yorker. 
its backing for conservative think tanks such 
as the Heritage Foundation, Heartland institute 
and anti-Democrat watchdog Media research 
center widened after 2010 to embrace anti-
islam initiatives, including $1million142 for political 
ads supporting a new York gubernatorial 
candidate fighting the so-called ‘ground Zero 
mosque’.143
the Mercers are now the gatestone institute’s 
third biggest donor, granting $250,000 since 2014 
($50,000 in 2014, $100,000 in 2015, $100,000 in 
2016).144 rebekah, who was on trump’s election 
transition team, joined british peers lord Finkelstein 
and baroness cox on gatestone’s board in 2017, 
alongside former chairman John bolton (now us 
national security adviser).
other counter-jihad-related grants include $50,000 
to encounter (2013-14), publishers of anti-Muslim 
books such as Londonistan by british columnist 
Melanie Phillips and robert spencer’s ‘Islam 
unveiled’. Another grantee, the Young America’s 
Foundation, has controversially sponsored talks by 
spencer and David Horowitz on us campuses,145 
and also receives Abstraction Fund grants. 
the foundation is however but one cog in the 
Mercers’ influence machine. robert Mercer is also 
the biggest donor to secure America now (sAn), 
a ‘social welfare’ non-profit previously chaired by 
John bolton and recently exposed for running 
a conspiratorial anti-islam Facebook campaign 
ahead of the 2016 us election. He gave sAn 
$2 million in 2016; (although sAn says Mercer’s 
funding was for israel and iran-related work, not 
the ads).146 in the same year, Mercer also donated 
$2.5m to the John bolton super PAc,147 which 
reportedly hired cambridge Analytica. 
in late 2017 an expose of ex-Breitbart columnist 
Milo Yiannopoulos’ links to white nationalists and 
neo-nazis saw robert Mercer sever ties with the 
british alt-righter. Mercer, 71, has since sold his 
Breitbart stake to his daughters, and retired as 
renaissance ceo in January 2018.148 rebekah 
recently faced calls to quit her American Museum 
of natural History board role over her funding of 
climate denialists, and trump and steve bannon. 
3. THE ABSTRACTION FUND:  
Contributed $6.47 million
Founded in 2006, Abstraction is one of several 
private tax-exempt foundations linked to nina 
rosenwald (notably the William rosenwald Family 
Fund and Anchorage charitable Fund) and has a 
long history of funding anti-Muslim groups. While 
rosenwald calls herself a human rights advocate; 
others accuse her of being embedded in a network 
‘of far-right extremists who sympathise with Donald 
trump’s white supremacist American Dream’.149 As 
outlined earlier, her sponsorship of Dutch MP geert 
Wilders and promotion of far-right leaders and 
european parties like germany’s AfD and France’s 
Marine le Pen has provoked much unease. 
in 2015, Abstraction held $4.1 million in assets 
and disbursed $971,565 in charitable grants. 
rosenwald herself was the only contributor, gifting 
$211,800 in non-cash shares to Abstraction.150 
top Abstraction counter-jihad grantees include 
those profiled earlier: Middle east Forum, 
investigative Project on terrorism, David 
Horowitz’s Freedom center and rosenwald’s own 
gatestone institute. All are fervent advocates of 
the ‘stealth jihad’ threat islam supposedly poses 
to europe. geert Wilders’ international Freedom 
Alliance Foundation received $25,000 in 2016 
while british think tank Henry Jackson society 
accepted $20,000 between 2012-16.
Abstraction initially used the Middle east Forum 
as a conduit to inject millions into gatestone. in 
2014-2015 grants to MeF dropped sharply and 
direct grants to gatestone increased. other us 
counter-jihad grantees include clarion advisory 
board member and gatestone senior fellow Zuhdi 
Jasser’s American islamic Forum for Democracy, 
csP, clarion Fund, Jihad Watch and anti-shariah 
mastermind David Yerushalmi’s legal outfit.
critics say rosenwald ‘uses her millions to 
cement the alliance between the pro-israel lobby 
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4. ROBERT SHILLMAN:  
Amount unknown, reportedly $1million+
Another high-profile counter-jihad financier is 
‘Dr bob’ shillman, who runs cognex corp, a 
publicly traded us tech firm worth $4 billion. An 
avid trump fan, he was a big donor to the Make 
America great Again campaign and funded 
outlandish video ads of ‘superman trump’.153 
His private grantmaking shillman Foundation had 
$17.9million in assets in 2016.
shillman, like nina rosenwald, is one of the 
counter-jihad elite and a staunch backer of 
conservative, pro-israel and Zionist causes. He 
claims not to be anti-Muslim. He sits on the David 
Horowitz Freedom center board and is sole 
director and chairman of the california-based 
international Freedom Alliance Foundation154 
(iFAF), which funds Dutch MeP geert Wilders’ 
us speaker tours, notably the provocative 2015 
‘Draw Mohammad’ cartoon contest in Dallas held 
by Horowitz and spencer’s Jihad Watch project 
and Pamela geller’s American Freedom Defense 
initiative. back then, shillman refused to confirm 
if he had sponsored the event.155 Wilders has 
since declared receipt of expenses payments 
from ‘iFA’156 and shillman’s 990 tax forms show a 
grant to iFA in the same period for $16,463.157 As 
Chapter 2 noted, two Muslim gunmen stormed 
the contest and were killed; shillman called it ‘a 
terrorist attack on the American way of life’.158
shillman has donated over $10 million in recent 
years to unknown groups under the generic 
heading ‘to support the community’ via the 
donor-advised Fidelity charitable trust – $5 million 
of this in 2016 alone. He also gave gatestone 
$50,000 in 2014.
SHILLMAN FOUNDATION
GRANTS 
2009-15
Fidelity charitable gift Fund  10,784,802
gatestone institute 50,000
international Freedom Alliance 
Foundation
16,463
rebel Media fellows and general 
costs (reportedly $1million plus)
$1m+
David Horowitz Freedom center and 
Middle east Forum shillman fellows
undisclosed
TOTAL $11 million +
ALSO FUNDS: Friends of the IDF, CAMERA, 
Christians United for Israel, American Friends of 
UN WATCH, Coalition for Tolerance on Campus, 
Congregation Beth AM, Jewish National Fund, 
Zionist Organisation of America.
 
the billionaire has long backed islamophobic 
reporting.159 He ‘underwrites’ four fellowships 
for journalists on FrontPage Magazine, 
Horowitz’s ‘online journal for news and political 
commentary’ and sponsored several Middle 
east Forum ‘shillman-ginsberg’ fellows, 
including ex-breitbarter raheem Kassam 
and French writer Michael gurfinkiel. Another 
shillman fellow is clarion Project ‘national 
security analyst’ ryan Mauro, whom the 
southern Poverty law center designates 
an anti-Muslim extremist (a charge Mauro 
and the islamophobic fringe’.151 Abstraction gives 
large sums to many Zionist and pro-settlement 
causes including central Fund of israel (cFi) 
which the New York Times describes as a 
multimillion dollar vehicle to ‘channel donations’ 
to West bank settlements.152 Another grantee, 
AisH new York, is linked to the pro-settler Aish 
Hatorah network.
ABSTRACTION FUND
GRANTS 
2009-16
Americans for Peace and tolerance  20,000 
American Freedom law center  10,000 
American islamic congress  5,000 
American islamic Forum for Democracy  150,000 
center for islamic Pluralism  40,000 
center for security Policy  62,500 
clarion Fund  25,000 
David Horowitz Freedom center  128,750 
encounter for culture and education  20,000 
gatestone institute  2,015,000 
international Freedom Alliance  25,000 
Henry Jackson society  20,000 
investigative Project on terrorism  116,000 
Jihad Watch  30,000 
Middle east Forum  3,790,300 
TOTAL $6,457,550
ALSO FUNDS: American Friends of NGO Monitor, 
CAMERA, Central Fund of Israel, Friends of Israel 
Initiative, Friends of Ir David, Foundation for Defense 
of Democracies, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 
JINSA, MEMRI, REPORT Inc, StandWithUs, Young 
America’s Foundation, ZOA.
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rejects160). in August 2017, rebel Media’s 
stephen Yaxley-lennon and laura loomer 
were appointed ‘shillman Fellows’; boss ezra 
levant confirmed shillman contributed to 
their salaries. Another brit, Katie Hopkins has 
since become rebel’s latest shillman fellow in 
January 2018.
curiously, no direct grants to MeF or Horowitz 
appear on shillman’s non-profit tax records; 
how he funds these fellowships is unclear, 
especially as neither group publicly discloses 
their donors on their charitable tax filings. 
nevertheless, it is clear that shillman’s money 
is helping to sustain european counter-jihad 
activists like stephen Yaxley-lennon, Katie 
Hopkins and geert Wilders.
5. EUGENE & EMILY GRANT FAMILY 
FOUNDATION: $4.91million 
this private grantmaking foundation was 
established in new York in 1998. Presided over 
by American real estate mogul and WWii veteran 
fighter pilot eugene grant, in 2015 it held $1.87m 
in assets and gave out $8.99m in grants.161 since 
2009, the foundation has given nearly $5 million 
to the counter-jihad network.
now aged in his 90s, grant is a founding member 
of the center for security Policy’s board of 
regents, alongside nina rosenwald. set up in 
2003, the board is responsible for csP’s financial 
development.162 in 2007 it presented grant 
with a ‘sacred Honour award’ in recognition 
of those who support csP to fulfil its mission. 
in his acceptance speech, grant made special 
reference ‘to the perils we face today posed by 
the global threat of militant islam, an enemy every 
bit as ruthless as the nazis and imperial Japan 
that we … face[d] so many years ago’.163
the foundation’s philanthropy covers a range of 
free market think tanks, notably the Manhattan 
institute, and support for Zionist and pro-israel 
settlement organisations. 
in recent years the grants’ greatest generosity – 
usD$3 million – has been for steve emerson’s 
investigative Project on terrorism. this outstripped 
all other counter-jihad grants including the 
$1,646,350 it gave gaffney’s think tank, and 
$265,000 to Middle east Forum between 2009-
2015. the foundation also gave small funding 
to uK-based charity spiro Ark, which hosted a 
MeF speaker in 2012164 and ‘eurabia’ conspiracy 
theorist bat Ye’or in 2015.165 
EUGENE AND EMILY GRANT 
FAMILY FOUNDATION 
GRANTS 
2009-15
center for security Policy 1,646,350
David Horowitz Freedom center 5500
investigative Project on terrorism  
(via Fidelity charitable) 
3,000,020
Middle east Forum 265,000
spiro Ark (uK) 1000
TOTAL $4,917,870
ALSO FUNDS: American Friends of Leket Israel, 
American Friends of NGO Monitor/ REPORT, 
American Jewish Committee, Anti-Defamation 
League, Birthright Israel, CAMERA, Central Fund 
of Israel, Friends of the IDF, Hudson Institute, Israel 
Project, Jewish National Fund, JINSA, Manhattan 
Institute, MEMRI, One Israel Fund, Secure America 
Now, StandWithUs, WINEP, London Center for Policy 
Research, UJA, ZOA.
 
6. LYNDE & HARRY BRADLEY 
FOUNDATION: $3.45 million 
one of the top 20 conservative non-profit funders 
in the us, the bradley Foundation is a long-
standing top donor to the islamophobia network. 
With assets of over us$800 million in 2016, this 
legacy foundation focuses on the desire of its 
industrialist namesakes, the bradley brothers, to 
promote ‘limited government, free enterprise and 
constitutional ideals’. 
Known for its stalwart funding of hardline neocon 
think tanks, including the American enterprise 
institute, and Hoover and Hudson institutes, it 
has faced strong criticism for supporting groups 
pushing anti-Muslim hatred in the us and beyond. 
‘bradley laid the groundwork for republican voters 
to embrace a demagogic candidate like Donald 
trump,’ says brendan Fischer of the center for 
Media and Democracy.166 
bradley’s biggest counter-jihad beneficiary by 
far is the David Horowitz’s Freedom center, to 
which it contributed $2.29 million between 2009-
2016. the Middle east Forum received $345,000 
in the same period, some of it specified for its 
islamist Watch and legal Project.167 bradley 
also gives many millions to its own publisher, 
encounter books,168 which exists at the nexus of 
the neocon and counter-jihad movements, and 
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whose european authors include HJs’ Douglas 
Murray and Times columnist Melanie Phillips. 
the latter’s eurabia-themed book Londonistan 
argues britain is ‘sleepwalking into islamisation’ 
and is oft-quoted by counter-jihadists. billionaire 
gatestone donors robert and rebekah Mercer 
also fund encounter.169
bradley president Michael grebe rejects ‘the 
notion that we are islamophobic’, as charged 
by the center for American Progress and 
council for islamic-American relations since 
2011. He argued in 2013 that while bradley 
funds some groups critical of radical islam, ‘we 
don’t promote… islamophobia, and indeed 
we provide grants to a number of groups that 
would be described as moderate Muslims’.170 
Yet grebe admitted that ‘we know also we are 
in a war with radical elements of islam’… ‘and 
we actively support groups that are engaged 
in counterterrorism’. in 2013 bradley gave the 
uK-based Quilliam Foundation $75,000.171 the 
other ‘moderate Muslims’ are presumably the 
controversial American islamic congress (Aic) to 
whom it gave $185,000 from 2010-2016. ex-
Dutch MP Ayaan Hirsi Ali, whom grebe has called 
‘a model of courage’, also received a $250,000 
stipend as a 2015 bradley Prize recipient.172
LYNDE & HARRY BRADLEY 
FOUNDATION
GRANTS 
2009-2016 
American islamic congress 185,000
center for security Policy 330,000
David Horowitz Freedom center 2,295,000
Middle east Forum 345,000
Quilliam Foundation 75,000
Ayaan Hirsi Ali 250,000
TOTAL $3,480,000
ALSO FUNDS: American Enterprise Institute, 
Encounter Books, Foundation for Defense of 
Democracies, Heritage Foundation, Hoover 
Institution ‘Working Group on Islamism and the 
International Order’, Hudson Institute’s ‘Center on 
Islam, Democracy, and the Future of the Muslim 
World’, International Center for Study of Violent 
Extremism, Institute for Study of War, Jewish Institute 
for National Affairs, MEMRi.
 
bradley has cut off the center for security 
Policy, whom it had funded since 1988 and gave 
$330,000 from 2009-2013.173 (observers cite 
gaffney’s anti-sharia hysteria.174) More recently, 
it has funded the Hoover institution on War, 
revolution and Peace’s ‘Working group on 
islamism and the international order’ and Hudson’s 
‘center on islam, Democracy, and the Future of the 
Muslim World’ ($150,000 in 2016), which hosted 
steve bannon as a speaker in late 2017.
7. ADELSON FAMILY FOUNDATION: 
Amount unknown but likely $2 million +
the private foundation of las vegas sands casino 
magnate and republican mega-donor sheldon 
g Adelson and his physician wife Miriam was set 
up in 2007 to ‘strengthen the state of israel and 
the Jewish people. it gives tens of millions each 
year to pro-settlement, Zionist and anti-Muslim 
causes.175 in 2015 it disbursed grants worth 
$48.7million. 
Adelson, who is a close friend and benefactor 
of israeli prime minister benjamin netanyahu, is 
said to have influenced trump’s recent choice 
of ex-gatestone chairman John bolton as his 
national security adviser.176 He is also one of two 
key funders of united Against nuclear iran, which 
included bolton as an advisory board member 
and whose irs tax forms link it to the us/ 
brussels-based counter extremism Project. 
ADELSON FAMILY FOUNDATION 
GRANTS 
2009-15
American islamic congress 95,500
combined Jewish Philanthropies 6,800,000
David Horowitz Freedom center 50,000 
Fidelity charitable gift Fund 350,000 
 TOTAL $ 7,295,500 
ALSO FUNDS: Birthright Israel, Christians United 
for Israel, Friends of IDF, Friends of Israel Initiative, 
Jewish Agency, Jewish National Fund, JINSA, 
MEMRI, PEF Israel Endowment Funds, Zionist 
Organization of America.
 
in 2015 Adelson gave David Horowitz Freedom 
center $50,000 via his family foundation177 and has 
previously gifted large sums to steve emerson’s 
investigative Project on terrorism. Despite a hostile 
record towards Muslims –describing Palestinians 
as ‘an invented people’ – Adelson also has funded 
the American islamic congress, which has close 
ties to anti-Muslim groups.178 He pumps many 
millions through donor-advised funds like Fidelity 
charitable and combined Jewish Philanthropies 
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(cJP); in 2015 alone for example he gave unknown 
organisations $350,000 via Fidelity and between 
2010-15 a total of $6.5million via cJP. so it’s 
incredibly difficult to know who else Adelson funds 
in the counter-jihad movement and how much he 
gives – although the investigative Project notably 
receives regular contributions from cJP ($221,000 
since 2009), which also funded MeF, csP and 
clarion in 2015.179  
8. HELEN DILLER FAMILY FOUNDATION: 
Contributed $1.76 million 
this private foundation is a well-respected 
benefactor for cancer and medical research, 
universities and the arts. it made headlines in 2017 
for donating us$500 million to the university of 
california.180 With an income of $59.2m and assets 
of $4.1m in 2015/6, its stated mission is to conduct 
supporting activities for the charitable, educational 
and religious purposes of the donor-advised Jewish 
community Federation of san Francisco.181 
the foundation’s wealth comes from real 
estate billionaire sanford Diller’s Prometheus 
group empire. named after and headed by 
his philanthropist wife Helen before she died in 
January 2015, it’s now run by their daughter, 
Prometheus president Jaclyn safier.
our investigation uncovered its grants totalling 
$1.76 million since 2009 to the inner us counter-
jihad sanctum, including $50,000 in grants 
earmarked for far-right Dutch MP geert Wilders.182 
Diller’s top grantees include David Horowitz 
Freedom center ($975,000 for 2009-15 which 
included $25k for Wilders’ legal defence fund), 
anti-sharia legal mastermind David Yerushalmi’s 
centre ($175,000) and Pamela geller’s AFDi 
($160,000). other beneficiaries were gaffney’s 
csP ($285,000 – including $25,000 for ‘the work 
of Daniel Pipes’), Middle east Forum and steve 
emerson’s investigative Project on terrorism. 
it’s not known whether the initial Wilders donation 
arrived after Jaclyn safier took the helm, but 
a second $25,000 grant to ‘support’ his work 
was given to the international Freedom Alliance 
Foundation post-June 2015, plus $25,000 more 
for ‘general purposes’. safier also sits on the 
advisory board of taube Family Foundation & 
Philanthropies,183 which has funded both David 
Horowitz and steve emerson’s think tanks 
(and was until recently connected to the Koret 
Foundation through its president tad taube).184 
safier personally donated $244,000 to the 
republican national committee in 2016. the Diller 
Foundation also gave $250,000 to the tea Party 
Patriots Foundation in 2015. 
Although the Helen Diller Foundation gives 
millions to Jewish education and teen leadership 
awards globally, it also directly funds pro-israel 
and Zionist causes as shown in the table below, 
many controversial. these include the AMcHA 
initiative, which stands accused of spying on and 
intimidating us students and publishing a ‘target 
list’ of ‘anti-israel professors.185
HELEN DILLER FAMILY 
FOUNDATION 
GRANTS 
2009-16
American Freedom Defense initiative 160,000
American Freedom law center 175,000
center for security Policy 285,000
David Horowitz Freedom center 975,000
international Freedom Foundation 50,000
investigative Project on terrorism 35,000
Middle east Forum 80,000
TOTAL $1,760,000
ALSO FUNDS: AMCHA Initiative, American Society 
for Technion, CAMERA, Central Fund of Israel, 
Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, Israel 
Allies Foundation, Israel Project Inc, Jewish News 
Service, Louis D Brandeis Center, Report INC, Zionist 
Organisation of America, UJA, Jewish Foundation for 
the Righteous.
 
9. BECKER FAMILY FOUNDATIONS: 
Amount unknown but possibly $1 million+
the newton D. & rochelle F. becker Foundation, 
and affiliated newton and rochelle charitable 
trust and becker Family Foundation are key 
funders of anti-Muslim, right-wing Zionist and 
neoconservative causes. they were identified in 
the center for American Progress’ report Fear 
Inc report as having given over a million dollars to 
islamophobic groups during the 2000s.
Founder and president newton becker, a prolific 
pro-israel philanthropist, died in 2012 but ensured 
his legacy of support for the pro-israel community 
through the newton and rochelle charitable 
trust. run by his son David, in 2016 the trust held 
$126 million in total assets. its stated mission is to 
direct funds ‘to the Jewish community, particularly 
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Jewish organisations and programs that combat 
media bias against israel and the Jewish people, 
israel advocacy, and democracy defense’. several 
of its board members are closely linked to the 
Jewish community Foundation of los Angeles, 
including its president Marvin schotland. 
Although the beckers’ direct contributions to core 
counter-jihad groups appear to have stopped after 
2012, the trust does pass grants through various 
donor-advised funds that contribute to such groups. 
in particular it has given large sums in recent years 
to schwab charitable Fund ($1,150,000 in 2016 
and $450,000 in 2015) and the Jewish community 
Federation of san Francisco ($340,000 from 2011-
16).186 both have passed hundreds of thousands of 
dollars to the David Horowitz Freedom, Middle east 
Forum, center for security Policy and clarion Fund 
since 2009, although as previously discussed it is 
impossible to link such donations due to the lack of 
public disclosure.
NEWTON AND ROCHELLE 
BECKER FAMILY FOUNDATIONS 
GRANTS 
2009-16 
clarion Fund 55,000
center for security Policy 95,000
David Horowitz Freedom center 23,000
Henry Jackson society 7,000
investigative Project on terrorism 100,000
Middle east Forum 129,000
Jewish Federation of san Francisco 340,000
schwab charitable Fund 1,600,000
TOTAL $2,349,000
ALSO FUNDS: Birthright Israel Foundation, 
Central Fund of Israel, Foundation for the 
Defense of Democracies, Friends of ELNET, Israel 
Emergency Alliance, Jerusalem Foundation, 
MEMRI, Scholars for Peace in the Middle East, 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy
 
10. MZ FOUNDATION: $1.45 million
californian real estate magnate Myron 
Zimmerman’s philanthropic backing of a medley 
of anti-Muslim, pro-israel and Zionist groups is 
unusually advertised on his private foundation’s 
website. ‘committed to combatting anti-semitism 
in the united states and across the globe’, the 
MZ Foundation ‘partners with more than 70 
different organisations across several continents’. 
in 2016, its income was close to $50 million and it 
held $63.7m in assets.187
MZ FOUNDATION
GRANTS 
2009-2016
Act! for America 10,000
American Freedom law center 75,000
American congress for truth 10,000
AHA Foundation 20,000
Americans for Peace and tolerance 80,000
American Freedom Defense initiative 60,000
center for security Policy 125,000
David Horowitz Foundation 501,600
gatestone institute 50,000
Henry Jackson society 50,000
international Freedom Alliance (iFAF) 25,000
investigative Project on terrorism 181,000
Middle east Forum 2010-16 282,500
TOTAL $1,470,100
Also FunDs: AMCHA Initiative, American Friends of 
Ariel Inc, CAMERA, Central Fund of Israel, Christians 
United for Israel, Im Tirtzu, Imagination Productions, 
Irish4Israel, Israel Emergency Alliance, Lawfare 
Project, MEMRI, Report Inc, StandWithUs, Students 
Supporting Israel, United Nations Watch – USA.
 
the website list of grantee logos188 and declared 
recipients on MZ’s tax records are a veritable 
who’s who of the counter-jihad network. they 
include Middle east Forum ($282,500 since 2010 
for research), steve emerson’s iPt ($181,000 
to 2014), gaffney’s csP ($135,000 since 2013), 
gatestone ($50,000 from 2015-16), Pamela 
geller’s American Freedom Defense initiative, 
($75,000 for ‘civil liberties advocacy’) and Ayaan 
Hirsi Ali’s AHA Foundation ($20,000, split evenly 
for women’s rights and ‘foreign affairs’189). David 
Yerushalmi’s legal centre, Zimmerman’s favourite 
grantee though is David Horowitz, whom he gave 
$501,600 from 2011-2016 towards ‘education 
for the next generation’. european grantees 
include Henry Jackson society, which accepted 
$50,000 in 2016 for ‘education’ purposes, and 
geert Wilder’s us-based iFAF funding vehicle 
run by robert shillman, which received $25,000 
for ‘general purposes’.190 the grassroots Act 
for America, which backs Pax europa’s elizabeth 
sabaditsch-Wolff, received $10,000 in 2014. 
Zimmerman has reportedly given over $1 million 
since 2012 to non-profits that support settlers 
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in the West bank,191 including the far-right extra 
parliamentary im tirtzu youth movement. Zionist 
grantees include christians united For israel, led 
by islamophobic pastor John Hagee.192 Another 
is charles Jacobs’ group Americans for Peace 
and tolerance, which employed stand for Peace’s 
sam Westrop in 2016 after he left britain.193
11. JEWISH COMMUNAL FUND: $1.58m 
the new-York-based Jewish communal Fund 
(JcF) bills itself as America’s largest and most 
active Jewish donor-advised fund, managing 
$1.3 billion in charitable assets for over 1300 funds. 
its mission is simply ‘to facilitate and promote 
philanthropy through donor-advised funds’, and 
works across secular and religious causes. 
in 2015 Lobelog revealed that JcF was passing 
grants ‘to groups that largely exist to spread 
islamophobic and anti-Muslim messages’, 
including Pamela geller.194 Her American Freedom 
Defense initiative group received $165,000 via 
JcF from 2012-2015.195 ironically geller has 
waged a campaign against JcF president Karen 
Adler since 2015 for JcF’s grants to the new 
israel Fund, which backs boycott and divestment 
campaigning. As detailed earlier in this chapter, 
most of the core counter-jihad groups with links 
to europe have received funds via JcF. grantees 
between 2009-2015 included Middle east Forum, 
clarion Fund, David Horowitz Freedom center, 
investigative Project on terrorism and gatestone 
institute as shown below.
JEWISH COMMUNAL  
FUND
 GRANTS 
2009-2015
American Freedom Defense initiative 165,000
clarion Project 304,642
David Horowitz Freedom center 215,870
gatestone institute 180,536
Henry Jackson society inc 45,000
investigative Project on terrorism 419,010
Middle east Forum 252,770
TOTAL  $1,582,828
 
12. KORET FOUNDATION: $1.05 million 
Founded in 1979, the Koret Foundation gives 
money to education, arts and culture, and Jewish 
causes. the san-Francisco grantmaker manages 
the $304 million fortune of clothing manufacturer 
Joseph Koret, who died in 1982. it was run until 
recently by his widow susan Koret and real estate 
mogul tad taube, whose fallout led to a high-
profile lawsuit that was settled in June 2017. both 
have now resigned from the board. the foundation 
had an income of over $118 million in 2015.196
Writer richard silverstein noted in 2013 that Koret, 
alongside the Fairbrook and irving Moskowitz 
foundations, was part of a group of radical 
foundations leading ‘a drive toward the increasing 
politicisation of Jewish philanthropy’ and funding 
an array of ‘far-right Jewish groups’.197 
indeed, foundation chair susan Koret had 
accused longtime president taube, of funnelling 
funds to conservative causes at odds with Koret’s 
original mission. taube, 86, is known for his hard-
right conservative politics. He is a Hoover institute 
board member and runs the taube Philanthropies 
foundations, which have also funded David 
Horowitz and steve emerson’s groups.198 Koret 
has also previously funded the Middle east 
Forum’s ‘legal Project’ and ‘islamist Watch’. 
our analysis of Koret’s tax filings from 2009-
2015, found sizeable donations to the center for 
security Policy ($450,000) and Middle east Forum 
($350,000) as well as the investigative Project, 
David Horowitz and Henry Jackson society. none 
received grants after 2013. 
KORET FOUNDATION
GRANTS 
2009-15
center for security Policy 450,000
David Horowitz Freedom center 120,000
investigative Project on terrorism 125,000
Middle east Forum 350,000
Henry Jackson society 4000
TOTAL $1,049,000
ALSO FUNDS: American Friends of IDC, Birthright 
Israel, CAMERA, Foundation for Defense of 
Democracies, Friends of ELNET, Friends of the IDF, 
Jewish National Fund, MEMRI, StandWithUs, Zionist 
Organization of America.
 
13. EMERSON FAMILY FOUNDATION: 
Contributed at least $500,000 
this foundation was set up in 2005 by husband 
and wife rita emerson and J steve emerson, key 
figures in the pro-israel us establishment. it held 
$4.6 million in assets in 2015. Although its direct 
donations to core counter-jihadists only appear 
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from 2012 onward, the foundation is listed as 
supporting a 2008 rome conference held under 
the auspices of the european Freedom Alliance,199 
a group of far-right politicians linked to counter-
jihadists as discussed in Chapter 2. in that same 
year emerson’s tax filings show it gave $174,000 
to unknown organisations via the donor-advised 
Jewish community Foundation (los Angeles) and 
another $390,000 a few years later in 2011.
EMERSON FAMILY  
FOUNDATION 
GRANTS 
2009-16
American congress for truth/Act for 
America education 
40,000
American Freedom Alliance 1700
American islamic Forum for 
Democracy
110,000
clarion Project 10,300
citizens for national security 20,000
David Horowitz Freedom center 115,000
gatestone institute 5,000
Henry Jackson society inc 50,000
investigative Project on terrorism 20,000
Middle east Forum 5,000
Jewish community Foundation (los 
Angeles)
920,000
vanguard charitable 30,000
TOTAL $1,327,000
ALSO FUNDS: Central Fund of Israel, StandWithUs, 
Shurat HaDin, Foundation for Defense of 
Democracies, Friends of Elnet, American Friends 
of NGO Monitor, American Friends of IDF, Electric 
Infrastructure Security, Palestinian Media Watch. 
Proclaiming Justice to the Nations, REPORT PMB.
 
the 2008 event, ‘identity crisis: can european 
civilisation survive?’, was co-sponsored by the 
Middle east Forum and held in collaboration with 
the european university of rome and the lepanto 
Foundation.200 it brought together ‘over 35 
academics, journalists, political commentators 
and government leaders from around the 
world to address issues relevant to europe’s 
political, cultural and social survival’. Moderators 
included islam critics bruce bawer (these days 
a gatestone blogger) and John Marks; panelists 
were Daniel Pipes and robert spencer, and key 
anti-Muslim european activists and ideologues 
baroness caroline cox, Douglas Murray, 
Melanie Phillips, bat Ye’or and [then] Dutch MeP 
Johannes Jansen. Attendees included Philippe 
Karsenty and Marcello Pera, founder member of 
the Friends of israel initiative lobby group, and 
several academics.
More recently, the foundation’s tax filings show 
grants to Henry Jackson society of $50,000 
and gatestone institute $5,000 in 2014. the 
foundation’s most regular giving has been to David 
Horowitz ($115,000) and the American islamic 
Forum for Democracy ($110,000), which claims to 
fight ‘islamofascism’. smaller sums went to Act 
and American Freedom Alliance, which has hosted 
geert Wilders and Austria’s elizabeth sabaditsch-
Wolff. emerson funds many pro-israel groups and 
has also passed grants to unknown organisations 
via vanguard charitable.201
14. BODMAN & ACHELIS FOUNDATION: 
Contributed $320,000
the long associated and recently merged 
bodman and Achelis Foundations are big donors 
in the conservative us public policy arena, 
backing think tanks such as the council on 
Foreign relations, Atlas network and Hudson 
institute to name a few. based in new York city, 
they have combined assets of $105 million. Wall 
street investment banker george bodman and 
his wife set up their foundation in 1945; it was at 
one point headed by former ciA director William 
casey.202 the Achelis Foundation was founded 
in 1940 by elisabeth Achelis, whose father was 
president of the American Hard rubber company. 
A lesser known donor to islamophobic groups, 
the foundation unusually publishes grants on its 
website. these show that in 2016 it gave the 
Henry Jackson society $80,000 for operating 
costs, and $15,000 to gatestone institute in 
2015. controversial gatestone fellow Zuhdi 
Jasser’s American islamic Forum on Democracy 
received $25,000 in 2017 to support ‘a social 
media campaign’. the bradley Foundation’s 
encounter books received $50,000 in 2017. 
bodman also gave the Middle east Forum 
$50,000 in 2012.
in 2016, bodman notably gave the Hudson 
institute usD $75,000 via Achelis ‘to support’ its 
center on islam, Democracy and the Future of the 
Muslim World. in october 2017, Hudson hosted 
a conference focused on violent extremism, iran, 
Qatar and the Muslim brotherhood, at which 
steve bannon was a keynote speaker.203 
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BODMAN AND ACHELIS 
FOUNDATIONS
GRANTS 
2009-17
American islamic Forum for 
Democracy
25,000
American islamic congress 50,000
encounter books 50,000
Friends of the european Foundation 
for Democracy
50,000
gatestone institute 15,000
Henry Jackson society inc 80,000
Middle east Forum 50,000
TOTAL  $320,000 
ALSO FUNDS: Atlas Network, Commentary, Council 
on Foreign Relations, Hudson Institute (and its 
Center on Islam, Democracy and the Future of the 
Muslim World) , Manhattan Institute, Central Fund 
Israel (Shurat Din), Shalom Harman North America 
Institute.
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conclusions
1.  this report has documented how some counter-
jihad actors present themselves as ‘counter-
extremism’ bodies. that islamophobic groups 
borrow this moniker suggests that, as well 
as the mainstreaming of some far-right ideas, 
official counter-extremism policies, practices and 
narratives have proved amenable to the far-
right’s agenda, by providing a ‘legitimate’ cover 
for targeting Muslims. 
2.  As a result, european counter-extremism 
regimes are not only failing to prevent the growth 
of the counter-jihad strand of the far-right: their 
rhetoric and practices may in some ways be 
fostering and enabling it. there are significant 
overlaps in the underlying assumptions of 
governments and the counter-jihad movement 
about the causes of and solutions to political 
violence; at times there are practical synergies 
in their respective counter-extremism efforts 
including similar targets, symbols and language.
3.  understanding and challenging islamophobia 
today therefore requires a critical interrogation 
of both state counter-extremism practices and 
the far-right, including the symbiotic relationship 
between them. counter-extremism policies 
which place blame and suspicion collectively on 
Muslims are a major part of the problem.
4.  As state power is wielded in increasingly 
authoritarian and discriminatory ways for the 
purposes of ‘counter-extremism’, the far-right 
is also gaining power. A degree of convergence 
is taking place as the counter-jihad movement, 
with the help of allies in intellectual and political 
elites, is able to work through the state and exert 
a radicalising influence on the mainstream.
recommendations
1. Government: governments need to ask 
serious questions about the effects of their 
counter-extremism regimes. the evidence 
presented here that counter-jihad actors are using 
‘counter-extremism’ as a cover for propagating 
racism ought to prompt reflection on the extent to 
which existing policies, practices and narratives 
may be empowering this strand of the far-right. 
this report suggests that if governments wish to 
halt the rise of islamophobia, a fundamental re-
think of the ideas underpinning counter-extremism 
will be needed; this must entail interrogation 
of basic concepts and terminology, and a re-
assessment of the underlying assumptions about 
the causes of and solutions to political violence. in 
countering the twin threats of political violence and 
racism, much greater transparency is also required. 
2. Anti-racism campaigners: since counter-
extremism policies are part of the problem, 
governments cannot offer effective solutions 
to islamophobia while these remain in place. 
seeking a more balanced authoritarianism by 
calling on government to be more even-handed 
in its application of counter-extremism regimes 
may only serve to increase state power at a time 
in which the far-right is gaining political influence 
and could potentially seize power in a western 
european country for the first time in decades. 
instead of looking to governments to oppose the 
counter-jihad movement therefore, anti-racism 
campaigners should oppose it directly as well as 
campaigning against discriminatory government 
counter-extremism policies. Despite their 
limitations, legal strategies should also be pursued.
3. Researchers: More attention should be 
paid to researching the far-right counter-jihad 
movement but examining it in isolation is less 
useful since islamophobia is a mainstream 
problem, not a fringe issue. the findings here 
point to the need to understand the interactions 
between government-sanctioned counter-
extremism policies, practices and narratives and 
the activities of the counter-jihad movement – 
thus far a largely overlooked relationship. 
4. Media: Press and broadcast media should 
treat self-declared ‘counter-extremism’ bodies with 
more caution. it has been too easy, especially in 
the uK, for actors with close links to the counter-
jihad movement to target Muslims in the media 
without journalists questioning the validity of the 
claims or the motives of the messenger, in effect 
colluding with groups seeking to exclude Muslims 
from public life. instead, the press could and should 
play an important role in educating the public about 
the growing threat of the counter-jihad movement, 
highlighting its absurd islamophobic conspiracy 
theories and hateful anti-Muslim rhetoric.
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